Sleem v. Yale University
| Decision Date | 04 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:90CV00434.,2:90CV00434. |
| Citation | 843 F. Supp. 57 |
| Parties | Dimitri K. SLEEM, Plaintiff, v. YALE UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
David F. Meschan, Joseph Francis McNulty, Jr., Tuggle Duggins & Meschan, P.A., Greensboro, NC, for Dimitri K. Sleem.
Harrell Hugh Stevens, Jr., Everett, Gaskins, Hancock & Stevens, Raleigh, NC, for Yale University.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION*
This is a case for defamation and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Before the court are the following motions: (1) motion by Yale University for partial summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claim for defamation based on libel per se; (2) motion by Yale University for summary judgment; and (3) motion by Yale University for partial summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages and for presumed damages. For the reasons stated below the court will DENY Yale's motions.
Plaintiff Dimitri K. Sleem is a 1975 Yale alumnus. Like many universities, Yale hosts alumni class reunions at five-year intervals. Class reunion directories are also compiled. At the request of the Class of 1975, Yale's Alumni Records Office mailed questionnaires to members of the Class of 1975 during 1989. The questionnaires solicited information for a class directory to be published in connection with the 15-year class reunion scheduled for May 1990. Each questionnaire requested personal data.
On or about November 17, 1989, the Alumni Records Office received a completed questionnaire bearing Sleem's name. The questionnaire included the following "personal statement":
I have come to terms with my homosexuality and the reality of AIDS in my life. I am at peace.
This questionnaire was processed and its contents were published in the class directory entitled, "Yale 1975 — Fifteen Years Out." Copies of the reunion books were mailed to members of the class in early May 1990, including approximately 18 members of the class residing in North Carolina of which three are in Guilford County.
Sleem sued Yale for defamation in November 1990, and on July 1, 1991, amended his complaint to add a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
As of this date, Yale has not been able to determine who submitted the questionnaire.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as this court must at the summary judgment stage, Sleem has forecasted the following evidence.
The questionnaires provided to members of the Class of 1975 were prepared and mailed by the Yale Alumni Records Office. Completed questionnaires were returned to the Yale Alumni Records Office and exclusively processed there. Two editorial assistants in the Alumni Records Office read the entries.
The director of the Yale Alumni Records Office, Gail Ferris, never looked at or read the reunion books before publication. (Karoline Pollack Dep. at 12-13, McKernan Dep. at 84.) There was no policy in place and no instructions were given to the staff concerning standards to be applied with regard to editing or correcting personal comments. (Anne Pollack Dep. at 26-27.)
Ferris testified that the Alumni Records Office never changed personal comments except in the rare case of excessive length. (Ferris Dep. at 82.) There is some evidence that other types of editing have taken place. Reunion book editors in the past have been consulted for advice about particular entries that did not make sense. (McKernan Dep. at 89.) In case of anything obscene or objectionable, the reunion book editor would be contacted and the question asked: "Do you want to see it in print?" (Karoline Pollack Dep. at 9; Anne Pollack Dep. at 23-26.)
Some procedures are in place for verifying reported deaths of alumni (Corcoran Dep. at 53) and name changes. (Id. at 45.) No attempt was made to verify the statements made about Plaintiff in the personal statement bearing his name. See, e.g., Ross Dep. at 39.
The class editor of the reunion book, Nancy Ross, a member of the Class of 1975, had no day-to-day involvement in the publication of the directory. (Ross Dep. at 34.)
Yale published the entry in the directory showing an address in Kingston, Jamaica (Sleem's address while in college), even though Yale had in its files Plaintiff's address in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Yale also had Plaintiff's Fayetteville telephone number. (Jakovenko Dep. at 66.)
The questionnaire was in Yale's possession for more than five months. (Ferris Dep., Ex. 7.)
Ferris and Sleem had mutual friends that Ferris could have contacted. (Ferris Dep. at 49-54, 57-62.)
The questionnaire had a Kingston, Jamaica address, but Plaintiff was not listed among the 18 Jamaica residents in a Yale alumni directory located in the Yale Alumni Records Office. (McKernan Dep. at 94-95.)
Two staff members spent a total of 146 hours proofreading the "Yale 1975—Fifteen Years Out" reunion book. They were aware that AIDS is an infectious disease. (Ferris Dep. at 155; Anne Pollack Dep. at 56-57; Karoline Pollack Dep. at 10-11.)
No questionnaire was sent to Sleem. (Ferris Dep. at 100, 124.)
No other entry in the "Yale 1975 — Fifteen Years Out" book alleges that the individual has a sexually transmitted disease.
Summary judgment is appropriate in those cases where there exists no genuine dispute as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Of course, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Pulliam Invest. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987).
Since this is a diversity case, under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), this court must apply the substantive law of North Carolina.
Applying these principles, the court will now turn to a review of Yale's three motions.
Until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the law of defamation was almost exclusively the province of the states. Under the then prevailing common law of libel,1 all libels were actionable per se. That is, in the majority of the states, the plaintiff was required to allege and prove that the defendant made defamatory statements, of or concerning the plaintiff, which subjected the plaintiff to ridicule or contempt. Truth was an affirmative defense. No proof of fault was required, either in the form of recklessness or negligence with regard to the truth of the publication. Injury to reputation was presumed and special damages such as pecuniary loss and emotional distress could be recovered. Punitive damages were available if common law malice were shown. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2948, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985) (White, J., concurring). The reason for allowing presumed damages for reputational injury was that "in many cases the effect of defamatory statements is so subtle and indirect that it is impossible to trace the effects thereof in loss to the person defamed." Id., (quoting Restatement of Torts § 621, cmt. a, (1938)). The defendant was permitted to show that there was no reputational injury, but a plaintiff was entitled to recover at least nominal damages without special allegations or proof of damages for any defamatory publication actionable per se. Id.; see also Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 144, 84 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1954).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan began the process of "constitutionalizing" the common law of libel. That case held that a public official cannot prevail in a state defamation action by simply proving that the publication was defamatory. Damages, either presumed or actually proved, could not be recovered without a showing of "actual malice" which required the plaintiff to prove that the publication was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726. (This standard has been labelled "constitutional malice" to distinguish it from "common-law malice.")
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), this constitutional malice requirement was extended to cases involving "public figures." Later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan suggested that the constitutional malice standard should extend to any defamation case involving a "matter of public or general interest" without regard to whether the defamed party was a public official, public figure, or private individual.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the protections of New York Times did not extend as far as Rosenbloom suggested. The fact that the expression concerned a public issue did not by itself entitle the libel defendant to the constitutional protections of New York Times. However, the Court in Gertz held for the first time that a private plaintiff must prove some fault, at least negligence, to succeed on a defamation claim. The Court held that: "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id. at 346-47, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. In addition, even with proof of negligence, presumed damages were not allowed, rather actual damages had to be proven. Actual constitutional malice had to be proven before presumed damages could be awarded. Id. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 3011-12.
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