Slayton v. City of River Rouge, Mich.
| Decision Date | 07 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-1278 |
| Parties | DOMINIQUE SLAYTON, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CITY OF RIVER ROUGE, MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants, EDWARD OTIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Before: BOGGS, WHITE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
Dominique Slayton led police on a high-speed chase through multiple jurisdictions in Wayne County, Michigan, culminating in his arrest-and, allegedly, in the unconstitutionally excessive use of force by pursuing officers. The officer who started the chase and ultimately arrested Slayton was Edward Otis of the River Rouge Police Department. Slayton then brought an excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Otis, which is the subject of the sole issue on appeal whether Otis is entitled to qualified immunity. The district court held that he was not.
Because Otis argues only that the district court erred in finding a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he violated Slayton's constitutional rights, this appeal is purely fact-based. This court therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear the case under Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), which limits us to purely legal questions in this type of appeal, and we dismiss.
The parties agree on this much:[1] At about 9:30 in the evening on January 2, 2016, Dominique Slayton was driving home with his girlfriend from a family function in Wayne County, Michigan. He suddenly swerved to avoid an unmarked black SUV driven by Officer Edward Otis of the River Rouge Police Department. Otis began to pursue Slayton and switched on his police lights; Slayton did not pull over and continued driving at a minimum of forty to fifty miles per hour. For more than ten minutes over eight miles, Slayton fled south along the Detroit River, out of River Rouge and into the downriver Michigan communities of Ecorse and Wyandotte, pursued all the while by Otis and other officers who joined the chase as Slayton entered their jurisdictions. Among these officers were Wyandotte's Benjamin Jones and Gerald Conz.
Eventually Slayton reached a marina on the Detroit River behind (coincidentally) the Wyandotte police station. By this time he was alone. He left his car and entered the water, pursued closely by police officers. The river was cold that day, and Slayton quickly reemerged, at which point two officers ordered him to get down. Slayton struggled on the ground with multiple officers, including Jones and Conz, but was eventually handcuffed. Jones and Conz were assisted in the arrest either by Otis or by other officers; accounts conflict. Slayton was then carried face down to Otis's car to be transported back to River Rouge. He arrived at the police station with injuries, including a nasal fracture, bruising, and a chipped tooth.
Apart from these bare facts, Slayton's account differs markedly from Otis's. The parties disagree on whether Slayton drove at forty or fifty miles per hour or as fast as ninety, whether Slayton tripped and fell into the river or jumped in to escape, whether he climbed out of the river under his own power or was dragged out by Jones and Conz, and even whether Slayton's girlfriend exited his vehicle before or during the chase. Most importantly, Slayton says he was kicked repeatedly after he was face down in handcuffs and identifies Otis as one of the officers who assisted Jones and Conz in the arrest. Otis denies any involvement and claims to have taken custody of Slayton after watching the river search and the arrest from afar.
During his deposition, Slayton provided a physical description of Otis-a Black, bald man in his mid-to-late thirties or early forties with a "big build"-identifying him as one of the officers nearest to him when he was being kicked, after he was in handcuffs.[2] Otis, in his deposition, testified that officers from Ecorse, Wyandotte, and River Rouge were already at the marina by the time he arrived, and that he had no involvement except to take custody.
Because on appeal from denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment we must take factual matters as stated by the district court, [3] we incorporate the district court's recitation and assessment of the facts here. See generally Slayton v. City of River Rouge, 515 F.Supp.3d 695 (E.D. Mich. 2021). The dispatch audio from the night in question independently confirms that numerous police vehicles pursued Slayton at a high rate of speed through River Rouge, Ecorse, and Wyandotte. Id. at 701. At some point during (not before) the chase, he let his girlfriend out of the car. Ibid. But the dispatch audio does not cover Slayton's arrest or his being carried to Otis's vehicle. The district court, for purposes of summary judgment, found that Slayton (1) did not resist the arresting officers after he was in handcuffs, (2) could not identify which officers committed which acts of force on him, but (3) adequately identified Otis, the officer "next to his head when he was kicked," as one of three officers around him "at the moment of the alleged constitutional violation." Id. at 703-06.
Slayton then filed a complaint in federal district court against Otis, Jones, and Conz; the Cities of River Rouge, Ecorse, and Wyandotte; and several other officers from those cities, not all of whom had been involved in the chase.[4] He alleged (against the cities) municipal liability for failure to properly train and supervise their police, and (against the individual officers) a single count of excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the close of discovery, the parties dismissed by stipulation Slayton's claims against the City of Ecorse and a number of the defendant officers. All remaining defendants then moved for summary judgment. The individual officers each asserted qualified immunity, while the cities argued that Slayton could point to no constitutional violation to support municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The district court granted summary judgment to the municipalities but denied it to the officers, concluding that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Slayton, 515 F.Supp.3d at 706-07. Specifically as to Otis, the court rejected his argument that his alleged actions were objectively reasonable and therefore that there could have been no violation, noting that through the lens of Slayton's factual allegations, "a jury could reasonably find that it was objectively unreasonable to kick or hit the Plaintiff while he was handcuffed face-down on the ground." Id. at 703. The court did not resolve one way or another whether Otis really was at Slayton's head when Slayton was kicked-it was enough that "the record facts viewed most favorably to the Plaintiff do not foreclose Plaintiff's version of events." Id. at 705.
The officer defendants had argued additionally that because Slayton could not identify which officer kicked him when, and because § 1983 liability requires each defendant to be "personally involved," they were entitled to qualified immunity.[5] Id. at 704. The district court found this argument unpersuasive. Id. at 706. The mere fact that Slayton was unable to identify which officers delivered which blows was not dispositive. See id. So long as Slayton alleged that each of the officers had engaged in some constitutional violation, and the circumstances causing him to be unable to identify them were out of his control, this court's precedents precluded a grant of qualified immunity. Id. at 705-06. The district court concluded by emphasizing that Officers Otis, Jones, and Conz had "failed to show a lack of outstanding material facts as to whether" each of them had violated Slayton's constitutional rights. Id. at 706.
Otis timely appealed. Slayton's claims against Jones and Conz were dismissed by stipulation of the parties following the decision on summary judgment, and Otis is now the sole defendant.
"Where jurisdiction is appropriate, we review de novo the denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity." Est. of Hill ex rel. Hill v. Miracle, 853 F.3d 306 312 (6th Cir. 2017). Summary judgment should be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact; that is, when the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are factual questions that should first be resolved by a jury. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). This standard, of course, requires us to "view[ ] all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[ ] 'all justifiable inferences' in his favor." Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). But we cannot reach an interlocutory appeal such as this until we assure ourselves that we have subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2001).
Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from "final decisions" of the district courts. 28 U.S.C § 1291. But "'final' . . . does not necessarily mean the last order possible." Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964). An otherwise interlocutory order may be considered final for purposes of appealability if it falls under the collateral-order doctrine, a "major characteristic" of which is this: "unless it can be reviewed before the proceedings terminate, it can never be reviewed at all." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) (alterations omitted) (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1952)). Under the collateral-order doctrine, a district court's denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable...
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