Sloan v. State

• Decision Date: 23 February 1935
• Parties: SLOAN v. STATE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

79 S.W.2d 1021

168 Tenn. 573

SLOAN v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 23, 1935

Appeal in Error from Criminal Court, Davidson County; Charles Gilbert, Judge.

Alton Sloan was convicted of the charge that, by falsely impersonating another, he received an automobile under a rental contract, and he appeals in error.

Affirmed.

James W. Rutherford, of Nashville, for plaintiff in error.

W. F Barry, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SMITH Special Justice.

Sloan was convicted on the charge that, by falsely impersonating another, he received an automobile under a rental contract. From a judgment imposing a sentence of not less than three years in the penitentiary, he has appealed in error.

At about 10 o'clock on the night of August 3, 1934, Sloan went to the place of business of Matthews Company, which was a concern engaged in renting automobiles, and located at Nashville, Tenn. He said to Sanders, an employee of the company, and in charge of its business at the time, that he wished to rent an automobile, stating that his name was J. B King, that he was employed by the Rock City Construction Company, was twenty-two years of age, and lived at Goodlettsville, Tenn. He also gave Sanders references at Goodlettsville, and, after calling up one of them, Sanders had Sloan sign a printed form of a rental contract, one of the terms of which was that the car should not be taken out of the state of Tennessee. This contract was not read by Sloan, as he was not requested to read it by Sanders.

After making a deposit of $8, Sloan obtained the car for the purpose, as he states, of taking a young lady out riding, but finding that she was ill, he went to Goodlettsville, and in company with a young man, named Russell, proceeded to Glasgow, Ky., for the purpose of visiting his aunt, Mrs Harper, who, he states, was ill. At about 7 o'clock on August 4, 1934, while Sloan and Russell were waiting at a gasoline station to meet a mutual friend, named Settle, the chief of police at Glasgow, noticing the car in front of the station, questioned its occupants as to how they had obtained it.

A few hours later, Murray, a member of the Nashville police force, arrested Sloan on the charge that while at Glasgow he had attempted either to sell or to swap the rented automobile. Murray testified that Sloan admitted to him on two occasions on the return trip to Nashville that such was his intention. Sloan and his companion, Russell, denied that any such admission had been made by Sloan, and, while admitting that he did give to Sanders the name of J. B. King when he rented the car, he states that he did so solely for the reason that as he was but eighteen years of age, he believed that he could not obtain the car under a rental contract unless he was twenty-one years of age, and that he never entertained at the time he rented the car any intent fraudulently to deprive the owner of it.

J. B. King, who was a real and not a fictitious person, was twenty-two years of age, worked for the Rock City Construction Company, and lived at Goodlettsville, Tenn. The presentment charged that Sloan unlawfully, falsely, fraudulently, and feloniously obtained possession of the car, and under this charge, and on the proof introduced by the state, Sloan was convicted and sentenced.

The determinative question in the case is whether intent to defraud is an essential element of the offense of false personation. This question is presented directly, for the first time, for decision by this court.

Code 1932, § 10951, reads as follows: "Any person who falsely impersonates another, and, in such assumed character, receives any property of any description, intended to be delivered to the person so personated, shall, on conviction, be punished as if he had stolen the property."

This section of the Code of 1932 defines the offense of false personation exactly, and without amendment, as it is defined by section 4703 of the Code of 1858.

Section 4703 of the Code of 1858, as well as sections 4701, 4702, 4704, and 4705 are codifications of sections 1, 2, and 3 of chapter 48 of the Acts of 1841-42, which sections read as follows:

"Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That whoever shall feloniously obtain, or get into possession the personal goods or choses in action of another, by means of any false and fraudulent pretences, shall be guilty of felony, and shall undergo confinement in the public Jail and Penitentiary house established in this state, for a period of not less than three, nor more than ten years.

"Sec. 2. Be it enacted, That whoever shall fraudulently receive the personal goods or choses in action of another, knowing that the same shall have been feloniously obtained, or got into possession by means of any false and fraudulent pretences as aforesaid, with intent to deprive the true owner thereof, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall undergo confinement in the public Jail and Penitentiary house established in this state, for a period not less than three nor more than ten years.

"Sec. 3. Be it enacted, That the words 'personal goods' in the two preceding sections of this act, shall include money and all other personal property; and the words 'choses in action' include bills, bonds, notes and every kind of negotiable or assignable instruments; the words 'false and fraudulent pretences' include all cases of pretended buying, borrowing and hireing, and all other cases of bailment where the buyer or bailee intended at the time he received the goods, feloniously to steal the same. These words also include all cases where a person feloniously gets the money or goods or choses in action of another into possession by any false token or counterfeit letter, or by falsely personating another, or by falsely pretending to be the owner of such goods or choses in action, or by any other false and fraudulent pretense, where the party obtaining or getting the goods or choses in action into possession, intended at the time feloniously to steal the same; and in all cases coming under the provisions of the first and second sections of this act, where the value of the goods or choses in action, which shall have been feloniously obtained or received, shall not exceed the value of ten dollars, it shall be lawful for the court, on the recommendation of the jury, to release the penalty imposed by this act." It will be observed that by section 3 the words "false and fraudulent pretenses" are defined as including all cases where a person feloniously gets the money or goods or choses of another into possession by false token, or counterfeit letter, or by falsely impersonating another, or by falsely pretending to be the owner of such goods or choses in action, or by any other false and fraudulent pretense.

It is clear that, as defined by section 3, "falsely impersonating another" was classed as one of four methods by which the offense of...