Slezak v. Stewart's Shops Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 November 2015
• Citation: 133 A.D.3d 1179,20 N.Y.S.3d 704
• Parties: Jane SLEZAK, as Executor of the Estate of Cecelia Slezak, Deceased, et al., Respondents, v. STEWART'S SHOPS CORP., Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

133 A.D.3d 1179

20 N.Y.S.3d 704

Jane SLEZAK, as Executor of the Estate of Cecelia Slezak, Deceased, et al., Respondents,

v.STEWART'S SHOPS CORP., Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Nov. 25, 2015.

Towne, Ryan & Partners, PC, Saratoga Springs (Susan F. Bartkowski of counsel), for appellant.

Robert J. Krzys, Amsterdam, for respondents.

Before: McCARTHY, J.P., EGAN JR., LYNCH and DEVINE, JJ.

McCARTHY, J.P.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (J. Sise, J.), entered October 28, 2014 in Montgomery County, which denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking rescission in connection with their sale of two parcels of real property to defendant. The terms of the sale were set forth in two agreements between the parties, an option agreement and an escrow agreement, both of which contained provisions related to holding funds in relationship to a potential need for environmental remediation of the real property. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that it failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211[a][7] ), was precluded by documentary evidence (see CPLR 3211[a][1] ) and was barred by the defense of payment (see CPLR 3211[a][5] ). Supreme Court denied the motion, and defendant now appeals.

Initially, we conclude that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action, although not one for the equitable relief that they seek. The resolution of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action requires that we "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 [1994] ; accord Zito v. New York City Off. of Payroll Admin., 130 A.D.3d 1326, 1328, 15 N.Y.S.3d 245 [2015] ). Liberally construed, plaintiffs' complaint alleges that defendant, as a result of depleting the escrow fund, failed to pay them the contractually required purchase price for the properties, and that, therefore, they should be entitled to such properties and any improvements made to them. These allegations of failure to pay pursuant to the terms of a valid contract—or valid contracts—are sufficient to establish a cause of action for breach of contract (see generally U.W. Marx, Inc. v. Koko Contr., Inc.,

124 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 2 N.Y.S.3d 276 [2015], lv. denied, 25 N.Y.3d 904, 2015 WL 1526546 [2015] ; Marshall v. Alaliewie, 304 A.D.2d 1026, 1027, 756 N.Y.S.2d 914 [2003] ). Nonetheless, because these allegations of damages in the form of nonpayment would be entirely remedied by any successful breach of contract claim, the equitable relief of rescission is unavailable; rescission can only be invoked "when there is lacking complete and adequate remedy at law and where the status quo may be substantially restored" (Rudman v. Cowles Communications, 30 N.Y.2d 1, 13, 330 N.Y.S.2d 33, 280 N.E.2d 867 [1972] [italics omitted]; see Marshall v. Alaliewie, 304 A.D.2d at 1027, 756 N.Y.S.2d 914 ).

Plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of contract survives defendant's remaining contentions. If documentary evidence contains a relevant ambiguity, such evidence cannot justify the dismissal of a cause of action (see Weston v. Cornell Univ., 56 A.D.3d 1074, 1075, 868 N.Y.S.2d 364 [2008] ; Mendelovitz v. Cohen, 37 A.D.3d 670, 671, 830 N.Y.S.2d 577 [2007] ). Although the two agreements that defendant submitted contain provisions regarding environmental remediation, neither contains clauses adequately specifying the circumstances in which use of the escrow funds for environmental remediation was proper. Accordingly, the documentary evidence does not utterly establish that defendant's environmental remediation expenditures were justified by the relevant contracts (see Weston v. Cornell Univ., 56 A.D.3d at 1075–1076, 868 N.Y.S.2d 364 ; Mendelovitz v. Cohen, 37 A.D.3d at 680–671, 830 N.Y.S.2d 577).

Further, given that the adequacy of defendant's payment is entirely based on the appropriateness of the environmental remediation expenditures, the same ambiguity prevents defendant from establishing the defense of payment as a matter of law (compare Parkoff v. Stavsky, 109 A.D.3d 646, 648, 970 N.Y.S.2d 817 [2014], lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 864, 2014 WL 1281932 [2014] ). Finally, defendant's proof of...