Smart v. Bd. of Cnty. Com'Rs of Craig Cnty.
| Decision Date | 11 December 1917 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 7737 |
| Parties | SMART, Sheriff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF CRAIG COUNTY. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 Counties -- Liabilities -- Sheriff's Fees and Expenses--Limitation of Indebtedness.
Moneys lawfully expended by a sheriff in the feeding of prisoners and fees earned by him in the discharge of duties imposed upon him by the Constitution and laws of the state constitute a valid charge against the county, and are not within the limitations imposed upon the county by section 26, art. 10 (section 291, Wms. Anno.) Constitution.
Error from District Court, Craig County; Preston S. Davis, Judge.
Action by L. P. Smartt, Sheriff of the County of Craig, against the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Craig, State of Oklahoma. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded.
W. H. Kornegay, for plaintiff in error.
Williard H. Voyles, for defendant in error.
¶1 L. P. Smartt, sheriff of Craig county, commenced this action against the board of county commissioners of Craig county to recover judgment on claims against said county to the amount of $ 282.34 for the board of prisoners, etc., payment of which had been refused on the ground that the revenue provided for such purposes for the fiscal year, during which said claims arose, had been exhausted prior to the accrual or presentation thereof. Judgment was for the county and plaintiff appeals. The case was submitted to the trial court on an agreed statement of facts, from which it appears that the claims were chargeable to and payable out of the contingent fund for the fiscal year 1912-1913; that the estimate of the contingent fund for said year was $ 5,000, the assessed value of said property for said county was $ 15,178,000, and that a levy of .36 mills was regularly made to produce $ 5,000 and 10 per cent. additional for delinquent taxes, and that on and prior to May 5, 1913, legal claims had been filed against said funds and had been regularly audited and allowed in the sum of $ 4,998.53 for which warrants had been issued on and prior to May 5, 1913, and that the services covered by said claims were rendered and performed prior to the services represented by the claims of plaintiff; that three-fifths of the voters of said county voting at an election held for that purpose had not during said fiscal year and prior to February 20, 1915, assented to the county becoming indebted for any purpose to an amount exceeding in said fiscal year the income and revenue of said fund for said year.
¶2 It is contended that the claims presented by plaintiff constitute no valid charge against the county, and therefore the judgment in his favor was erroneous. This contention was based upon the application of section 26, art. 10 (section 291, Wms. Anno.) Const., which provides:
"No county * * * shall be allowed to become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of three-fifths of the voters thereof, voting at an election, to be held for that purpose. * * *"
¶3 It is the clear intention of this provision that counties shall not be allowed to become indebted except in the manner provided, and if the claims of plaintiff come within its terms the judgment was erroneous. We do not think, however, that such claims are affected thereby. Section 18, art. 25 (section 382, Wms. Anno. Const., is as follows:
"Until otherwise provided by law, the terms, duties, powers qualifications, and salary and compensation of all county and township officers, not otherwise provided by this Constitution, shall be as now provided by the laws of the territory of Oklahoma for like named officers. * * *"
¶4 Section 2 of article 17 (section 320a, Wms. Anno.) Const., creates subject to change by the Legislature certain offices for each organized county, including the office of sheriff, and his duties, salary, and compensation were fixed by section 18, art. 25, according to the duties, salaries, and compensation performed and enjoyed by sheriffs at the time the Constitution was adopted. Referring to section 2995, Wilson's Rev. & Ann. Stats. 1903, we find the rate of compensation allowed the sheriff for services of the character herein involved and the rate therein fixed continued until changed by section 3197, Rev. Laws 1910, which made some unimportant changes in the rate of compensation for such duties, and by virtue of the change, the sheriff is entitled to receive compensation under the provisions of said law as changed unless prevented by section 26, art. 10. It is clear from the nature of the claims presented that the services were rendered in the discharged of plaintiff's duty as sheriff, and some of those duties he could neglect only at grave peril to himself. The keeping of prisoners confided to his custody is enjoined upon him by law, and should he refuse to receive any person as a prisoner he would by section 2245, Rev. Laws 1910, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and if, after receiving any such prisoner in his custody, he should willfully or carelessly allow such prisoner to escape or go at large except as might be permitted by law, he would, under section 2244, be guilty of a felony and subject to prosecution therefor. So we have this situation: An officer compelled to perform at his peril certain duties which involve the expenditure of his private funds and subject to imprisonment for a failure to do so is penalized by being denied compensation therefor.
¶5 It may be contended with some show of reason that section 26, art. 10, taken alone, would bear the construction urged, but it is a fundamental rule of construction that to determine the meaning and scope of one provision it must be read in the light of and with due regard for other provisions. In re Application of State to Issue Bonds to fund Indebtedness, 33 Okla. 797, 127 P. 1065.
¶6 The very purpose of creating a state government by the people is to delegate thereto the performance of certain functions looking to the common safety and welfare, and the necessity for the performance of these functions through the agency of the state and its various subdivisions is the sole object for its creation. The people have provided in the Constitution for a full set of state officers, and have created separate departments and co-ordinate branches of the government and various municipal subdivisions, and confided to each the performance of certain duties which are made mandatory because necessary for the protection and well-being of the people composing the state. There has been much controversy among publicists and thinkers and much conflict in the decisions of the courts as to the proper and necessary limitations upon the powers delegated to the different departments and arms of the state government, but it is conceded by all that certain necessary fundamental functions must always be actively exercised in order to preserve the existence of the state and secure to the people the rights guaranteed to them, among which are the right to life, liberty, the possession of property, and the pursuit of happiness, and should the state become so impotent as to be unable to discharge these functions, there would result a failure of the purposes for which government was established. The surest way to bring about this result is to construe the Constitution in such a way as to place it in the power of one set of officials to deprive another of the means necessary for the performance of the duties imposed upon that other. If we give the Constitution such construction the enforcement of laws for the regulation and protection of the public peace and safety in any county might, in its ultimate analysis, depend upon the whim and caprice of certain local officials who might, by falling and refusing to make proper provision therefor, render it impossible to secure an enforcement of such laws by the officers charged with the duty of so doing. The items embraced in plaintiff's claim, being incurred in the necessary discharge of his duties imposed upon him by the imperative mandate of the law, are not within the limitation imposed by section 26, art. 10. A similar question was presented in Re Application of the State to Issue Bonds to Fund Indebtedness, supra. That was an application by the state to determine the existence, character, and amount of the legal outstanding indebtedness of the state, and to issue funding bonds therefor. Warrants were issued from time to time during the fiscal year, ending June 30, 1911, in payment of the ordinary, current expenses of maintaining the state government pursuant to valid legislation, for which provisions had been made by the levy of taxes which in addition to the revenues expected to be derived from other sources was believed to be sufficient to meet the ordinary, current expenses for which the warrants were drawn. It is true in that case that the warrants were within the amount appropriated, while here the claims exceed the estimate made by the board of county commissioners, but the case is in point in principle because by section 23, art. 10 (Wms. Anno.) Const., the state was prohibited from contracting debts on account of deficits or failures in revenue to exceed at any one time $ 400,000, and it was contended that the warrants which amount to something is excess of $ 2,000,000 were void because issued in violation of said section 23, art. 10. The limitations imposed by that section were held not to apply to that class of pecuniary obligations arising out of the ordinary, necessary current expenses of maintaining the state government which were otherwise legal and valid.
¶7 Similar provisions have been construed in other states by the courts of last resort, holding that the ordinary expenses of maintaining a county and municipal government are not within the limitation of constitutional...
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