Slocum v. Krupy, s. A--657

Citation11 N.J.Super. 81,77 A.2d 871
Decision Date05 January 1951
Docket NumberA--658,Nos. A--657,s. A--657
PartiesSLOCUM v. KRUPY. . Appellate Division
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division

Nathan Reibel, Elizabeth, argued the cause for the appellant.

Victor H. Eichhorn, Elizabeth, argued the cause for the respondent.

Before Judges JACOBS, EASTWOOD and BIGELOW.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JACOBS, S.J.A.D.

The defendant seeks to have an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Union County, directing that he contribute the sum of $20 per month towards the support of his indigent father, set aside on the ground that during his minority his father had abandoned and deserted and failed to support him. See R.S. 44:7--19, N.J.S.A.

The Old Age Assistance Act of 1936 provided that it shall be the duty of the Director of the County Welfare Board to ascertain the applicant's relatives chargeable by law for his support and compel them to render assistance. P.L.1936, c. 31, p. 63. It further provided that in the event any relative responsible for the applicant's support failed to perform the Director's order, the Court of Common Pleas, upon complaint, was authorized to summon the defendant and order payment of such amount as the circumstances may require. In the general statutory revision of 1937 the foregoing was embodied in R.S. 44:7--19, N.J.S.A. In 1939 the Court of Common Pleas was authorized to initiate the proceeding upon certification from the Director and its jurisdiction was made state-wide. P.L. 1938, c. 361, p. 911. In 1940 the Legislature, in several enactments, expressed the general policy that a child deserted during his minority by his parent may be excused from supporting him (P.L.1940, cc. 55, 56, 57, R.S. 44:1--141, 44:4--102, 44:7--19, N.J.S.A.) and in accordance with this policy the Court of Common Pleas was authorized in a proviso in R.S. 44:7--19, N.J.S.A., to revoke the Director's order for support or reduce its amount where it appeared that the child 'was abandoned and deserted and said applicant failed to support and maintain' him during his minority.

In 1943, R.S. 44:7--19 was again amended. P.L.1943, c. 164, p. 479, N.J.S.A. At this time the Legislature evidently contemplated vesting the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations with full authority, concurrent with the Court of Common Pleas, to entertain proceedings against children to compel support of their indigent parents. Thus it expressly enacted that either the Court of Common Pleas or the Court of Juvenile and Comestic Relations upon certification by the Director could summon the defendant, conduct the necessary proceedings, and enter an appropriate order for such support as the circumstances may require in the court's discretion. Inadvertently, the proviso in R.S. 44:7--19, N.J.S.A. was not specifically altered to include reference to the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations but the legislative intent, apparent from the entire enactment, seems sufficiently clear to justify supplying the omission. Orvil Township v. Borough of Woodcliff, 64 N.J.L. 286, 289, 45 A. 686 (E. & A.1900); Wagner v. County Employees Pension Commission, 130 N.J.L. 230, 234, 32 A.2d 287 (E. & A.1943). In actual practice, cf. Burlington County v. Martin, 129 N.J.L. 92, 93, 28 A.2d 116 (E. & A.1942); Martini v. Civil Service Commission, 129 N.J.L. 599, 603, 30 A.2d 569 (Sup.Ct.1943), the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations construed the pertinent enactments as vesting it with adequate power under the proviso and the propriety of this construction is not questioned by the parties. See R.S. 9:18--14(c), N.J.S.A. Indeed, denial of the power would lead to the incongruous situation in which the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations would be compelled to enter an order for support without regard to the legislative policy and the Court of Common Pleas, now the County Court would be authorized to disregard the proceedings in the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations and invoke the legislative policy upon a direct application to enforce or review the original order of the Director. See Giordano v. City Commission of the City of Newark, 2 N.J. 585, 594, 67 A.2d 454, 458 (1949) where our Supreme Court recently restated the principle that where a literal interpretation of the statute 'would lead to anomalous or absurd results, the spirit of the law controls the letter.'

In the instant matter, the statement under Rule 1:2--23 of the proceedings before the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations discloses that pursuant to written certification from the Director of Welfare the defendant, a relative who had failed to perform the order of the Director with regard to the support of his applicant father, was directed by summons to appear before the court. On the return day there was testimony by the Director, the defendant and his brother. The defendant at that time contended that he should not be subjected to an order for support because of his father's conduct towards him as a child but the court on February 23, 1950 ordered that he contribute $15 per month towards his father's support. Thereafter counsel for the defendant requested a rehearing which was granted. At the rehearing the defendant testified that at the age of 12 he was committed to the State Home for Boys at Jamesburg on his father's complaint, thereafter he was released and later recommitted, and when ultimately released, placement and employment were obtained for him away from home. His testimony further indicated that his father had not adequately supported their family, which included five children, and consequently his mother had been obliged to work from time to time to aid in their support. The record discloses that in June, 1923 a complaint was filed by the defendant's father for incorrigibility and the defendant was committed to the State Home for Boys at Jamesburg upon...

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3 cases
  • Hewitt v. Hollahan
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • July 1, 1959
    ...powers of fine, imprisonment, and the imposition of money judgments than in days gone by. State v. Monroe, supra; Slocum v. Krupy, 11 N.J.Super. 81, 77 A.2d 871 (App.Div.1951). Cf. State v. Mull, 30 N.J. 231, 152 A.2d 572 (1959); State v. Schrier, 30 N.J. 241, 152 A.2d 578 (1959); Krieger v......
  • Early v. Early, A--57
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • March 11, 1952
    ...were adversely affected by the fact that it was not actually annexed to the counterclaim. See Rule 1:2--20(b); Slocum v. Krupy, 11 N.J.Super. 81, 87, 77 A.2d 871 (App.Div. 1951). Furthermore, although its non-annexation was evident from examination of the counterclaim no point thereof was m......
  • Gierkont v. Gierkont
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • July 26, 1957
    ...whether the proceeding originates in the appropriate court or with the Director's order. See N.J.S.A. 44:7--19; Slocum v. Krupy, 11 N.J.Super. 81, 84, 77 A.2d 871 (App.Div.1951). The statute '* * * However, where it shall appear that the person or persons sought to be held were the child or......

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