Slepicka v. Ill. Dep't of Pub. Health

• Citation: 21 N.E.3d 368
• Decision Date: 18 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 116927.,116927.
• Parties: Mary SLEPICKA, Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

21 N.E.3d 368

Mary SLEPICKA, Appellant

v.The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, et al., Appellees.

No. 116927.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 18, 2014.

Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing Nov. 24, 2014.

Duane D. Young, of LaBarre, Young & Behnke, of Springfield, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and John P. Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Department of Public Health.

Nicholas J. Lynn and Amy E. McCracken, of Duane Morris LLP, of Chicago, for appellee Holy Family Villa.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The Illinois Department of Public Health (Department) determined that Mary Slepicka was subject to involuntary transfer or discharge from Holy Family Villa, the nursing home in which she resided. Slepicka sought administrative review of the Department's decision in the circuit court of Sangamon County. Holy Family Villa moved to dismiss or transfer the action because it had not been filed in the proper venue, as set forth in section 3–104 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–104 (West 2012) ). The circuit court denied Holy Family Villa's motion and confirmed the Department's decision.

¶ 2 Slepicka appealed, and Holy Family Villa argued, in part, that the appeal should be dismissed because Slepicka's failure to file the administrative review action in a proper forum deprived the circuit court and the appellate court of jurisdiction to review the Department's decision. Finding that the circuit court had jurisdiction but that venue was improper, the appellate court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the cause with the direction that it be transferred to the circuit court of Cook County for review of the Department's decision. 2013 IL App (4th) 121103, 374 Ill.Dec. 540, 995 N.E.2d 1037. This court allowed Slepicka's petition for leave to appeal (Ill.S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. July 1, 2013)), and Holy Family Villa and the Department seek cross-relief (Ill.S.Ct. R. 318(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the cause to the appellate court for review of the Department's decision.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Mary Slepicka is a resident of Holy Family Villa, a skilled nursing facility in Palos Park, Illinois, which is in Cook County. On January 24, 2012, Holy Family Villa sent Slepicka a notice of involuntary transfer or discharge based on her alleged failure to pay for her stay at the facility. The notice advised Slepicka of her right to request a hearing before the Department within 10 days of receiving the notice, and a timely request for hearing was made on Slepicka's behalf.

¶ 5 On May 24, 2012, an administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Department presided over a hearing, which was conducted at Holy Family Villa. After the hearing, the Department's Assistant Director issued a final order approving the involuntary transfer or discharge of Slepicka unless the sums owed by her were paid in full.¹ The final order was mailed to the parties and their representatives from a post office in Springfield, which is in Sangamon County.

¶ 6 Slepicka timely filed a complaint for administrative review of the Department's decision in the circuit court of Sangamon County. Holy Family Villa filed a motion to dismiss or transfer the action, contending that Cook County was the only proper venue under section 3–104 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–104 (West 2012) ). Slepicka opposed Holy Family Villa's motion, asserting that Sangamon County was a proper venue because the Department issued its final order from Springfield. The circuit court ruled that Sangamon County was a proper venue and denied Holy Family Villa's motion, but upheld the Department's final order allowing the involuntary discharge.

¶ 7 Slepicka appealed. Holy Family Villa argued that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the administrative review action had been filed in an improper venue. The appellate court held that Sangamon County was not a proper venue under section 3–104 of the Administrative Review Law, but rejected Holy Family Villa's argument that filing the action in an improper venue constituted a jurisdictional defect. 2013 IL App (4th) 121103, ¶¶ 23–26, 29–31, 374 Ill.Dec. 540, 995 N.E.2d 1037.² The appellate court did not decide the merits of the appeal, but vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded with directions to transfer the cause to the circuit court of Cook County for review of the Department's decision. Id. ¶ 42. This appeal followed.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 Before this court, Slepicka challenges the appellate court's judgment that Sangamon County was not a proper venue in which to file her administrative review action. Holy Family Villa seeks cross-relief, contending that the appellate court erred in holding that the circuit court of Sangamon County had jurisdiction to review the Department's decision, despite the fact that venue was improper. The Department also seeks cross-relief, arguing that the appellate court ruled correctly on the issues of venue and jurisdiction, but erred in vacating the circuit court's judgment and remanding with directions that it be transferred to the circuit court of Cook County for review of the Department's decision.

¶ 10 Generally, we consider issues relating to jurisdiction first. In this case, the question of whether the circuit court had jurisdiction is predicated on the assertion that venue was improper. Accordingly, we initially consider whether Sangamon County was a proper venue for Slepicka's action.

¶ 11 Proper Venue

¶ 12 The Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–101 to 3–113 (West 2012)) applies to and governs every action for judicial review of a final administrative decision where its provisions are expressly adopted by the statute creating or conferring power on the agency. 735 ILCS 5/3–102 (West 2012). The Nursing Home Care Act provides that “[a]ll final administrative decisions of the Department under this Act are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Review Law.” 210 ILCS 45/3–320 (West 2012) ; see also 210 ILCS 45/3–713(a) (West 2012) (providing that actions to review final administrative decisions after a hearing are governed by the Administrative Review Law and must be filed within 15 days after receipt of the final agency determination). Therefore, an action seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Department to approve or disapprove an involuntary transfer or discharge is governed by the Administrative Review Law.

¶ 13 As noted above, the appellate court held that venue was improper because Sangamon County was not a permissible venue under the terms of section 3–104 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–104 (West 2012) ). Because resolution of this issue presents a question of law involving statutory construction, our review is de novo. Nelson v. Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 22, 381 Ill.Dec. 484, 10 N.E.3d 893.

¶ 14 Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. ¶ 23. The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, which must be given its plain, ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Id. Each word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable construction, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago,

2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15, 357 Ill.Dec. 520, 963 N.E.2d 918. In determining the meaning of a statute, a court will not read language in isolation, but must consider it in the context of the entire statute. In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill.2d 332, 343, 280 Ill.Dec. 695, 802 N.E.2d 1216 (2003). Clear and unambiguous language will be enforced as written. In re Karavidas, 2013 IL 115767, ¶ 109, 376 Ill.Dec. 413, 999 N.E.2d 296. “ ‘Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context.’ ” Italia Foods, Inc. v. Sun Tours, Inc., 2011 IL 110350, ¶ 17, 369 Ill.Dec. 106, 986 N.E.2d 55 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) ). If a statutory term has multiple dictionary definitions, each of which would make some sense in the statute, it is ambiguous and is open to interpretation. Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill.2d 1, 11, 335 Ill.Dec. 581, 919 N.E.2d 300 (2009) ; see also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418, 112 S.Ct. 1394, 118 L.Ed.2d 52 (1992).

¶ 15 In addition, a court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15, 357 Ill.Dec. 520, 963 N.E.2d 918. Moreover, courts will presume that the legislature did not intend to enact a statute that leads to absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill.2d 414, 422, 269 Ill.Dec. 452, 781 N.E.2d 249 (2002).

¶ 16 Section 3–104 of the Administrative Review Law provides as follows:

“§ 3–104. Jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction to review final administrative decisions is vested in the Circuit Courts, except as to a final order of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board in which case jurisdiction to review a final order is vested in the Appellate Court of a judicial district in which the Board maintains an office. If the venue of the action to review a final administrative decision is expressly prescribed in the particular statute under authority of which the decision was made, such venue shall control, but if the venue is not so prescribed, an action to review a final administrative decision may be commenced in the Circuit Court of any county in which (1) any part of the hearing or proceeding culminating in the decision

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