Small v. United States

• Decision Date: 26 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-750.,03-750.
• Parties: SMALL v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

544 U.S. 385

SMALL v. UNITED STATES

No. 03-750.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued November 3, 2004.

Decided April 26, 2005.

Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese court of trying to smuggle firearms and ammunition into that country. He served five years in prison and then returned to the United States, where he bought a gun. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), which forbids "any person . . . convicted in any court . . . of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm." (Emphasis added.) Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to challenge his conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction, being foreign, fell outside § 922(g)(1)'s scope. The Federal District Court and the Third Circuit rejected this argument.

Held: Section 922(g)(1)'s phrase "convicted in any court" encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions. Pp. 388-394.

(a) In considering the scope of the phrase "convicted in any court" it is appropriate to assume that Congress had domestic concerns in mind. This assumption is similar to the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application, see, e. g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 285. The phrase "convicted in any court" describes one necessary portion of the "gun possession" activity that is prohibited as a matter of domestic law. Moreover, because foreign convictions may include convictions for conduct that domestic laws would permit, e. g., for engaging in economic conduct that our society might encourage, convictions from a legal system that are inconsistent with American understanding of fairness, and convictions for conduct that domestic law punishes far less severely, the key statutory phrase "convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" somewhat less reliably identifies dangerous individuals for the purposes of U. S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at issue. In addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign convictions are at issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the statutory definition is not consistent with the statute's language; it is not easy for those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign court (say, of economic crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations. These considerations provide a convincing basis for applying the ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes here. Thus, the Court assumes a congressional intent that the phrase "convicted in any court" applies domestically, not extraterritorially, unless the statutory language, context, history, or purpose shows the contrary. Pp. 388-391.

(b) There is no convincing indication to the contrary here. The statute's language suggests no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions. To the contrary, if read to include foreign convictions, the statute's language creates anomalies. For example, in creating an exception allowing gun possession despite a conviction for an antitrust or business regulatory crime, § 921(a)(20)(A) speaks of "Federal or State" antitrust or regulatory offenses. If the phrase "convicted in any court" generally refers only to domestic convictions, this language causes no problem. But if the phrase includes foreign convictions, the words "Federal or State" prevent the exception from applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory conviction is at issue. Such illustrative examples suggest that Congress did not consider whether the generic phrase "convicted in any court" applies to foreign convictions. Moreover, the statute's legislative history indicates no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions. Although the statutory purpose of keeping guns from those likely to become a threat to society does offer some support for reading § 922(g)(1) to include foreign convictions, the likelihood that Congress at best, paid no attention to the matter is reinforced by the empirical fact that, according to the Government, since 1968, there have been fewer than a dozen instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution. Pp. 391-394.

333 F. 3d 425, reversed and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, post, p. 394. REHNQUIST, C. J., took no part in the decision of the case.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

Paul D. Boas argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Stephen P. Halbrook.

Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wray, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and John A. Drennan.

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States Criminal Code makes it

"unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added).

The question before us focuses upon the words "convicted in any court." Does this phrase apply only to convictions entered in any domestic court or to foreign convictions as well? We hold that the phrase encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions.

I

In 1994 petitioner, Gary Small, was convicted in a Japanese court of having tried to smuggle several pistols, a rifle, and ammunition into Japan. Small was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757, n. 3 (WD Pa. 2002). After his release, Small returned to the United States, where he bought a gun from a Pennsylvania gun dealer. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under the "unlawful gun possession" statute here at issue. 333 F.3d 425, 426 (CA3 2003). Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to challenge his conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction, being a foreign conviction, fell outside the scope of the illegal gun possession statute. The Federal District Court rejected Small's argument, as did the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 183 F. Supp. 2d, at 759; 333 F.3d, at 427, n. 2. Because the Circuits disagree about the matter, we granted certiorari. Compare United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (CA4 1989) ("convicted in any court" includes foreign convictions); United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 757-759 (CA6 1986) (same), with United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 95 (CA2 2003) ("convicted in any court" does not include foreign convictions); United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256 (CA10 2000) (same).

II

A

The question before us is whether the statutory reference "convicted in any court" includes a conviction entered in a foreign court. The word "any" considered alone cannot answer this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says, "I'll see any film," may or may not mean to include films shown in another city. In law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase "`any person'" may or may not mean to include "`persons'" outside "the jurisdiction of the state." See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.) ("[G]eneral words," such as the word "`any,'" must "be limited" in their application "to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them"); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004) ("`any'" means "different things depending upon the setting"); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994) ("[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the broad statutory reference to `any' law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest of the statute"); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1981) (it is doubtful that the phrase "`any statute'" includes the very statute in which the words appear); Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 149 (1960) ("`[A]ny sum,'" while a "catchall" phrase, does not "define what it catches"). Thus, even though the word "any" demands a broad interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997), we must look beyond that word itself.

In determining the scope of the statutory phrase we find help in the "commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind." Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204, n. 5 (1993). This notion has led the Court to adopt the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial application. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); see also Palmer, supra, at 631 ("The words `any person or persons,' are broad enough to comprehend every human being" but are "limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state"); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 249-251 (1991). That presumption would apply, for example, were we to consider whether this statute prohibits unlawful gun possession abroad as well as domestically. And, although the presumption against extraterritorial application does not apply directly to this case, we believe a similar assumption is appropriate when we consider the scope of the phrase "convicted in any court" here.

For one thing, the phrase describes one necessary portion of the "gun possession" activity that is prohibited as a matter of domestic law. For another, considered as a group, foreign convictions differ from domestic convictions in important ways. Past foreign convictions for crimes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment may include a conviction for conduct that domestic laws...