Smith, In re, 1

• Decision Date: 10 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1,1
• Parties: In re Jeffrey Alan SMITH, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas Forty-Second Judicial District, Bradford County. JD 96. of Pennsylvania
• Court: Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline

Page 1229

687 A.2d 1229

In re Jeffrey Alan SMITH, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas Forty-Second Judicial District, Bradford County.

No. 1 JD 96.

Court of Judicial Discipline

of Pennsylvania.

Dec. 10, 1996.

Order Issuing Reprimand Feb. 11, 1997.

Memorandum on Sanctions March 3, 1997.

Before McCLOSKEY, President Judge, and BURNS, McGINLEY, DONOHUE, CASSEBAUM, MAGARO and MESSA, JJ.

DECISION

McCLOSKEY, Judge.

Findings of Fact

In accordance with Court of Judicial Discipline Rule of Procedure 502(D)(1), the Judicial Conduct Board and the Respondent have submitted stipulations of fact in lieu of trial. Under Rule 502(D)(1) the Court must accept the following facts as the facts necessary for disposition of this case, and hereby incorporates and adopts the stipulated facts below:

1. The Judicial Conduct Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") is empowered by Art. V, § 18 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to file formal charges alleging ethical misconduct on the part of judges, justices or justices of the peace and to present the case in support of the formal charges before the Court of Judicial Discipline.

2. President Judge Jeffrey Alan Smith (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent") is a duly-elected judge of the Court of Common Pleas serving the Forty-second Judicial District, which encompasses Bradford County, Pennsylvania.

3. Respondent commenced his service as a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of the Forty-second Judicial District on or about December 27, 1983, was elected to a ten-year term beginning January 2, 1986, and retained for another ten-year term after an election in November, 1995.

4. The Respondent is currently one of two commissioned judges in the Forty-second Judicial District.

5. In November, 1987, John C. Mott was elected judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Bradford County and commenced his service in January, 1988. Judge Mott continues to serve at this time.

6. Prior to Judge Mott's service, the Respondent was the only commissioned judge in the Forty-second Judicial District.

7. In his capacity as president judge of the Forty-second Judicial District, the Respondent has adjudicative and administrative responsibility for all divisions of the Court of Common Pleas in the Forty-second Judicial District (although all Orphans' Court cases are assigned to Judge Mott).

8. Since Judge Mott took office in January, 1988, the caseload in Bradford County was divided between the two judges by assigning all even-numbered (using the second digit) cases to the Respondent and all odd-numbered and Orphans' Court cases to Judge Mott. This pattern was altered only when the judges disqualified themselves from a case or were otherwise unavailable.

9. At no time since 1988 did the Respondent request any additional help from the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts in the form of assigning a senior judge or other matters in order to help him administer to his caseload.

10. Since December, 1983, the Respondent has generally attempted to comply with Rule of Judicial Administration 703 in that the Respondent has kept a record of each matter, civil, orphans' court, and criminal, whether interlocutory or final, which was pending before him for disposition. These records were intermittently submitted to the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania usually no later than the tenth day of the calendar month for the period ending with the last day of the preceding calendar month. Additionally, Judge Mott has also complied with the substantive requirements of Rule 703.

11. The Respondent failed to render decisions in a timely manner with regard to the following cases identified in the Complaint of the Judicial Conduct Board (Board Complaint): Case Nos. 1, 3, 5-10, 13, 16-18, 23, 24, 27, 32-41, 43-50, 52, 53, 56-66, 68-70, 72-74, 76-82, 84 and 85.

12. The decisional delay in the cases identified in Paragraph 11 of these Stipulations was unreasonable and unjustifiable under the circumstances.

13. The Respondent did not act with malicious intent with regard to the rights of litigants in failing to render prompt decisions.

Discussion

Neglect or Failure to Perform the Duties of Office

The Board contends that the Respondent has failed to render decisions in a timely manner, and thereby has engaged in conduct which constitutes a neglect or failure to perform the duties of office under Art. V, § 18(d)(1). Neither the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, nor disciplinary entities in other jurisdictions that have similar disciplinary provisions, have set forth a standard to determine when a judicial officer has violated this provision. In seeking to establish such a standard, we note that there are two basic questions involved in analyzing this provision: (1) what are the duties of office of a common pleas court judge, and (2) what conduct with regard to those duties will constitute a neglect or failure to perform them.

a. What are the Duties of a Common Pleas Court Judge?

With regard to the question of what duties are imposed upon a common pleas court judge, we note that the genesis of judicial powers in the Commonwealth stems from Art. V, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which establishes the Unified Judicial System as the basic framework for the judicial branch in the Commonwealth. Section 5(b) of Art. V sets forth the general jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas, vesting those courts with "unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law."

The powers and jurisdictional limits of the common pleas courts have been further fleshed out by the legislature in the Commonwealth's Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 101 et seq. Also, the Supreme Court has played its role as the supervisor of the Unified Judicial System, 42 Pa.C.S. § 1701, by promulgating rules governing the processes used by the courts and the administrative organization of the judicial system, which refines the powers, and consequently the duties, of judges of the common pleas courts.

Although the above-mentioned sources of the courts' powers and duties are in some instances specific with regard to particular duties of common pleas court judges, many duties of those judges are not precisely set forth but rather implied, based upon the powers vested in the courts.

Hence, when considering whether a judicial officer has neglected or failed to perform a duty of office, we may look to not only statutory and regulatory directives, but also to those duties that are implied by law.

With regard to the question of whether rendering decisions is a duty of a common pleas court judge, we note that generally neither statute nor rule dictate the performance of such a task. Therefore, in order to conclude that the Respondent has engaged in neglect or failure to perform a duty of office, we must consider whether the duty to render decisions is one that is implied by law.

As noted above, the legislature, in implementing the powers vested in it by Art. V, to define the jurisdiction of the common pleas courts, has vested those courts with the power to preside over various civil and criminal disputes. Based upon the courts' jurisdiction over such matters, we can infer that one of the necessary functions and indeed duties of judges is not only to preside over disputes, but also to resolve such disputes through the decision-making process. Accordingly, we conclude that the duty to render decisions in cases that are ripe for resolution is an implied but essential duty of judicial office. Hence, the "duty of office" element of the charge has been satisfied.

However, the duty to render decisions must have some temporal qualifications. We recognize that judges must have a reasonable amount of time within which to render decisions.

Neither statute nor Supreme Court rule sets forth a particular time frame within which judges must render decisions in cases that are ready for disposition. The only guidance is found in the Supreme Court's Rule of Judicial Administration 703, which requires common pleas court judges to submit reports of cases that have been pending for more than sixty days. Under that rule, judges are required to proffer explanations for why cases that remain pending past the sixty-day period have not been decided.

Because this Court concludes that a sixty-day period is generally a reasonable As noted above, the Board, in seeking to establish that a judge has engaged in conduct which constitutes a neglect or failure to perform a duty of office, must establish that a duty exists. However, once that element is established, it is also reasonable to consider whether a judge has some excuse for not complying with the duty. Accordingly, the Court must consider the various evidentiary burdens of the Board and Respondent in the context of decisional delay, specifically with regard to the issue of justification or excuse for delay beyond the sixty-day period.

time within which trial judges should dispose of matters that are ripe for disposition, that period of time supports the acceptance by this Court of a substantive rule applicable in proceedings before this Court when the Board charges a judge with unjustifiable delay.

In legal proceedings, questions often arise regarding which party has the responsibility to present evidence on a particular issue of fact. In many instances, the party which has pleaded a case against another has the initial responsibility of offering evidence in support of the facts necessary to prevail on the pivotal legal points at issue. McCormick on Evidence, § 337 (John William Strong ed., 3d ed. 1984). He must establish a prima facie case.

Courts often decide the question of what constitutes a prima facie case, and also, which party carries the initial burden of production on a fact issue, although in some instances the legislature will designate which party has a particular evidentiary responsibility. Leonard Packel and Anne Bowen Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence, ...