Slayton v. State

• Decision Date: 23 January 1937
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 64
• Citation: 234 Ala. 9,173 So. 645
• Parties: SLAYTON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

173 So. 645

234 Ala. 9

SLAYTON v. STATE.

6 Div. 64

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 23, 1937

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

Petition of the State of Alabama for certiorari to Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision of that court in the case of Slayton v. State, 173 So. 632, wherein a judgment convicting Frank Slayton of assault with intent to murder was reversed.

Writ granted; reversed and remanded.

A.A Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and Wm. H. Loeb, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.

Horace C. Wilkinson, of Birmingham, opposed.

BOULDIN Justice.

This is a second petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals in this cause.

On first petition we held the Court of Appeals in error in holding there was no evidence corroborative of the testimony of the accomplice as required by Code, § 5635, and remanded the cause to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. A.A. Carmichael Attorney-General (Frank Slayton v. State of Alabama) (Ala.Sup.) 173 So. 642.

On further consideration, the Court of Appeals, in an extended opinion, held there was reversible error in the refusal of a charge requested by defendant in writing; and in the admission of certain evidence.

In reviewing the extended opinion now before us, we deem it our duty, in the exercise of our constitutional function of supervising other jurisdictions, to deal with that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals which misconceives the law governing a review of the rulings of the trial court, especially the application of rule 45.

Says the Court of Appeals (173 So. 632):

"It is held in Diggs v. State, 49 Ala. 311, that the admission of irrelevant evidence is an error which will work a reversal of the judgment unless the record clearly shows that no injury could possibly have resulted. And in Jackson v. State, 52 Ala. 305, it is held that where illegal evidence has been admitted a reversal must follow unless the court can clearly see that the illegal evidence could not have prejudiced defendant, and this although the appellate court may not be able to see that injury resulted from the error. Williams v. State, 83 Ala. 16, 3 So. 616. To the same effect are Ridgell v. State, 1 Ala.App. 94, 55 So. 327, Phillips v. State, 3 Ala.App. 218, 57 So. 1033, Watson v. State, 8 Ala.App. 414, 62 So. 997, Powe v. State, 19 Ala.App. 215, 96 So. 370, 371. In the latter case it is said, 'where error is shown to have been committed by a trial court, injury is presumed, and the burden and obligation to subsequently remove and to wholly neutralize the prejudicial effect wrought by the admission, over the adversary's seasonable objection and exception of such illegal matter, is upon the party inducing the admission of such illegal matter as evidence in the cause.' Watson v. Adams, 187 Ala. 490, 65 So. 528, Ann.Cas.1916E, 565; Davis v. State, 18 Ala.App. 482, 93 So. 269; Booker v. State, 23 Ala.App. 78, 121 So. 3; Halford v. State, 24 Ala.App. 540, 137 So. 679.

"We therefore hold that Supreme Court Rule 45 does not apply and is not applicable in the instant case, and that the rulings of the court on the admission of the testimony of Joe Watts constituted error to reversal."

Rule 45 was promulgated in 1913, and first appeared in volume 175 Alabama Reports.

In Henderson v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 190 Ala. 126, 129, 67 So. 414, 415, decided in 1914, opinion by Chief Justice Anderson, it was declared: "It is no doubt true that rule 45, which is as follows: 'Hereafter no judgment will be reversed or set aside, nor new trial granted by this court or by any other court in this state, in any civil or criminal case on the ground of misdirection of the jury, the giving or refusal of special charges or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, nor for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless, in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken, or application is made, after an examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties'--was intended to obviate previous rulings as to reversing cases upon the mere presumption of injury, whenever error was shown, and makes it incumbent upon an appellant to not only show error but also that he was probably injured thereby."

By express terms the rule applies to both criminal and civil causes; includes rulings on evidence, on pleadings, and instructions to juries. No judgment will be reversed, says the rule, "unless in the opinion of the court *** after an examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties." (Italics supplied.)

We need do no more than say the construction of the rule in the Henderson Case, supra, has been followed and applied in a vast number of cases, of which we cite a few: Southern Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 229 Ala. 456, 157 So. 854;...