Smart v. Cantor
Decision Date | 16 December 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 13413,13413 |
Citation | 117 Ariz. 539,574 P.2d 27 |
Parties | Randy SMART, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Irwin CANTOR, Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court, Respondent, and Alan C. SMART, Real Party In Interest. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Shirley H. Frondorf, Frondorf & Thayer, Phoenix, for petitioner.
Tod F. Schleier, Ronald I. Rubin, Sternberg, Sternberg & Rubin, Ltd., Phoenix, for real party in interest.
Petitioner, Randy Smart, instituted a special action in this Court pursuant to 17A A.R.S., Rules of Procedure for Special Actions. She has alleged an abuse of discretion by the Honorable Irwin Cantor, Judge of the Superior Court, based on the granting of respondent's petition for writ of habeas corpus in a child custody matter.
The custody dispute revolves about Robert Smart who was born to Randy and Alan Smart approximately five years ago. On March 12, 1975, the parties were divorced in Utah, with the petitioner being awarded custody of the child. Then on June 6, 1977, petitioner signed a stipulation to modify the original custody arrangement. Under the terms of the stipulation, respondent was to have custody during the school year, with the summer months being available to petitioner. On account of this stipulation, an order modifying the divorce decree was entered by the Utah court on September 12, 1977.
After signing the stipulation, but prior to the entry of the court order, petitioner moved to Arizona with the child. Respondent, attempting to retrieve the child, filed a certified copy of the Utah order together with a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Maricopa County. Based on these documents, an order to show cause was issued by the court below on the day before the date set for hearing. Although petitioner was not notified until the evening preceding the hearing, she was able to retain counsel. Following oral argument, the superior court ordered the child be returned to respondent. Due to the adverse determination, petitioner filed this special action, and the superior court's order was stayed pending this opinion.
From the memoranda which have been submitted, it appears that Arizona law concerning habeas corpus procedures in a child custody case is less than clear. The additional issue of full faith and credit 1 certainly has not simplified the matters here contested. Since we are granting the prayer for relief and remanding for further proceedings, a brief review of these issues seems appropriate.
As utilized by respondent, habeas corpus is merely a procedural device to bring child custody matters before a court. Warren v. Meyers, 21 Ariz.App. 111, 516 P.2d 53 (1973); Application of Stone, 14 Ariz.App. 109, 481 P.2d 280 (1971). Conceptually, such proceedings are related to the "criminal" habeas corpus procedure, A.R.S. § 13-2001 et seq., which is technically a civil procedure to test the legality and correctness of a prisoner's detention. Powell v. State, 19 Ariz.App. 377, 507 P.2d 989 (1973). However, when a person petitions the court for a writ of habeas corpus in a child custody matter, the paramount issues are the best interests and the welfare of the child, "rather than the technical legal right of the parent." Clifford v. Woodford, 83 Ariz. 257, 262, 320 P.2d 452, 455 (1957); Johnson v. Johnson, 105 Ariz. 233, 462 P.2d 782 (1969). Because of this difference, we feel the child custody procedures set forth in A.R.S. § 25-331(D) and (E) now control this type of action rather than the procedures set forth in the criminal code.
It was not until the evening preceding the 9:15 a. m. hearing that petitioner received her first notice of the hearing. Because of this abbreviated notice she was unable to prepare a responsive pleading. Also, petitioner was not heard on questions which she sought to raise at the oral argument. On account of the virtual lack of due process, we are remanding for additional proceedings in accordance with A.R.S. § 25-331(E).
As respondent correctly asserts, a valid child custody decree of a sister state is entitled to full faith and credit in Arizona. In Re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966). But, as explained by Justice Frankfurter concurring in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947):
The majority opinion in Halvey concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause:
Id. at 614-615, 67 S.Ct. at 906. Accord Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958). See Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 520 (1971).
From the foregoing it is clear that if Utah lacked the jurisdiction necessary to award respondent custody of the child, then respondent would not have been entitled to enforcement of the Utah order in this jurisdiction. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953); In Re Hughes, 73 Ariz. 97, 237 P.2d 1009 (1951). Therefore, petitioner should have been heard on this issue in the court below. Additionally, change of circumstances since the time of the order relied on by respondent may constitute proper grounds for either modifying the foreign custody award or for refusing its enforcement in whole or in part. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958); In Re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966); Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550 (1949). Although changed circumstances may constitutionally be considered during a habeas corpus proceeding, Arizona courts should not adjudicate such matters absent extraordinary circumstances if the child has been wrongfully brought into or retained in Arizona. McNeal v. Mahoney, 117 Ariz. 543, 574 P.2d 31 ( ); Graton v. Graton, 24 Ariz.App. 194, 537 P.2d 31 (1975).
Fraud has also been cited by the petitioner as adequate grounds to...
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