Sleeper v. Bragdon
| Decision Date | 04 March 1907 |
| Citation | 45 Wash. 562,88 P. 1036 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | SLEEPER v. BRAGDON et al. |
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Arthur E. Griffin, Judge.
Action by Minnie A. Sleeper against George W. Bragdon and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Byers & Byers, for appellant.
Richard Saxe Jones, for respondents.
This is an action to enforce specific performance of a contract concerning the sale of real estate. The defendants George W. Bragdon and wife were on July 11, 1905 the owners of the property in question, and on that day they executed with the plaintiff a written contract of the following import: The said defendants were to sell and the plaintiff was to buy the land at the price of $3,000. Eight hundred dollars was paid in cash as earnest money, and the further sum of $1,000 was to be paid on or before November 1 1905, and the additional sum of $1,200 on or before the 11th day of July, 1906, with interest upon said sums at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum. The land was to be conveyed by a good and sufficient deed when the purchase price was fully paid, or, at the option of the purchaser, on payment of the $1,000 due November 1, 1905, a deed should be given and a mortgage made to the vendor to secure the last payment of $1,200. Time was made of the essence of the contract, and it was provided that, in case of failure of the purchaser to make either of the payments, the contract should be forfeited and determined at the election of the vendor, the payment theretofore made upon the contract should be forfeited and should be retained by the vendor in satisfaction and liquidation of damages, and the vendor should have the right to re-enter and take possession. The plaintiff alleges that in pursuance of the contract, she took possession of the property, and that she has ever since remained in possession thereof; that she has performed all the conditions of the agreement which were to be performed on her part, that on or about March 26, 1906, she tendered to the vendors the sum of $1,097, together with a mortgage upon the premises to secure the remaining payment, and demanded a deed from the defendants, which was refused; that the defendants did not at any time prior to said tender elect to declare the contract forfeited, and they did not notify plaintiff of such election at any time prior to the tender. By the complaint it is sought to compel the execution of a deed to plaintiff, or, in the event the contract cannot be specifically performed, recovery of $1,000 is asked. Certain other persons were made defendants, and issues were joined as to their claims against the property in question. But the only questions material to this appeal are those between the plaintiff and the said vendors. The answer and cross-complaint of the vendors admits the execution of the contract, and that $800 was paid in July, 1905, but alleges that the plaintiff has neither paid any other sum nor performed any of the conditions in the contract set forth. It is admitted that the plaintiff took possession in July, 1905, and that she has ever since been in possession, although it is alleged that possession has often been demanded by the defendants and cross-complainants before the commencement of this action. It is alleged that in the month of November, 1905, plaintiff requested from defendants an extension of time in which to make the payment of $1,000, which by the contract was to be made on the 1st day of November; that the defendants agreed to extend the time until January 10, 1906, and notified the plaintiff that, unless the payment was made on the last-named day, the contract would be canceled on that day, and that the cross-complainants under the conditions of the said contract elected and determined to cancel the contract and forfeit the payments theretofore made on said 10th day of January, 1906, unless the plaintiff should make the $1,000 payment, with interest, before said date; that on said 10th day of January the plaintiff notified the defendants in writing of her full understanding of said agreement of extension, and again in writing asked a further extension, which the defendants refused to grant, and did not grant; that on the 24th day of February, 1906, the defendants notified the plaintiffs in writing of their election to cancel the contract. It is also alleged that a further notice in writing was given on March 24, 1906, and demand for possession made, which was refused, and that the plaintiff wrongfully and unlawfully retained possession of the property, and has so done since January 10, 1906. The defendants and cross-complainants ask that judgment shall be entered canceling said contract and awarding damages, and a writ of restitution directing possession to be given to the defendants and cross-complainants. The cause was tried by the court without a jury, resulting in a judgment that the contract be...
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In re McDaniel
...on the existence of the forfeiture clause and the seller's right by his sole action to cancel the purchaser's rights. Sleeper v. Bragdon, 45 Wash. 562, 88 P. 1036 (1907). The existence of such unfettered authority did not give rise to a property interest but created a mere contract right. T......
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...15 Idaho 379, 98 P. 616; Rischar v. Shields, 26 Idaho 616, 145 P. 294; Papesh v. Wagnon, 29 Idaho 93, 157 P. 775; Sleeper v. Bragdon, 45 Wash. 562, 563, 88 P. 1036.) It not enough that the plaintiff believed the title of the defendants was defective, or that it was in fact clouded; there wa......
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In re Gunning
...782); and that the vendor, by giving notice of forfeiture, may terminate the rights of the vendees under the contract. Sleeper v. Bragdon, 45 Wash. 562, 88 P. 1036; Bedtelyon v. Otis Orchards Co., 106 Wash. 151, 179 P. It is also admitted that, under the laws of the State of Washington, whe......
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True v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.
... ... This provision was valid ... and binding on the parties. Reddish v. Smith, 10 ... Wash. 178, 38 P. 1003, 45 Am. St. 781; Sleeper v ... Bragdon, 45 Wash. 562, 88 P. 1036; Grant v ... Munch, 54 Minn. 111, 55 N.W. 902. It follows that, if ... the contracts were lawfully ... ...
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Real Estate Contracts and the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion in Washington: Dispelling the Ashford Cloud
...50. See infra text accompanying notes 58-59, 64-67. 51. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code chs. 61.12, 61.24 (1981). 52. E.g., Sleeper v. Bragdon, 45 Wash. 562, 88 P. 1036 (1907). A seller need only declare her intention to forfeit, send proper notice if notice is required by the contract, and the forfe......