Sleasman v. City of Lacey
Decision Date | 08 February 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 77590-7.,77590-7. |
Citation | 159 Wn.2d 639,151 P.3d 990 |
Parties | Stephen SLEASMAN and Barbara Sleasman, husband and wife, Petitioners, v. CITY OF LACEY, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondent. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Michael G. Gusa, Kalikow & Gusa PLLC, Olympia, WA, for Petitioners.
Joseph Michael Svoboda, Attorney at Law, Lacey, WA, William Dale Kamerrer, Law Lyman Daniel Kamerrer et al, Olympia, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 We are asked to determine the meaning of "undeveloped" and "partially developed" lot as these terms were used in a Lacey ordinance. In May 2002 Stephen and Barbara Sleasman cut down trees in their backyard. City of Lacey (Lacey or city) regulates tree removal on "undeveloped" or "partially developed" property, former Lacey Municipal Code (LMC) 14.32.030(C), and fined the Sleasmans $16,861 for allegedly violating chapter 14.32 LMC. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 42-43. A reduced fine was upheld by the Court of Appeals. We reverse.
¶ 2 We hold the Lacey ordinance does not apply to the Sleasmans' property. Their property is developed because it is a lawful building site that is already suited for sale or use. It is irrelevant that the Sleasmans may further improve the property.
¶ 3 The Sleasmans live in a 1,967 square foot, single-family residence on a 12,632 square foot, or .29 acre, lot in Lacey. CP at 195 (citing Thurston County GeoData Center and Thurston County Assessor's Office). Soon after cutting down 18 trees, the Sleasmans were notified by Lacey they violated chapter 14.32 LMC by removing trees without a permit. The city hired Galen Wright, an arborist with Washington Forestry Consultants, Inc. Wright assessed the trees' "appraised value" at $16,861. CP at 42, 50.
¶ 4 The hearings examiner held the Sleasmans violated the ordinance but reduced the fine after exempting the five most expensive trees.1 The city did not object. CP at 15. The Sleasmans appealed to Thurston County Superior Court. On January 30, 2004, the trial court affirmed the hearings examiner and denied the Sleasmans' equal protection claim.2 After requesting additional briefing on the remaining claims, the trial court concluded the Sleasman property was "partially developed," and the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. The Sleasmans appealed again. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.3 Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 128 Wash.App. 617, 619, 116 P.3d 446 (2005). The Sleasmans obtained review in our court to dispute the Court of Appeals' construction of "partially developed," its deference to the city's interpretation, and to argue alternatively the ordinance is void for vagueness. Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 156 Wash.2d 1031, 134 P.3d 232 (2006). Both the Sleasmans and Lacey seek reasonable attorney fees.
¶ 5 The Court of Appeals held this ordinance was clear and unambiguous. We agree but find it unambiguously inapplicable.
¶ 6 Statutory construction is a question of law and our review is de novo. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 801, 807, 16 P.3d 583 (2001). Under Lacey's municipal code:
No person, corporation, or other legal entity shall engage in timber harvesting or cause land clearing in the city without having complied with one of the following:
A. Received a land clearing permit from the director;
B. Having obtained approval of the proposed work under the processes described in Section 14.32.050A;
C. Having received an exemption from the director under the provisions of Section 14.32.050.
LMC 14.32.040. The code defines land clearing as "direct and indirect removal of trees and/or ground cover from any undeveloped or partially developed lot, public lands or public right-of-way." Former LMC 14.32.030(C) (emphasis added). Lacey argues property is "partially developed" when additional improvements of any kind are allowed under the zoning code, asserting chapter 16.12 LMC permits the Sleasmans to build additional structures on up to 50 percent of their lot and improve 65 percent of their lot with structures, driveways, or roads. LMC 16.12.050(F), (G). The ordinance does not define undeveloped, partially developed, or developed property.
¶ 7 We interpret local ordinances the same as statutes. Kitsap County v. Mattress Outlet, 153 Wash.2d 506, 509, 104 P.3d 1280 (2005). An unambiguous ordinance will be applied by its plain meaning, State v. Villarreal, 97 Wash.App. 636, 641-42, 984 P.2d 1064 (1999), while only ambiguous ordinances will be construed. Food Servs. of Am. v. Royal Heights, Inc., 123 Wash.2d 779, 784-85, 871 P.2d 590 (1994).
¶ 8 The Lacey ordinance is unambiguous. Under the term's plain meaning, the Sleasman property is "developed."4 The Court of Appeals appropriately cited Webster's Third New International Dictionary to define the plain meaning:
Webster's Third International Dictionary defines "partial" as "of, involving, or affecting a part rather than the whole." Webster's defines the term "develop" as "to convert (as raw land) into an area suitable" for "building" or "residential or business purposes." Reading these definitions together supports the City's definition — that land is partially developed where it is converted in part to commercial, residential, or some other specific purpose.
Sleasman v. City of Lacey, No. 31775-3-II, slip op. (unpublished portion) at 18 (Wash.Ct. App. July 26, 2005). The court held that because the Sleasmans cut down 18 trees, their property was "converted" in part, and therefore only "partially developed." Id.
¶ 9 But despite accurately quoting the definitions, the Court of Appeals misapplies them. According to Webster's, one "develops" property by converting raw land into an area suitable for building or residential or business purposes. The most obvious example of "development" is the platting process where building lots are made ready for sale or use for future improvement. To be "partially" developed, property must either be an area where part is raw land that is unsuitable for building or where the area as a whole is not yet finally developed so it is not yet a lawful building site. Under the plain meaning, the Sleasman property is "developed" because it is a lawful building site ready for sale or use.
¶ 10 Lacey confuses "developed" with "improved." After land is developed it may then be improved. An improvement is generally understood as adding any structure to the land. See Verna v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 261 Conn. 102, 108-09, 801 A.2d 769 (2002) . Lacey asserts land is only developed when one can no longer improve it. But one cannot build on or improve upon a lot unless it is developed. The Sleasmans can add to their improvements only because their lot is developed as a lawful building site.
¶ 11 Our precedent also supports reading "developed property" to mean a lawful building site made suitable for sale or use. Hogue described land where "`people and their families or predecessors have had farms, small businesses and homes ... in a rural atmosphere'" as "well-developed agricultural and residential lands." Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash.2d 799, 826, 341 P.2d 171 (1959) (quoting trial court). Certainly this rural, agricultural land could be improved upon, but it was developed because no part was raw land needing further development to be made suitable for sale or improvement. Also, in B & W Construction, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 19 Wash.App. 220, 226, 577 P.2d 583 (1978), the Court of Appeals described the costs of developing land: "The price of developed lots usually includes expenses of subdivision sales and promotion, sewers, streets, utilities, and perhaps sidewalks." A developer must plat land, add sewers, streets, and utilities, etc., to convert raw land to make it suitable for final plat approval and possible improvement. In B & W Construction, the developer had not yet obtained a final plat of the land so it was then not yet suitable for building: "Although the comparable property had been engineered and platted on paper, no further steps had been taken to develop it, i.e., no utilities or roads had been laid and no lots had been staked out." Id. Hence that land was only partially developed.5
¶ 12 Lacey and the Court of Appeals both read "partially developed" so broadly it includes nearly every piece of property. Every house would be at most "partially developed" if it could be added to, altered, or if the owner is allowed to change the property's use — such as to a day care. Sleasman, No. 31775-3-II, slip op. (unpublished portion) at 20 n. 18. Because some change can always be made to improvements on property or its use, all lots under this broad reading are only "partially developed."
¶ 13 But this reading belies the plain meaning of the terms. If the city council intended the ordinance to reach all property it could have simply required a permit for undeveloped or developed land.6 Full effect must be given to the legislature's language, with no part rendered meaningless or superfluous. Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996). By limiting the ordinance to partially developed land, the city council obviously intended to exclude "developed property."
¶ 14 Although the Court of Appeals held the ordinance was plain on its face, it nonetheless gave deference to the city's construction. Ordinances with plain meanings are not subject to construction. Only ambiguous ordinances may be construed. City of Pasco v. Pub. Employment Relations...
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Table of Cases
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