Sr. v. Locke

• Decision Date: 30 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-2485.,09-2485.
• Citation: 613 F.3d 875
• Parties: Lisa Mae COPELAND; Jason Carl Hayes, Plaintiffs, Norman August Steibel, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward LOCKE, Jr.; City of Byrnes Mill; City of Bella Villa, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

613 F.3d 875

Lisa Mae COPELAND; Jason Carl Hayes, Plaintiffs,Norman August Steibel, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Edward LOCKE, Jr.; City of Byrnes Mill; City of Bella Villa, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-2485.

United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 17, 2010.

Filed: July 30, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Michael F. Jones, argued and on the brief, Clayton, MO, for appellant.

Priscilla F. Gunn, argued, St. Louis, MO, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, BEAM and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Norman Steibel appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on his claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Chief Edward Locke used excessive force to effectuate his unlawful arrest and that the City of Bella Villa was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights. ¹ Under the facts viewed in a light most favorable to Steibel, Chief Locke is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on some of Steibel's claims. Therefore, we reverse in part and affirm in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Steibel based his claim on the following record facts including a video of the events, which we have reviewed. We view this evidence in a light most favorable to Steibel. On October 18, 2007, Chief Edward Locke of the City of Bella Villa Police Department executed a traffic stop at the corner of Bayless Road and Pardella Avenue in St. Louis County. Norman Steibel, a sixty-seven-year old business owner, operates a welding and body shop located at that very corner. The offending vehicle came to a stop alongside Steibel's business such that the police cruiser partially blocked access to and from the business's parking lot.

At approximately the same time as Chief Locke exited his police cruiser to approach the stopped vehicle, one of Steibel's patrons sought to leave the parking lot but was blocked in by the vehicles. Steibel exited his business and requested in a “nice” manner that Chief Locke move his vehicle so that the patron could exit. Chief Locke summarily rejected Steibel's request, stating that he was engaged in official police business. After repeated requests for Chief Locke to move his vehicle, Steibel approached the traffic stop where he can be seen on the video captured from the police cruiser's dashboard camera. Standing at the rear passenger side of the vehicle, and separated from Chief Locke by the width and length of the stopped vehicle, ² Steibel pointed at Chief Locke, pointed down the road, said “move the f* * *ing car,” and pointed at Chief Locke again.

Chief Locke immediately reached for his handcuffs, walked around the rear of the vehicle and grabbed for Steibel's hands. Steibel, visibly agitated and not wanting to be arrested, backed up and pulled his hands away from Chief Locke. Chief Locke continued walking towards Steibel until both were out of range of the dashboard camera.

Once out of camera range, Chief Locke slammed Steibel against a parked car, threw him to the ground, kneed him in the back, yanked and twisted the handcuffs on his wrists, and applied continuing pressure to his neck and back. As a result of Chief Locke's force, Steibel suffered lacerations to both wrists for which he was treated at the emergency room and abrasions across his body caused by pieces of gravel and debris. Moreover, Steibel alleges that he suffered an injury to his knee. Today, Steibel maintains that he has continuing pain in his knee and cannot walk as well as he could before the incident.

Steibel brought this § 1983 action alleging that (1) Chief Locke lacked probable cause to arrest him; (2) Chief Locke used excessive force to arrest; and (3) the City of Bella Villa was subject to municipal liability for Chief Locke's actions. Appellees moved for summary judgment on all three claims, and the district court granted the motion in full.

II. DISCUSSION

“We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d 1015, 1019 (8th Cir.2009) (quotation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 473 (8th Cir.2010).

A. Unlawful Arrest

The district court held that Steibel's first claim against Chief Locke failed because no reasonable jury could find that Chief Locke lacked actual probable cause to arrest Steibel for violating St. Louis County Ordinance section 701.110, which prohibits interfering with official police conduct, and Missouri Statute section 575.150, which prohibits fleeing from or interfering with an arrest. We disagree.

“Probable cause exists if ‘the totality of facts based on reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent person in believing the individual arrested had committed ... an offense.’ ” Flynn v. Brown, 395 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir.2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir.1986)). A review of the video taken from Chief Locke's police cruiser illustrates that Steibel's repeated requests for Chief Locke to move his vehicle distracted Chief Locke while conducting the traffic stop. Moreover, the video depicts an agitated Steibel who points at Chief Locke, points down the road, and by Steibel's own admission, tells Chief Locke to “move the f* * *ing car.” However, even at the height of his agitation, Steibel was separated from Chief Locke by the length and width of the stopped vehicle. And, while Steibel did approach the traffic stop, the video shows Steibel approaching in a non-aggressive manner. Accordingly, when viewed in a light most favorable to Steibel, at most, Steibel distracted, cursed at, and pointed at Chief Locke.

Steibel's conduct, viewed in this light, does not violate Missouri Statute section 575.150 which requires “(1) the defendant, having knowledge that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest or a stop of a person or vehicle, (2) resists or interferes with the arrest by threatening to use violence or physical force or by fleeing from the officer, ... and (3) defendant did so with the purpose of preventing the officer from completing the arrest.” State v. Clark, 263 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Mo.App.2008), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Daws, 311 S.W.3d 806 (Mo.2010). Here, Steibel knew that Chief Locke was making a traffic stop, but the record, viewed in a light most favorable to Steibel, indicates that Steibel did not threaten the use of violence or physical force nor did he “flee” from the officer under any reasonable definition of the word as he backed away from the scene upon being engaged and pursued by Chief Locke. Moreover, according to the record, Steibel had no intention of preventing the officer from completing the stop. Thus, under the facts viewed in a light most favorable to Steibel, no reasonable officer could have believed that Steibel had violated section 575.150.

Moreover, Steibel's conduct, viewed in this light, did not constitute an arrestable violation of the county ordinance. Under the ordinance “it is unlawful for any person to interfere in any manner with a police officer or other employee of the County in the performance of his official duties or to obstruct him in any manner whatsoever while performing any duty.” St. Louis County, Mo., Rev. Ordinances tit. VII, ch. 701, § 701.110. As we have noted, the evidence indicates that Steibel's conduct distracted Chief Locke while he was conducting the traffic stop. We doubt, however, whether merely requesting that an officer move his vehicle, which momentarily distracts the officer from conducting a routine traffic stop, constitutes interference under the ordinance. But, even assuming that a Bella Villa police officer is an officer or employee of St. Louis County, which we doubt, and that such a distraction does constitute interference under the ordinance, such expressive conduct cannot constitute an arrestable offense. That is, “[i]t is ... fundamental that a lawful arrest may not ensue where the arrestee is merely exercising his First Amendment rights.” Gainor v. Rogers, 973 F.2d 1379, 1387 (8th Cir.1992); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) (“The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.”). If, as Steibel avers, Chief Locke arrested Steibel solely for distracting him from the stop through the use of his protected expression, then the arrest was unlawful even if it arguably interfered with police activity.

Notably, Chief Locke asserts that he advised Steibel to step back. Steibel denies this. Accordingly, viewing the record in a light most favorable to Steibel, Chief Locke merely reacted to Steibel's use of loud, profane language coupled with Steibel's expressive gestures in directing the Chief to move his cruiser away from Steibel's business. No reasonable police officer could believe that he had actual probable cause to arrest a citizen for such protected activity. Accordingly, on this summary judgment record, Steibel has presented sufficient evidence to show that Chief Locke arrested him without actual probable cause.

The appellees assert that even if Chief Locke lacked actual probable cause he is entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause. “In the wrongful arrest context, officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they arrest a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so, provided that the mistake is objectively reasonable.” Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 478 (internal quotation omitted). Thus, “the governing standard for a Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim is not probable cause in...