Sliter v. Clark

• Decision Date: 10 December 1923
• Docket Number: 18137.
• Citation: 220 P. 785,127 Wash. 406
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: SLITER v. CLARK et ux.

220 P. 785

127 Wash. 406

SLITER v. CLARK et ux.

No. 18137.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 10, 1923

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; E. M. Card, Judge.

Action by Ralph Sliter against R. W. Clark and another. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Henry Arnold Peterson, of Tacoma, for appellant.

Remann & Gordon, of Tacoma, for respondents.

FULLERTON J.

This is an action brought by the appellant, Sliter, against the respondents Clark, to recover for personal injuries. On the trial, at the conclusion of the appellant's case, the respondents moved the court to discharge the jury and enter a judgment of nonsuit, on the ground that the evidence on the part of the appellant failed to sustain his cause of action. The court granted the motion, entering a judgment of dismissal.

The accident causing the injury for which recovery is sought occurred on the Pacific Highway, a short distance northerly from a point where the highway crosses the southerly line of the government military reservation, known as Camp Lewis. At the time of the accident, the appellant was riding a motorcycle which had a side car attachment. Immediately preceding it he was traveling northerly on the paved part of way, on what was to him its right-hand side, at a speed of approximately 25 miles per hour. The statute permitted a speed at this place of 30 miles per hour. At this time the respondents approached the paved highway from the left on an intersecting highway, driving a Nash automobile. As they reached the highway they not only drove upon it but drove directly across it immediately in front of the approaching motorcycle of the appellant, compelling the appellant, in order to avoid a collision, to turn his vehicle from the roadway to the right. On leaving the roadway, the motorcycle came into contact with débris lying on the side of the way, overturned, and caused the injuries to the appellant for which he sues.

The evidence disclosed that the paved highway was straight for a considerable distance on each side of the place where the accident occurred, that both the paved highway and the intersecting highway on which the respondents approached were in the open, with nothing to obstruct the view of either of the parties, and that the appellant did see the respondents' approaching car for some distance before it reached the pavement. The appellant testified, however, that the respondents gave no signal indicating what their intention was on reaching the highway; that is, whether they intended to turn to the right, turn to the left, or proceed directly across it.

Arguing from these premises the respondents' counsel say that they 'fail to see where, in any particular, the respondents were guilty of negligence,' and further, that their conduct 'gave every intention of their purpose to cross the pavement,' and that they 'had a perfect right to assume that plaintiff [appellant] recognized this evident purpose and would act as a reasonable prudent man and protect himself to avoid a collision.' But to us the facts argue a directly contrary conclusion. It seems to us that the respondents were not only guilty of negligence, but were guilty of negligence of the gravest sort. The statute has laid down certain rules of the road for the guidance of persons driving motor vehicles over the public highways. It has provided that 'drivers when approaching highway intersections, shall look out for and give right of way to vehicles on their right, simultaneously approaching a given point' (Rem. Comp. Stat. § 6340, subd. 6), and has made it a penal offense to violate the provision ( Id. § 6354). Plainly, as the facts now appear in the record, the respondents violated this mandate of the statute. They were approaching the intersection of the highways from the appellant's left. They had not sufficient time to pass in front of him without interference at the rate of speed he was approaching, which rate was well within the maximum speed limit. It was their duty, therefore, to look out for him and give him the right of way. Failing in this they violated the statutory command, and were thus guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Ebling v. Nielsen, 109 Wash. 355, 186 P. 887.

But aside from this we think that, were there no statute on the subject, the question whether the respondents were guilty of negligence would have been for the jury. In such a case their conduct would have been measured by the rules of ordinary prudence; that is to say, whether under the given circumstances their conduct was that of ordinarily prudent persons,...