Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Martin

• Citation: 417 So.2d 199
• Parties: SLIMFOLD MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. Joyce A. MARTIN. Civ. 2710.
• Decision Date: 09 December 1981
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 199

417 So.2d 199

SLIMFOLD MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. Joyce A. MARTIN.

Civ. 2710.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 9, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 29, 1981.

Lyman H. Harris and Judy C. Whalen of Lorant, Harris & Yearout, Birmingham, for appellant.

Jere C. Segrest of Hardwick, Hause & Segrest, Dothan, for appellee.

HOLMES, Judge.

This is a workmen's compensation case.

Pelham A. Martin, an employee of Slimfold Manufacturing Company, died as a result of an injury which occurred at his place of employment. Joyce A. Martin, Martin's widow and appellee, brought this action to recover benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Alabama. The learned trial judge, after an ore tenus hearing, concluded that Martin's death was compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act and awarded benefits to Mrs. Martin accordingly. Slimfold Manufacturing Company appeals from this judgment contending generally that Martin's death was not a compensable claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the trial court committed reversible error in holding that the death was compensable.

The record reflects that Martin had been employed at Slimfold Manufacturing Company since July, 1978. On the afternoon of February 20, 1980, Martin attended a safety meeting at Slimfold. Upon leaving the meeting, Martin walked to another room and engaged in casual conversation while waiting to use the copy machine. While there he fell and struck his head on the floor.

After calling paramedics, Martin was transported to Southeast Alabama Medical Center. He was subsequently diagnosed as having a massive right subdural hematoma. This condition was surgically treated. However, Martin died on March 11, 1980, of acute cardiopulmonary failure secondary to intracranial pressure which was caused by the subdural hematoma.

The evidence offered to explain Martin's fall was inconclusive. None of Martin's co-workers witnessed him fall. Martin himself, who regained consciousness sometime after the fall, could offer no explanation for the incident. Appellant-Slimfold offered much evidence to indicate that Martin's fall was due to a fainting spell caused by his condition of cirrhosis of the liver. A doctor, however, testifying through deposition, stated that Martin's memory of the event after the fall would be compatible with a slip and fall.

The trial court found that the cause of the fall was not clearly determined. The court concluded, however, that the fall itself met the definitional requirement for "accident" as set out in the Workmen's Compensation Act.

On appellate review, a workmen's compensation judgment must be affirmed if there is any legal evidence to support the finding of fact by the trial judge and if the correct law was applied to such facts. City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 701, 318 So.2d 729 (1975). As indicated above, there is evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the cause of the fall was unexplained. Consequently, this court is bound by that finding. The issue remains, however, as to whether the correct law was applied.

This court has never been confronted with the issue of the compensability of unexplained falls. We note at the outset, however, that in order for an accident or death to be compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the following two requirements must be met: (1) the accident or death must arise out of the employment and (2) the accident or death must occur in the course of employment. McKnight v. Consolidated Concrete Co., 279 Ala. 430, 186 So.2d 144 (1966); Anderson v. Custom Caterers, Inc., 279 Ala. 360, 185 So.2d 383 (1966). In the case before us, there is no dispute that Martin's fall occurred in the course of employment. The primary issue in this case is one of causation, i.e., did Martin's fall "arise out of" his employment.

Though an issue of first impression in Alabama, the unexplained fall problem has been addressed in numerous other states. According to Professor Larson, the majority of courts that have addressed the issue have awarded compensation. 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 10.31 (1978). E.g., American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. King, 88 Ga.App. 176, 76 S.E.2d 81 (1953); Coomes v. Robertson Lumber Co., 427 S.W.2d 809 (Ky.App.1968); Slizewski v. International Seafood, Inc., 46 N.C.App. 228, 264 S.E.2d 810 (1980). Most of the courts that allow compensation in unexplained fall cases take the position that the causation requirement is satisfied by the fact that the claimant's employment placed him in the particular place at the particular time when he was injured. See Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 5 Wis.2d 247, 92 N.W.2d 824 (1958). This reasoning is categorized by Larson as the but-for test of causation or the positional risk doctrine. 1 A. Larson, supra, § 6.50.

A substantial minority of courts have, however, denied compensation in unexplained fall cases. 1 A. Larson, supra, § 10.31. E.g., Finn v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968); Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell, Inc., 227 S.C. 444, 88 S.E.2d 611 (1955); Nielsen v. Industrial Commission, 14 Wis.2d 112, 109 N.W.2d 483 (1961). The courts that deny compensation in unexplained fall cases obviously do not accept the but-for test of causation. Instead, these courts require the claimant to establish a definite causal connection between the work and the fall.

As noted earlier, no Alabama appellate court has specifically addressed the causation issue in the context of an unexplained fall case. There have been, however, numerous decisions dealing generally with the causation requirement of the Workmen's Compensation Act. These prior decisions are not compatible with a but-for causation test.

This court has discovered two Alabama decisions that are particularly pertinent when considering the acceptance of but-for reasoning as the test of causation under Alabama's Workmen's Compensation Act. Both cases are factually similar in that they involve claims for workmen's compensation benefits arising out of automobile accidents. In Wooten v. Roden, 260 Ala. 606, 71 So.2d 802 (1954), the employee was injured en route to a company Christmas party while a passenger in his employer's automobile. Though our supreme court engaged in an extensive discussion of causation, it did not specifically discuss the but-for causation test. It did, however, cite with approval F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 333 Ill. 340, 164 N.E. 668, 670 (1928). In that case the Illinois Supreme Court stated that: "It is not enough that the injured person may be present at the place of the accident because of his work, unless the injury is the result of some risk of the employment." As was recognized by this court in Wiregrass Comprehensive Mental Health Clinic, Inc. v. Price, 366 So.2d 725 (Ala.Civ.App.1978), cert. denied, 366 So.2d 728 (Ala.1979), the above quoted language is the antithesis of but-for reasoning. Wiregrass involved an employee who was killed in a car-train collision while...