Sleyster v. Eugene Donzelot & Son

• Decision Date: 11 March 1930
• Parties: MRS. WILLIAM G. (EMMA ROSE) SLEYSTER, RESPONDENT, v. EUGENE DONZELOT & SON AND UNION INDEMNITY COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANTS. [*]
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

25 S.W.2d 147

223 Mo.App. 1166

MRS. WILLIAM G. (EMMA ROSE) SLEYSTER, RESPONDENT, v. EUGENE DONZELOT & SON AND UNION INDEMNITY COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANTS. ^[*]

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis

March 11, 1930

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.--Hon. George E. Mix, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Judgment affirmed.

Leahy Saunders & Walther for appellants.

(1) In construing a statute the intent of the Legislature in enacting it, when ascertainable in the light of the end sought to be obtained, must control: State ex rel Tadlock v. Mooneyham, 212 Mo.App. 573; State ex rel Consolidated School District v. Hackman, 302 Mo. 558; Kerens v. The St. Louis Union Trust Co., 283 Mo. 601; City of St. Louis v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 162 Mo. 720. (2) A reasonable construction should be given. State ex rel. Major v. Williams, 222 Mo. 268; Gist v. Construction Co., 224 Mo. 369; DePaige v. Douglas, 234 Mo. 78. (3) If the meaning is not clear, the reason and sense of it will control in determining its meaning rather than its literal reading. Dahlin v. Commission for the Blind, 262 S.W. 420; Stack v. Baking Company, 283 Mo. 410-411. (4) The purpose or intent of the whole act controls a definite purpose and all clauses and sections should be construed so as to harmonize with the subject-matter and general purpose. In re Rutter v. Corrothers, 223 Mo. 643; Spurlock v. Wallace, 204 Mo.App. 674, 678; Sanders v. Kansas City, 175 Mo.App. 367, 373; Hegberg v. Railroad, 164 Mo.App. 514; In re Kohlsaat v. Murphy, 96 U.S. 153, 24 L.Ed. 844. (5) Other sections of an act in pari materia should be looked to in arriving at the true meaning of a statute. Rutter v. Corrothers, 223 Mo. 643; State ex rel. Jones v. Howe Scale, 182 Mo.App. 658; State ex rel. McClanahan v. Dewitt, 160 Mo.App. 304; Gantt v. Brown, 238 Mo. 560. (6) The meaning must be given to a statute which is most consonant with its policy or obvious purpose. State v. Robinson, 163 Mo.App. 221.

Sears Lehmann for respondent.

HAID, P. J. Becker and Nipper, JJ., concur.

OPINION

HAID, P. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment approving and confirming an award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. The appeal was granted to the Supreme Court but that court finding that jurisdiction of the appeal was in this court (20 S.W.2d 69) transferred the cause here. The facts, which are not in dispute, are well stated in the brief of appellant, as follows:

William G. Sleyster, age sixty years, died on the 25th day of January, 1927, as a result of accidental injuries suffered while in the course of his employment at the place of his employer, Eugene Donzelot & Son, No. 16 South First street, St. Louis, Missouri. At the time of his death and for more than a year prior to that time, deceased had been an employee of the employer at a weekly wage of fifty-seven dollars and sixty-nine cents ($ 57.69) per week, or three thousand ($ 3000) dollars per year. The said deceased left surviving him Mrs. William G. (Emma) Sleyster, respondent herein, his lawful wife, who was his sole and only dependent. Both employer and deceased at the time of sustaining injuries and at the time of his death were bound by the provisions of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act of 1925.

Following the death of said deceased, the report of accident and notice of disagreement and request for hearing were given the Commission, the disagreement arising out of the total amount of the award to be made in the case for compensation due the claimant, by reason of the death of said William G. Sleyster. Respondent contends that she is entitled to total award of eleven thousand five hundred dollars ($ 11,500) plus medical expense and funeral benefits, the figure above mentioned being based on two-thirds of the average weekly wage of the deceased for the period of three hundred (300) weeks. The employer and insurer contend that the amount of the award should be six thousand ($ 6000) dollars, plus medical and burial benefits provided by the act. The sum of six thousand ($ 6000) dollars represents a maximum weekly compensation of twenty ($ 20) dollars for a period of three hundred (300) weeks.

The controversy relates to the construction of section 21 of our Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws of 1927, p. 502) which, so far as it involves the question here, is as follows:

"Sec. 21. If the injury causes death, either with or without disability, the compensation therefor shall be as provided in this section. . . .

(b) The employer shall also pay to the total dependents of the employee a single total death benefit, the amount of which shall be determined in the following manner to-wit: "There shall first be determined as a basis for computation 66 2/3 per cent of the employee's average weekly earnings during the year immediately preceding the injury as provided in section 22 and such amount shall then be multiplied by three hundred and the amount so determined shall be the amount of such death benefit. The death benefit provided for shall be payable in installments in the same manner that compensation is required to be paid under this act, but in no case less than at the rate of six dollars per week nor more than twenty dollars per week. There shall, however, be deducted from such death benefit any compensation which may have been paid to the employee during his lifetime for the injury resulting in his death."

Counsel for appellant call attention to various sections of the act which they contend support their construction as follows:

Section 7(b) of the act provides that, "'Death' when mentioned as a basis for the right to compensation means only death resulting from such violence and its resultant effects occurring within three hundred weeks after the accident," and appellant asserts that this section shows the intent of the Legislature to limit the payment of compensation in death cases to that period of time.

"Sec. 13(d). No compensation shall be payable for the death or disability of an employee, if and in so far as the same may be caused, continued or aggravated by an unreasonable refusal to submit to any medical or surgical treatment or operation, the risk of which is, in the opinion of the commission, inconsiderable in view of the seriousness of the injury. If the employee dies as a result of an operation made necessary by the injury, such death shall be deemed to be caused by the injury."

"Sec. 14(b). Compensation shall be payable as the wages were paid prior to the injury, but in any event at least once every two weeks. Each installment shall bear interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date when due until paid. Compensation shall be payable on the basis of 66 2/3 per cent of the average earnings of the employee computed in accordance with the rules given in section 22 of this act, but in no case shall the compensation exceed twenty dollars a week."

"Sec. 20. The death of the injured employee shall not affect the liability of the employer to furnish compensation as in this act provided, so far as such liability has accrued and become payable at the time of the death, and any accrued and unpaid compensation due the employee shall be paid to his dependents without administration, or if there be no dependents, to his personal representative or other persons entitled thereto, but such death shall be deemed to be the termination of the disability. Where an employee is entitled to compensation under this act for an injury received and death ensues for any cause not resulting from the injury for which he was entitled to compensation, payments of the unpaid unaccrued balance for such injury shall cease and all liability therefor shall terminate unless there be surviving dependents at the time of such death."

"Sec. 21(e). All death benefits provided for in this act shall be paid in installments in the same manner as provided for disability compensation."

And that portion of section 48 relating to the...