Sledge v. State

• Decision Date: 05 February 2021
• Docket Number: CR-19-0529
• Citation: 332 So.3d 451
• Parties: Jarquis Daquon SLEDGE v. STATE of Alabama
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

332 So.3d 451

Jarquis Daquon SLEDGE

v.STATE of Alabama

CR-19-0529

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

February 5, 2021

Brian D. Clark, Huntsville, for appellant.

Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and Kristi O. Wilkerson, asst. att'y gen., for appellee.

McCOOL, Judge.

Jarquis Daquon Sledge appeals the Madison Circuit Court's revocation of his probation. Sledge was originally convicted of trafficking cocaine and was ordered to serve 80 months’ imprisonment. That sentence was split, and he was ordered to serve 36 months’ imprisonment followed by 5 years on probation.

Sledge's probation officer filed a delinquency report alleging that Sledge had violated his probation by committing the new offense of possessing a firearm that, by law, he was forbidden from possessing. See § 13A-11-72, Ala. Code 1975. A revocation hearing was held, during which the following evidence was presented:

Officer Tyler Storm, a police officer employed by the University of Alabama in Huntsville testified that on October 4, 2019, he was "running radar" and watching traffic on Sparkman Drive in Huntsville. Officer Storm stated that he observed a vehicle speeding excessively and clocked the vehicle as traveling 72 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone. Officer Storm testified that he made contact with the driver, who identified himself using a "non-driver ID." (R. 6.) The driver was later determined to be Sledge. Officer Storm stated that he was informed that Sledge's license had been revoked, that he then asked the passenger in the vehicle if he had a valid driver's license, and that he determined that the passenger's driver's license was valid. Officer Storm testified that, while he was talking to his supervisor, he observed Sledge lean toward the passenger side of the vehicle. Officer Storm stated that, because Sledge had no reason to be moving around the car, he asked Sledge and the passenger to step out of the vehicle. Officer Storm testified that, after Sledge and the passenger exited from the vehicle, Sledge "tried to dismiss the reason he made that movement as something trivial." (R. 8.) The officers searched the vehicle and discovered a .40-caliber handgun under the passenger seat of the vehicle. Officer Storm then detained Sledge and the passenger, and asked them whether either of them had a concealed-carry permit. According to Officer Storm, Sledge responded by stating that he did not have a concealed carry permit for the gun. Officer Storm testified that he then arrested Sledge and charged him with speeding, driving while his license was revoked, and the concealed carry of a firearm by "certain persons forbidden." (R. 9.) After Officer Storm finished testifying, the State rested its case.

Terrell Antonio Kelly testified on behalf of Sledge that the passenger in the vehicle with Sledge was Tevareous Crutcher. Kelly testified that he brought Crutcher to defense counsel's office after Sledge had been arrested and that Crutcher admitted that he owned the gun in the vehicle. According to Kelly, Crutcher was murdered a couple of weeks after he spoke to defense counsel.

The circuit court revoked Sledge's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his 80-month sentence. Sledge filed a motion to reconsider the revocation of his probation, in which he argued: (1) that the court's written revocation order failed to sufficiently set out the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking his probation and (2) that the revocation of his probation was not supported by the facts presented at the hearing. Sledge's motion to reconsider was denied by the circuit court, and Sledge appealed.

On appeal, Sledge contends that the circuit court's written revocation order was insufficient to satisfy due-process requirements. He also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the revocation of his probation.

" ‘[T]he general rules of preservation apply to probation revocation hearings,’ " and " ‘issues not presented to the trial court are waived on appeal.’ "

Attaway v. State, 854 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 728 So. 2d 673, 680 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) ). There are four exceptions to the general rule that a defendant waives for appeal issues not presented to the circuit court; those exceptions encompass allegations that the circuit court did not satisfy any of the following requirements: (1) the requirement that there be an "adequate written order of revocation"; (2) "the requirement that a revocation hearing actually be held"; (3) the requirement that the circuit court must advise a defendant of his or her right to request an attorney to represent him or her during the probation-revocation proceedings; and (4) the requirement that the circuit appoint an attorney to represent an indigent defendant during the probation-revocation proceedings. Attaway, 854 So. 2d at 1213 ; see also Mead v. State, 271 So. 3d 860, 862-63 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018).

I.

Sledge first argues that the circuit court's written revocation order did not satisfy due-process requirements. This claim falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the preservation rules. Rule 27.6(f), Ala. R. Crim. P., requires a circuit court presiding over a probation-revocation proceeding to "make a written statement or state for the record the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation." In Ex parte Garlington, 998 So. 2d 458 (Ala. 2008), our Supreme Court explained:

"In order to meet the requirements of Rule 27.6(f), as well as those of constitutional due process, it is ‘the duty of the trial court to take some affirmative action, either by a statement recorded in the transcript or by written order, to state its reasons for revoking probation, with appropriate reference to the evidence supporting those reasons.’ McCoo [v. State ], 921 So. 2d [450,] 462 [(Ala. 2005)] (emphasis added)."

998 So. 2d at 458-59.

In the present case, at the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the circuit court stated the following:

"THE COURT: Okay. This is my ruling and the way I see this: Hearsay is admissible by both sides. What weight I give to the hearsay testimony is entirely up to me as the trier of facts. In this case, having someone come in here and tell me that a dead man told him it was his gun before he died and he's no longer here doesn't carry much weight. I believe that this was this man's pistol.

"The [c]ourt is reasonably satisfied the defendant violated his probation by violating the statute for certain people possessing a firearm. His probation is revoked."

(R. 16-17.) The circuit court entered a written probation-revocation order, stating that the court was "reasonably satisfied" that Sledge had violated the rules of his probation by committing the new offense of possessing a firearm that, by law, he was forbidden from possessing. The circuit court's order stated:

"The [c]ourt relied upon the following evidence in revoking the defendant's probation:

"1. The testimony of Officer Storm, University of Alabama at Huntsville Police Department

"2. The testimony of Mr. Kelly, a friend of the defendant."

(C. 16.) Here, the circuit court, through its statement made at the conclusion of the hearing and its written order, provided a sufficient statement indicating its reasons for revoking Sledge's probation and the testimony that it relied on in making its determination. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 26 So. 3d 1263, 1266 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) ("Although ‘general recitations by the trial court to its consideration of the "testimony," "sworn testimony," or "relevant and competent evidence" presented at the revocation hearing [are] insufficient for purposes of satisfying’ due-process requirements, ... where, as here, the trial court's order specifically lists the witnesses whose testimony the trial court found credible and relied upon in revoking probation, the order adequately specifies the evidence relied upon and, therefore, satisfies Rule 27.6(f), Ala. R. Crim. P., and due process requirements."). Thus, Sledge is not entitled to relief on this claim.

II.

Next, Sledge contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the revocation of his probation. Although this claim does not fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the preservation requirement, Sledge raised this claim in the circuit court, and, thus, this claim was preserved for appellate review. Our Supreme Court has held that the evidentiary standard applicable to a probation revocation is as follows:

" ‘ "Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of, or pleading guilty to, a crime. A proceeding to revoke probation is not a criminal prosecution, and we have no statute requiring a formal trial. Upon a hearing of this character, the court is not bound by strict rules of evidence, and the alleged violation of a valid condition of probation need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." ’

" Martin v. State, 46 Ala. App. 310, 312, 241 So. 2d 339, 341 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970) (quoting State v. Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 154 S.E.2d 53 (1967) (citation omitted)). Under that standard, the trial court need ‘only to be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the probationer has violated the conditions of his probation.’ Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 103, 312 So. 2d 620, 623 (1975). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's conclusions. SeeMoore v. State, 432 So. 2d 552, 553 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), and Wright v. State, 349 So. 2d 124, 125 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977)."

Ex parte J.J.D., 778 So. 2d 240, 242 (Ala. 2000). Additionally,

" ‘[t]he weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence, where susceptible of more than one rational conclusion, are for the jury [or trier of fact] alone.’ Willcutt v. State, 284 Ala. 547, 549, 226 So. 2d 328 (1969). Conflicting evidence always presents a question for the trier of fact unless the evidence

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