Smiley v. Holm

Decision Date11 April 1932
Docket NumberNo. 617,617
Citation52 S.Ct. 397,76 L.Ed. 795,285 U.S. 355
PartiesSMILEY v. HOLM, as Secretary of State of Minnesota
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. George T. Simpson, Alfred W. Bowen, W. Yale Smiley, John A. Weeks, and F. J. Donahue, all of Minneapolis, Minn., for petitioner.

Messrs. Henry N. Benson, Atty. Gen., and William H. Gurnee, Asst. Atty. Gen., both of St. Paul, Minn., for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 356-361 intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the reapportionment following the fifteenth decennial census, as provided by the Act of Congress of June 18, 1929 (c. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 21, 26 (2 USCA § 2a)), Minnesota is entitled to nine Representatives in Congress, being one less than the number previously allotted. In April, 1931, the bill known as House File No. 1456 (Laws Minn. 1931, p. 640), dividing the state into nine congressional districts and specifying the counties of which they should be composed, was passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate of the state, and was transmitted to the Governor, who returned it without his approval. Thereupon, without further action upon the measure by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives, House File No. 1456 was deposited with the secretary of state of Minnesota. This suit was brought by the petitioner as a 'citizen, elector and taxpayer' of the state to obtain a judgment declaring invalid all fillings for nomination for the office of Representative in Congress, which should designate a subdivision of the state as a congressional district, and to enjoin the secretary of state from giving notice of the holding of elections for that office in such subdivi- sions. The petition alleged that House File No. 1456 was a nullity, in that, after the Governor's veto, it was not repassed by the Legislature as required by law, and also in that the proposed congressional districts were not 'compact' and did not 'contain an equal number of inhabitants as nearly as practicable' in accordance with the Act of Congress of August 8, 1911.1

The respondent, secretary of state, demurred to the petition upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. He maintained the validity of House File No. 1456 by virtue of the authority conferred upon the Legislature by article 1, § 4, of the Federal Constitution, and he insisted that the act of Congress of August 8, 1911, was no longer in force, and that the asserted inequalities in redistricting presented a political and not a judicial question. The trial court sustained the demurrer, and its order was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state. 238 N. W. 494. The action was then dismissed upon the merits, and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment upon its previous opinion. 238 N. W. 792. This Court granted a writ of certiorari. 284 U. S. 616, 52 S. Ct. 266, 76 L. Ed. —.

Article 1, § 4, of the Constitution of the United States, provides:

'The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators.'

Under the Constitution of Minnesota, the 'legislature' consists 'of the senate and house of representatives.' Const. Minn. art. 4, § 1. Before any bill passed by the Senate and House of Representatives 'becomes a law,' it must 'be presented to the governor of the state,' and if he returns it, within the time stated, without his approval, the bill may become a law provided it is reconsidered and thereupon passed by each house by a two-thirds vote. Id. art. 4, § 11. The state Constitution also provides that, after each Federal census, 'the legislature shall have the power to prescribe the bounds of congressional * * * districts.' Id. art. 4, § 23. We do not understand that the Supreme Court of the state has held that, under these provisions, a measure redistricting the state for congressional elections could be put in force by the Legislature without participation by the Governor, as required in the case of legislative bills, if such action were regarded as a performance of the function of the Legislature as a lawmaking body. No decision to that effect has been cited. It appears that 'on seven occasions' prior to the measure now under consideration the Legislature of Min- nesota had 'made state and federal reapportionments in the form of a bill for an act which was approved by the Governor.'2 While, in the instant case, the Supreme Court regarded that procedure as insufficient to support the petitioner's contention as to practical construction, that question was dismissed from consideration because of the controlling effect which the court ascribed to the federal provision. 238 N. W. page 500. The court expressed the opinion that 'the various provisions of our state Constitution cited in the briefs are of little importance in relation to the matter now in controversy'; that 'the power of the state Legislature to prescribe congressional districts rests exclusively and solely in the language of article 1, § 4, of the United States Constitution.' Id. 238 N. W. page 497. Construing that provision, the court reached the conclusion that the Legislature in redistricting the state was not acting strictly in the exercise of the lawmaking power, but merely as an agency, discharging a particular duty in the manner which the Federal Constitution required. Upon this point the court said (Id. 238 N. W. page 499):

'The Legislature in districting the state is not strictly in the discharge of legislative duties as a lawmaking body, acting in its sovereign capacity, but is acting as representative of the people of the state under the power granted by said article 1, § 4. It merely gives expression as to district lines in aid of the election of certain federal officials; prescribing one of the essential details serving primarily the federal government and secondly the people of the state. The Legislature is designated as a mere agency to discharge the particular duty. The Governor's veto has no relation to such matters; that power pertains, under the state Constitution, exclu- sively to state affairs. The word 'legislature' has reference to the well-recognized branch of the state government-created by the state as one of its three branches for a specific purpose-and when the framers of the Federal Constitution employed this term, we believe they made use of it in the ordinary sense with reference to the official body invested with the functions of making laws, the legislative body of the state; and that they did not intend to include the state's chief executive as a part thereof. We would not be justified in construing the term as being used in its enlarged sense as meaning the state or as meaning the lawmaking power of the state.'

The question then is whether the provision of the Federal Constitution, thus regarded as determinative, invests the Legislature with a particular authority, and imposes upon it a corresponding duty, the definition of which imports a function different from that of lawgiver, and thus renders inapplicable the conditions which attach to the making of state laws. Much that is urged in argument with regard to the meaning of the term 'Legislature' is beside the point. As this Court said in Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U. S. 221, 227, 40 S. Ct. 495, 497, 64 L. Ed. 871, 10 A. L. R. 1504, the term was not one 'of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution. What it meant when adopted it still means for the purpose of interpretation. A Legislature was then the representative body which made the laws of the people.' The question here is not with respect to the 'body' as thus described but as to the function to be performed. The use in the Federal Constitution of the same term in different relations does not always imply the performance of the same function. The Legislature may act as an electoral body, as in the choice of United States Senators under article 1, § 3, prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment. It may act as a ratifying body, as in the case of proposed amendments to the Constitution under article 5. Hawke v. Smith, No 1, supra; Hawke v. Smith, No. 2, 253 U. S. 231, 40 S. Ct. 498, 64 L. Ed. 877; Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, 137, 42 S. Ct. 217, 66 L. Ed. 505. It may act as a consenting body, as in relation to the acquisition of lands by the United States under article 1, § 8, par. 17. Wherever the term 'legislature' is used in the Constitution, it is necessary to consider the nature of the particular action in view. The primary question now before the Court is whether the function contemplated by article 1, § 4, is that of making laws.

Consideration of the subject-matter and of the terms of the provision requires affirmative answer. The subject-matter is the 'times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives.' It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved. And these requirements would be nugatory if they did not have appropriate sanctions in the definition of offenses and punishments. All this is comprised in the subject of 'times, places and manner of holding elections,' and involves lawmaking in its essential features and most important aspect.

This view is...

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