Smallwood v. State
| Decision Date | 13 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. F-93-514,F-93-514 |
| Citation | 907 P.2d 217,1995 OK CR 60 |
| Parties | Dion Athanasius SMALLWOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Appellant, Dion Athanasius Smallwood, was charged with murder in the first degree (Malice Aforethought) and third degree arson. He was convicted May 13, 1993 on both counts after a two-stage jury trial in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-92-809 before the Honorable Leamon Freeman, District Judge. After the sentencing stage proceeding, the jury recommended Appellant be sentenced to death on the murder charge and 15 years and fined $10,000.00 for the arson. The trial court sentenced accordingly. Appellant appeals, challenging both the guilty verdicts and the sentences imposed for the crimes. We affirm.
Late on the evening of February 5, 1992, Oklahoma City police and fire fighters were called to the intersection of Oklahoma and Wilshire Boulevard to the scene of a car fire. After extinguishing the fire, a badly burned body was discovered in the back seat of the vehicle. A check run on the vehicle's license number revealed that it was registered to Lois Frederick of Oklahoma City. Simultaneously, Oklahoma City police were at Frederick's home investigating a missing person's report filed by her family. The body in the car was identified as Lois Frederick, and an autopsy revealed that she had died as a result of a severe head injury and smoke inhalation.
On February 5, 1992, Appellant arrived at Frederick's Oklahoma City home located at 4225 N.W. 57th Street, at approximately 4:00 p.m. Frederick, a 68 year old white female, lived at the home with her daughter, Terry Jo, Appellant's girlfriend. Terry Jo was not home when Appellant arrived there looking for her. Appellant's relationship with Terry Jo had begun in January of 1991, and was marked with numerous incidents of physical abuse. The two had lived together, off and on, during most of 1991, but Terry Jo had recently moved back in with her mother approximately one month before the murder. Lois Frederick made no secret of the fact that she disapproved of and did not like Appellant. Likewise, animosity between Terry Jo and Lois was well known to neighbors, family, and the Oklahoma City police, who had been called to the residence on numerous occasions to resolve disputes between the two.
Appellant testified he arrived at Frederick's home intending only to look for Terry Jo. He walked into the residence, uninvited, knowing he was not welcome, and immediately encountered Lois. She asked Appellant to leave, grabbing his arm in the process. Appellant then pushed her away, causing her to fall over backward. Lois, advising Appellant she would "make him pay" for his actions, attempted to call police, but Appellant took the phone from her and smashed it. The confrontation continued, with Appellant conducting a room to room search of the house, looking for Terry Jo, with Lois in tow. During that time, Appellant again struck Lois in the face, knocking her to the ground and bloodying her nose.
As the two entered one of the bedrooms, Lois attempted to clean up, washing the blood from her face in the adjoining bathroom. Appellant testified that Lois came out of the bathroom and kicked him in the shin. He responded by grabbing a croquet mallet and telling Lois that he had no "beef" with her. He testified Lois then brandished a knife at him, at which point he struck her once in the head with the croquet mallet. He left Lois in the bedroom, closing the door behind him, after hearing her choking. He had no recollection of Lois moving after he initially hit her, and thought he had killed her.
Appellant then attempted to clean up the house, wiping blood from various surfaces with a pair of Lois' socks, turning the bed mattress over to conceal a large blood stain, and placing various items in a trash bag which he then took to the garage. He closed the front door after making sure that no one was watching him, and eventually wrapped Lois' body in the sheets and a bedspread from the bed, and laid her in the back seat of her car.
At about 6:30 p.m., a 9-1-1 call was received from Lois' sister, Louise Chapman 1, and Oklahoma City police officer Kevin Washa went to Frederick's house to check on her. Washa tried to enter the house after getting no response, but the doors were locked. He left after looking in the windows of the house and seeing no one.
Upon hearing Washa's knock on the door, Appellant hid in a storage closet to avoid detection. Lois' body had already been placed in the car, and Appellant left the residence in her car after Washa left the scene. Appellant claims he drove around for some time, trying to decide what to do. He called a friend, David Macias, requesting assistance, telling Macias he thought he had killed somebody. Macias refused to help, and Appellant eventually stopped at a gas station and purchased some gasoline which he put in a plastic container given to him by the gas station personnel.
Appellant testified he splashed the gasoline around the outside of the car and on the front seat, but denied pouring any on Lois' body. 2 He then set the car afire and ran home to his apartment approximately two miles away. Passersby saw the fire, and attempted to extinguish it with a fire extinguisher, but were unable to do so. 3 The blaze was eventually extinguished by the Oklahoma City Fire Department.
Appellant's arguments and Propositions of Error will be addressed in the sequential order of the trial, beginning with the first stage proceedings.
Appellant claims fundamental error at Proposition XI, alleging the State excluded prospective juror Spears, a black woman, on the basis of race, failing to refute Appellant's Batson 4 objection and prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. A review of the record indicates no such discrimination. Pursuant to Batson, as modified by Powers 5 Appellant is required to prove that (1) he is entitled to rely upon the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a practice that could allow discrimination and (2) show any other relevant circumstances which raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude veniremen from the jury on account of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
The guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Batson indicated the following:
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a "pattern" of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.
Id. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
A review of the record in this case reveals that there was no "pattern" of striking minority jurors. The jurors stricken prior to juror Spears were all white, five female, one male. The remaining black juror (apparently the only one at that point in the proceedings) was not excused. The explanation given for striking Spears was her psychology background (as Appellant had indicated he intended to use a diminished capacity defense), her status as a student, and the State's concern, despite her answers to the contrary, that she would be "very weak" in considering imposition of the death penalty. The trial court determined there was no pattern of striking minority jurors, and noted for the record that this particular juror had been observed during voir dire wearing radio headphones and being generally inattentive to the proceedings around her.
As we noted in Black v. State, 871 P.2d 35, 43 (Okl.Cr.1994), it is very difficult to establish a pattern based on the striking of one black juror. Combined with the record made concerning this particular juror, we find that Appellant did not meet the prima facie burden raising the inference that Spears was excluded because of her race. We find no error here.
At Proposition III, Appellant alleges error in the admission of evidence 6 obtained during his questioning, which he now claims was the result of an illegal detention. Appellant alleges that after being placed in the police car to be taken for questioning he was never free to leave and was therefore under arrest, although the police had no probable cause to arrest him. As a result, he now claims that all evidence seized from him during that time period should be suppressed, and that he is entitled to a new trial. We disagree.
Resolution of this issue turns on whether Appellant was under arrest at the time he was transported to, and subsequently questioned, at the Oklahoma City police station. An examination of the record in this case reveals that he was not. The present case is remarkably similar to Johns v. State, 742 P.2d 1142, 1149 (Okl.Cr.1987), wherein we determined that the statement given to police was admissible in light of the appellant's behavior and the resulting police response.
In Johns, the appellant voluntarily accompanied...
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