Slider v. Brown Shoe Co.
| Decision Date | 13 December 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 7593,7593 |
| Citation | 308 S.W.2d 306 |
| Parties | Rachel June SLIDER, Employee, Respondent, v. BROWN SHOE COMPANY, a Corporation, Employer, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Renderer, Nolde & Kleinschmidt, St. Louis, for appellant.
Ford & Ford, Kennett, for respondent.
In this proceeding under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Law, Brown Shoe Company (the employer) appeals from the judgment of the circuit court affirming the final award of the Industrial Commission of Missouri dated January 12, 1956, which awarded to Rachel June Slider (the claimant) compensation in the aggregate sum of $1,806.84 for temporary total disability from March 22, 1954 (the date of accident), to September 1, 1955, and directed payment by the employer of $747.59 for necessary medical aid not furnished by it. On this appeal, the employer frankly concedes that the record 'reasonably supports the findings of the Industrial Commission that (claimant) sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment * * * on March 22, 1954, and that (claimant) was unable to work from the date of accident until September 1, 1955,' and the primary and determinative issue is 'whether the evidence reasonably established a causal connection between the accident and the disability.'
We emphasize at the outset that, although we are authorized to determine whether, upon the entire record, the Industrial Commission reasonably could have made the findings and award under consideration, this does not mean that we may substitute our judgment on the evidence for that of the Commission. On the contrary, we may set aside the findings and award of the Commission only if they are clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, when the evidence in its entirety, including all legitimate inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, is viewed in the light most favorable to such findings and award. Hance v. Johnson, Stephens & Shinkle Shoe Co., Mo.App., 306 S.W.2d 80, 83(5-7), and cases there cited. Our statement of facts gives appropriate and required recognition to that guiding principle. Davis v. McKinney, Mo.App., 303 S.W.2d 189, 190.
About 7:45 A.M. on Monday, March 22, 1954, while working in a standing position at her regular job of spraying shoes in the employer's plant at Caruthersville, Missouri, claimant (then twenty-nine years of age) slipped and started to fall backward. By grasping with her right hand a vertical bar bolted to the machine in front of her, claimant avoided falling to the floor; but, 'when I (claimant) grabbed this bar it threw me around and my (right) side hit and threw my back in the case,' a shoulderhigh steel rack holding thirty-six pairs of shoes. She had immediate pain in her back and hips, within a few minutes reported the accident, and shortly thereafter was driven to her home by a fellow-employee. That same afternoon, claimant 'got to hurting so bad' with severe pain in her back and legs that a neighbor conveyed her to the office of Dr. W. M. Lamb, who promptly administered 'a double shot or hypo and took (claimant) to the hospital' at Hayti, Missouri.
Claimant said that her right hip, 'about halfway to the knee on the right side,' was bruised as a result of the accident. Her husband also saw the hip bruise, and Dr. Lamb remembered that claimant 'had ecchymosis on the right hip and the right leg but (it) did not amount to anything.' While in the hospital at Hayti from March 22 to 28, 1954, claimant complained of severe back pain radiating into her right leg, pain in her neck and right arm, and 'disuse or tingling in the right arm.' X-ray examination was negative, but physical examination revealed acute muscle spasm of the back muscles and neck muscles. Having 'used about everything we could think of to try to alleviate the pain' but being unable to 'get any relief for her' or to 'explain the reason for disuse or tingling in the right arm,' Dr. Lamb arranged for claimant to be transported by ambulance to the Missouri Pacific Hospital in St. Louis, where she was examined by Dr. Royal A. Weir, the employer's medical director, and Dr. George L. Hawkins, Jr., a neurosurgeon. Dr. Weir's examination of claimant's back 'revealed tenderness on pressure over the lumbosacral region' but 'no apparent (muscle) spasm.' Neither Dr. Weir nor Dr. Hawkins made 'any objective findings of pathology' and both thought that (as stated in Dr. Weir's language) she 'had a great amount of functional overlay which was in a great degree responsible for her complaints.' By functional overlay or functional disability, the witnesses meant disability 'which is a result of mental processes but not of injury to the nervous system'--disability resulting from an unstable nervous system or 'psychic response such as hysteria' and manifesting itself in 'complaints or findings that are not explainable on any organic basis.'
According to Dr. Weir, claimant was 'symptom free' when discharged from Missouri Pacific Hospital on April 2, 1954. However, claimant said that 'at the time I was dismissed I was in pain and could not straighten up,' and that, when she reached Caruthersville on the return trip by bus, 'the bus driver * * * found me a taxi to go home because I was not able to go home.' Having received no report from Drs. Weir and Hawkins and having concluded that they 'apparently had not relieved (claimant) from her complaints,' Dr. Lamb of Caruthersville referred claimant to Dr. Bland Cannon, a neurosurgeon, and Dr. Marcus Stewart, 'a back specialist,' at Memphis. Although neither Dr. Cannon nor Dr. Stewart testified in the instant case, we learn from claimant that, while confined in the Baptist Hospital at Memphis for about two and one-half weeks during April, 1954, she was in traction for ten days, was given heat therapy, and was fitted with a back brace which she subsequently wore for about four and one-half months. Claimant's description of her condition upon her return from Memphis was that 'I could not still get around very well, walk, and the doctor told me to do walking but not to do work, stooping or squatting down or anything like that, and I still suffered with my back.' Claimant thereafter 'improved under conservative treatment and therapy'; but, the improvement 'was very short-lived' and in July or August, 1954, she was sent to Drs. Cannon and Stewart again. Claimant consulted these Memphis specialists three or four times during 1954 (on dates not fixed in the record) and remained under the constant medical care of Dr. Lamb through 1954 and 1955.
Apparently pursuant to arrangement by the employer, claimant was confined in Barnes Hospital at St. Louis from August 3 to September 1, 1955, where she was examined by Dr. E. H. Parsons, a neuropsychiatrist, and by several consultants. None of these examiners found any evidence of trauma or injury, and all agreed that (as Dr. Parsons stated it) claimant was 'a very insecure, anxious young woman' with a crippled child, severe emotional burdens, and 'real but non-traumatic problems,' whose 'variable and fluctuating series of subjective complaints' had a 'functional background,' i. e., resulted from 'a severe anxiety reaction without any organic physical change.' In short, claimant's difficulties were said to have been psychological and not traumatic, although Dr. Parsons emphasized that 'this girl (claimant) is not malingering.' When discharged from Barnes Hospital on September 1, 1955, claimant was reported by Dr. Parsons to have been in excellent condition and able to return to her regular work; and, as we have noted, compensation was awarded for temporary total disability to that date.
Testimony was taken at three hearings, to-wit, before the referee on November 18, 1954, and January 25, 1955, and before the Industrial Commission on December 13, 1955. At the first hearing, claimant said that 'there is a continuous pain in my back at all times, sometimes it is worse than other times,' and that 'at times I think I am improved, at times I think I am not because my back bothers me--about the time I think I am feeling all right, my back gets me back down'; and, at the last hearing, claimant's description of her then condition was couched in similar language. We note also claimant's positive testimony that 'I chopped and picked cotton every fall and every summer until I was married and even after I was married,' and that, prior to the accident on March 22, 1954, she had...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection
...Anderson Air Activities, 319 S.W.2d 61 (Mo.App.1958); Anderson v. Pickwick Hotel, Inc., 313 S.W.2d 39 (Mo.App.1958); Slider v. Brown Shoe Co., 308 S.W.2d 306 (Mo.App.1957); Blair v. Armour & Co., 306 S.W.2d 84 (Mo.App.1957); Hance v. Johnson, Stephens & Shinkle Shoe Co., 306 S.W.2d 80 (Mo.A......
-
Heaton v. Ferrell
...cases there collected. Our statement of facts accords appropriate and required recognition to that guiding principle. Slider v. Brown Shoe Co., Mo.App., 308 S.W.2d 306, 307; Davis v. McKinney, Mo.App., 303 S.W.2d 189, About 12:15 P.M. on December 1, 1956, Heaton pumped (so he said) fifty ga......
-
Lathrop v. Tobin-Hamilton Shoe Mfg. Co.
...130 S.W.2d 187, 192(11).11 Cotton, supra note 7, 392 S.W.2d at 434; Davis v. Brezner, Mo.App., 380 S.W.2d 523, 529; Slider v. Brown Shoe Co., Mo.App., 308 S.W.2d 306, 310(6); Blair v. Armour & Co., Mo.App., 306 S.W.2d 84, 89.12 Williams, supra note 8, 332 S.W.2d at 299--300; Johnson v. Simp......
-
Cotton v. Voss Truck Lines, Inc.
...conclusion might have been if we had heard the evidence originally. Davis v. Brezner, Mo.App., 380 S.W.2d 523, 529; Slider v. Brown Shoe Co., Mo.App., 308 S.W.2d 306, 310(6); Blair v. Armour & Co., Mo.App., 306 S.W.2d 84, 89. Suffice it to say that, as we already have indicated, our opinion......