Small v. Centocor, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-9910-CV-694.,49A02-9910-CV-694. |
| Citation | 731 N.E.2d 22 |
| Parties | JAMES GARRETT SMALL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. CENTOCOR, INCORPORATED, Eli Lilly & Company, Community Hospitals Indiana, Robert S. Joseph, Steven A. Norris, James H. Dobson, Phyllis Garrison (f/k/a Einsweiller), Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
James Garrett Small, Pro Se, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Sally Franklin Zweig, Nancy Menard Riddle, Thomas G. Stayton, Gregory L. Taylor, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees.
Plaintiff-Appellant, James Garrett Small (Small), appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellants Centocor, Inc. (Centocor), Eli Lilly & Company (Lilly), Community Hospitals Indiana (Community), Robert S. Joseph (Joseph), Steven A. Norris (Norris), James H. Dobson (Dobson), and Phyllis Garrison (Garrison) (collectively "Defendants").
We affirm.
Small presents four issues which we restate as:
In September 1992, Small's father, Clarence Small (Clarence), was hospitalized and eventually died at Community Hospital. In 1994, Small, as the representative of his father's estate, filed a proposed complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance. However, prior to the receipt of a decision from the medical review panel, the trial court entered summary judgment against Small and dismissed the complaint with prejudice based upon Small's failure to respond to discovery requests. Small then attempted to appeal the trial court's order. This Court dismissed Small's attempted appeal and denied his request for rehearing. Finally, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed Small's petition to transfer.
In 1998, Small, on his own behalf, filed a complaint for damages with the trial court again raising issues related to his father's hospitalization and death; this is the action at issue in the present case. In response to Small's complaint, Defendants filed motions for summary judgment claiming that Small's action was barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel and the applicable statute of limitation. The trial court granted Defendants' motions, and this appeal ensued.
The party appealing the denial of summary judgment has the burden of persuading this Court that the trial court's ruling was improper. Morton v. Moss, 694 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). Upon review of the denial of a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court. We resolve any doubt as to any fact, or inference to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment should be granted only when the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Therefore, on appeal, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the law has been correctly applied by the trial court. Morton, 694 N.E.2d at 1151. We may not search the entire record to support the judgment, but may only consider that evidence which was specifically designated to the trial court. Askren Hub States Pest Control Services, Inc. v. Zurich Insurance Company, 721 N.E.2d 270, 274 (Ind.Ct. App.1999).
Small first contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Within this broad contention, Small states four sub-issues: (1) his affidavit contains evidence that precludes the entry of summary judgment; (2) res judicata does not apply to bar his action; (3) collateral estoppel does not apply to bar this action; and (4) the proper statute of limitation in this case is six years. We will address each argument in turn.
Small asserts that his affidavit contains evidence that precludes the entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Specifically, Small claims that his affidavit is unopposed by Defendants and that the statements in his affidavit show that there are issues of fact, regarding whether Defendants committed fraud, that preclude the entry of summary judgment. Therefore, he reasons, summary judgment should not have been entered. In support of his argument, Small merely states that there are issues of fact, but he fails to specifically state the issues of fact to which her refers and explain how they preclude the court from granting summary judgment. Further, Small does not argue that his affidavit contains issues of fact relative to the bases upon which summary judgment was entered (i.e., res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statute of limitation).
Moreover, Small has overlooked the threshold questions upon which summary judgment was granted in the first instance. The trial court granted summary judgment based upon an expired statute of limitation, and application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Because these issues were addressed at the summary judgment stage of the proceeding, it was unnecessary for the court to address the substance of the underlying claims. Thus, Small has failed to persuade us that the trial court's ruling was improper.
Next, Small alleges that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata bars litigation of a claim after a final judgment has been rendered in a prior action involving the same claim between the same parties or their privies. Indiana Ins. Co. v. American Community Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 1147, 1155 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). The principle behind this doctrine, as well as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is the prevention of repetitive litigation of the same dispute. Id. The following four requirements must be satisfied for a claim to be precluded under the doctrine of res judicata: 1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; 3) the matter now in issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and 4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action must have been between the parties to the present suit or their privies. Id.
In the present case, Small challenges the trial court's determination that there was a "prior action." He argues that the proposed complaint for medical malpractice filed with the Indiana Department of Insurance in 1994 was not a lawsuit but rather was merely an administrative prerequisite to a lawsuit. We disagree. The prior action in this instance is the complaint filed with the Indiana Department of Insurance on behalf of Clarence's estate. We now turn to the factors establishing res judicata. First, we must determine if the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Marion County Superior Court Number 11 rendered the judgment granting summary judgment and dismissing with prejudice the estate's claims. The action was before the court on a motion for summary judgment, a motion for preliminary determination of law, and a motion to dismiss. Ind.Code § 34-18-11-1 of the Medical Malpractice Act provides, in part, that a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to a proposed complaint filed with the commissioner may preliminarily determine an affirmative defense or issue of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under the Indiana Rules of Procedure. The court has jurisdiction to entertain such a motion only during that time after a proposed complaint is filed with the commissioner but before the medical review panel gives its written opinion.
Additionally, Ind.Code § 33-5.1-2-4 provides, in pertinent part, that the superior courts of Marion County have concurrent and coextensive jurisdiction with the Marion circuit court in all civil cases, as well as original and exclusive jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to the probate and settlement of decedents' estates. In the instant case, the Marion Superior Court Number 11 issued its order regarding preliminary determinations of law prior to the medical review panel rendering its decision. Thus, pursuant to the aforementioned statutes, Marion Superior Court had competent jurisdiction to render a judgment.
The second factor requires that the judgment be a judgment on the merits. Ind. Trial Rule 37(B)(2)(c) provides that a court may dismiss an action for a party's failure to comply with discovery orders. The trial court is not required to impose lesser sanctions prior to applying the ultimate sanction of dismissal. Hatfield v. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 676 N.E.2d 395, 399 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), reh'g denied, trans. denied, 690 N.E.2d 1183. Further, dismissal as a discovery sanction under T.R. 37 acts as an adjudication on the merits unless the order of the trial court expressly states that it is to be without prejudice. State v. Wilbur, 471 N.E.2d 14, 16-17 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Moreover, Ind. Trial Rule 41(B) provides, in pertinent part:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision or subdivision (E) of this rule and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Here, the record of the hearing on defendants' motions for summary judgment, dismissal and preliminary determination of law in the action filed on behalf of...
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