Sligo Furnace Co. v. Kieffer

• Decision Date: 05 March 1921
• Docket Number: No. 21795.,21795.
• Citation: 229 S.W. 188
• Parties: SLIGO FURNACE CO. v. KIEFFER et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

229 S.W. 188

SLIGO FURNACE CO. v. KIEFFER et al.

No. 21795.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

March 5, 1921.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Iron County; E. M. Dearing, Judge.

Suit by the Sligo Furnace Company against Augustus R. Kieffer and others. Judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This suit was begun in the circuit court of Iron county by the plaintiff, against the defendants to ascertain and determine title to the following described real estate:

"The east part of the south half of section ten, township thirty-four, range one west."

S. O. Smalley was the record owner of the land in question, and that he was the common source of title. The plaintiff claims under a tax deed executed under a sale for taxes had under a judgment of the circuit court of Iron county, wherein the property was described as previously stated. Service was by publication.

Edgar & Edgar, of Ironton, and Watts, Gentry & Lee, of St. Louis, for appellant. Arthur T. Brewster and Sam M. Brewster, both of Ironton, for respondents.

WOODSON, P. J.

The only question presented for determination is, Was the description of the land as before described sufficient to give the circuit court jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the case? We think not.

This court in the case of Winningham v. Trueblood, 149 Mo. 584, 51 S. W. 402, said:

"But the order of publication is not valid because it misdescribes the land in, suit, giving it as the east half of the northwest quarter and the west of the northwest quarter, section 8, township 30, range 14. This is a fital defect, so far as concerns John R. Winningham. On this topic: Fagg, J., aptly remarks: `The true meaning of the statute in such cases is that it [the publication] shall go to the extent of a substantial statement of all the objects of the suit.' Bobb v. Woodward, 42 Mo. 482. at is impossible that the publication should do this, unless it properly describes the property in litigation. * * * Now, if you are required to state `the object and general nature of the petition,' how is it possible to do this unless you describe the land to be affected by the contemplated judgment or decree? Would it be seriously contended that a decree would be valid which should result from an order of publication `stating briefly the object and general nature of the petition' to be to obtain the enforcement of a vendor's lien on land, without describing the subject-matter of the suit? This question furnishes its own negative answer. In the second place, even if the statute should in terms deny the necessity of notice or be silent on the subject, the law in the later case would imply that notice must be given, as has so often been decided by this and other courts."

Also in the case of Western v. Flanagan, 120 Mo. loc. cit. 64, 25 S. W. 531, 532, the description of the land in the register's deed was:

"Two (2) acres in the northwest quarter of section six (6), township forty-nine (49), range thirty-three (33) the property of Hester Lucas."

And the court said:

"It does not contain a description of the premises sued...