Smith, In re, Cr. 13961
Decision Date | 30 April 1970 |
Docket Number | Cr. 13961 |
Citation | 467 P.2d 836,2 Cal.3d 508,86 Cal.Rptr. 4 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 467 P.2d 836 In re Lawrence O'Neil SMITH on Habeas Corpus. |
Edward J. Horowitz, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Russell Iungerich, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner attacks the validity of a prior narcotics conviction used to increase the prison term imposed for a subsequent narcotics offense.
In 1954 petitioner was convicted on a plea of guilty of violating Health and Safety Code, section 11721 ( ). 1 In 1956 he was convicted by a judge sitting without a jury of violating Health and Safety Code, section 11500 ( ). The trial court found that the 1954 narcotics conviction had been proved, and petitioner was sentenced to the term prescribed by law. 2 We affirmed the conviction. (People v. Smith (1958) 50 Cal.2d 149, 323 P.2d 435.)
Petitioner now contends the 1954 conviction cannot be used to aggravate the maximum sentence for the 1956 narcotics conviction because Health and Safety Code, section 11721 has since been held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner relies on Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758. In that case the court held that insofar as section 11721 punished a person for being addicted to the use of narcotics, the statute imposed cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Robinson v. California, supra, 370 U.S. at pp. 666--667, 82 S.Ct. 1417.) The court, however, did not strike down that portion of section 11721 which makes unlawful the use of narcotics. (In re Carlson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 70, 72, 48 Cal.Rptr. 875, 410 P.2d 379.)
In the Carlson case we stated at page 73, 48 Cal.Rptr. at page 877, 410 P.2d at page 381: (See also In re Becerra (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 746, 747, 32 Cal.Rptr. 910.) We stated further at page 75, 48 Cal.Rptr. at page 878, 410 P.2d at page 382:
The evidence before us demonstrates that petitioner has not met this burden. Although the complaint filed against petitioner in 1954 has since been destroyed by court order, 3 the Attorney General has submitted evidence that petitioner was charged with and therefore pleaded guilty to both the use of and addiction to narcotics. 4 The declaration of Philip E. Grey, Assistant City Attorney of Los Angeles, states that at the time petitioner was arraigned and convicted, a prepared form of complaint was used in prosecutions for violations of section 11721 which charged that the defendant 'did wilfully and unlawfully use and be addicted to the unlawful use of narcotics.' The declaration further states that '(i)t was not the practice of deputies assigned to prosecute cases under Section 11721 to amend the complaint form * * * to charge only that the accused was addicted to the unlawful use of narcotics.' The declaration of John L. Denny, the deputy city attorney assigned to represent the People when petitioner was arraigned, states that the declarant is 'of the unalterable opinion that during the year of 1954, (he) never used any complaint form alleging a violation of Section 11721 of the Health and Safety Code other than such printed forms, since if (he) had done so it would have been such an unusual occurrence that (he) * * * would remember it to this day.'
Petitioner has presented no evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity which attached to the judgment or the showing offered by the Attorney General that he pleaded guilty to both the use of and addiction to narcotics. 5 His sole allegation in this regard is that he 'was arrested on or about October, 1954 and was convicted for being addicted to the use of narcotics (violation of Section 11721 Health & Safety Code) which addiction was determined by the opinion of an investigating officer of the Los Angeles Police Department.' This allegation is not inconsistent with a plea of guilty to a joint charge of use of and addiction to narcotics.
Petitioner has placed some reliance on the 1954 arrest report. In that report petitioner is quoted as saying: The report also contains the following statement by the arresting officers: The statements in the arrest report at best are only inconclusive as to whether petitioner was arrested for and subsequently pleaded guilty to the use of or addiction to narcotics.
Petitioner further...
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