Smart v. United States
| Decision Date | 14 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | EP-14-CV-00208-KC |
| Parties | MICHAEL C. SMART, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
On this day, the Court considered Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion"), ECF No. 16, in the above-captioned case (the "Case"). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.
Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are taken from Plaintiff's pleadings.
The Case stems from a series of interactions between Plaintiff and the El Paso Medical Center ("Medical Center") between November 2012 and June 2013 regarding Plaintiff's pursuit of mental health treatment. Plaintiff visited the Medical Center on November 15, 2012, seeking to obtain previously prescribed medications and to schedule an appointment with a mental health specialist. Compl., ECF No. 3 at 3. During the course of his treatment over the following nine months, Plaintiff alleges that the Medical Center's staff diagnosed Plaintiff with intermittent explosive disorder, a diagnosis Plaintiff alleges was contrary to a previous diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. See Attach. to FTCA Claim, Mot. to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Ex. A, ECF No. 1-3 at 3. Plaintiff further alleges that the Medical Centerrepeatedly cancelled medical appointments. See Compl. 3; Attach. to FTCA Claim. Based on this series of events, Plaintiff came to believe that the Medical Center's staff misdiagnosed his mental health condition "for the sole purpose of denying and delaying . . . adequate mental health treatment." Compl. 3.
As a result, on September 6, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an administrative claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). See Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death ("FTCA Claim"), Mot. to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Ex. A, ECF No. 1-3 at 1; Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss and Mot. for Summ. J. ("Plaintiff's Response"), ECF No. 17 at 1. In his claim, Plaintiff sought damages in the amount of $480,000.00 arising from the Medical Center's staff negligently delaying and denying Plaintiff's mental health treatment. See FTCA Claim 1.
On November 1, 2013, the VA mailed Plaintiff a final denial letter by certified mail informing Plaintiff that his FTCA Claim had been denied.1 See Letter from Melinda Frick to Michael Smart (Nov. 1, 2013) (the "Final Denial"), Mot. to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Ex. B, ECF No. 1-4 at 2-3; see also Decl. of Rita McCaghren ("McCaghren Declaration"), Mot. Ex. A, ECF No. 16-1 at 2-3; Mot. 2. The Final Denial informed Plaintiff of a six-month statute of limitations to seek judicial relief from the VA's decision. Final Denial 2. Defendant disputes that the Final Denial was mailed on this date. Resp. 2.
Plaintiff, not having received the Final Denial, called the VA on January 3, 2014, to inquire about the status of the FTCA Claim. Pl.'s Resp. 1. By letter dated January 3, 2014, the VA informed Plaintiff that "[t]he original denial letter for [Plaintiff's] Federal Tort Claim wassent to [Plaintiff] by Certified Mail on November 1, 2013." Letter from Rita McCaghren to Michael Smart (Jan. 3, 2014) ("January Notice"), Mot. to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Ex. B, ECF No. 1-4 at 1. A copy of the Final Denial was attached to the January 3, 2014, letter. Id.
Five months after learning of the Final Denial, Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 3, 2014. See Mot. to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges "negligence and professional malpractice in connection with medical care denied and delayed to Plaintiff by the [VA] at the [Medical Center]." Compl. 1.
On June 24, 2014, the Honorable Robert F. Castaneda issued his Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (the "Report"), ECF No. 5. The Report recommended that Plaintiff's "application to proceed in forma pauperis be granted," but that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed "with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted." Id. at 1. In recommending dismissal, the Report found that the VA mailed Plaintiff the Final Denial on November 1, 2013. Id. at 7. Accordingly, under the FTCA's six-month statute of limitations, Judge Castaneda concluded that Plaintiff's June 3, 2014, petition to this Court was time-barred. Id.
After due consideration of the Report, the Court issued its Order Adopting in Part Report and Recommendation ("Order on the R&R"), ECF No. 10, on July 28, 2014. By the Order on the R&R, the Court found that dismissal based on the statute of limitations was not appropriate at that time because the Court could not conclude that the Final Denial had in fact been mailed on November 1, 2013, "[a]bsent an affidavit by an appropriate government official or some other direct evidence that the denial letter was sent." Id. at 3.
On October 24, 2014, Defendant filed its Motion, seeking either dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment because Plaintiff's claim is barred by the FTCA's statute oflimitations. Mot. 5-6. In support of the Motion, Defendant attaches a number of evidentiary documents not found in Plaintiff's pleadings. See Mot. Ex. A, ECF No. 16-1.
Plaintiff filed his Response on November 5, 2014. See Pl.'s Resp. Defendant, in turn, filed its Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 18, on November 12, 2014.
"If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 270-71 (5th Cir. 2010). Where a court converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, "[w]hile parties should be on notice that matters outside the pleadings are being considered by the Court, a district court need not give 'express notice' that it will treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment." Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 855 F. Supp. 2d 625, 639 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing Mackey v. Owens, No. 98-60758, 1999 WL 423077, at *2 (5th Cir. June 2, 1999); see also Montgomery v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Civil Action No. 09-0584, 2010 WL 4781438, at *3-4 (W.D. La. Oct. 14, 2010)). "[T]he proper question is whether the nonmovant was on notice that the district court could treat the motion as one for summary judgment, not [whether] the court would in fact do so." Id. (citing Gen. Retail Servs., Inc. v. Wireless Toyz Franchise, LLC, 255 F. App'x 775, 784 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir. 1990).
"Adequate notice is provided when the moving party frames its motion in the alternative as one for summary judgment." Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,Local 150, AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Hifirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1996); Tremont LLC v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 741, 853 (S.D. Tex. 2010) ().
In this Case, Defendant clearly framed the Motion as seeking summary judgment in the alternative. See Mot. 1, 3-4. Plaintiff accordingly has been on notice that the Court could grant summary judgment since October 24, 2014, when the motion was first filed. See Tri-Gen, 433 F.3d at 1029; Mot. 1, 3-4. Indeed, Plaintiff's Response acknowledges that Plaintiff has been aware that the Court could grant summary judgment since at least November 5, 2014, because Plaintiff states that he is "opposed" to Defendant's "motion for summary judgment." See Pl.'s Resp. 3. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has received sufficient notice for the Court to consider the Motion as a motion for summary judgment. See Grynberg, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 639; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
A court must enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008). "A fact is 'material' if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law." Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for thenonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 1996).
"[The] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Wallace v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1996). To show the existence of a genuine dispute, the nonmoving party must support its position with citations to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[,]" or show "that the materials cited by the movant do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute, or that [the moving party] cannot produce admissible...
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