Smith v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1901
• Citation: 88 N.W. 368,115 Iowa 217
• Parties: IDA C. SMITH v. THE AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

88 N.W. 368

115 Iowa 217

IDA C. SMITH v. THE AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 20, 1901

Appeal from Black Hawk District Court.--HON. A. S. BLAIR, Judge.

ACTION upon a policy of accident insurance, by the beneficiary therein, to recover the sum of $ 2,000; being the indemnity provided in said policy in case of the death of the assured Samuel E. Smith, who was plaintiff's husband. There was a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict for plaintiff. From the judgment rendered thereon, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Dawson & Estey and E. A. Dawson for appellant.

Boies & Boies for appellee.

OPINION

WATERMAN, J.

Samuel E. Smith, who was a deputy sheriff of Black Hawk county, lost his life by stepping or falling from a rapidly moving train on the Illinois Central Railroad as he was returning to his home in Waterloo, from a trip to Independence where he had been for the purpose of taking a patient to the hospital for the insane. The accident happened shortly after midnight of September 7, 1899. The first complaint made is that the evidence does not sustain the verdict, in this: The burden was upon plaintiff to establish that Smith's death was the result of an accident, and the evidence does not so show. The instructions of the trial court placed the burden upon plaintiff of establishing that the death of the assured was "caused as alleged" (id est, by accidental means), and we have, therefore, to determine whether she made any substantial showing in this respect. When he went upon the train at Independence. Smith entered the smoking car, taking a seat and riding therein until reaching Waterloo. As the train entered that city, Smith left his seat and went out upon the platform. He had told a fellow passenger that he intended to alight when the train stopped at the crossing of the Great Western Railroad, as that would save him about three squares walk in getting home. As a matter of fact, he left the train at a point 1,046 feet before the Great Western crossing was reached, and while the train was running at least ten miles an hour. Two witnesses testify as to the manner in which he got off. He descended the steps and stood upon the lower one for just an appreciable space of time. It was quite dark. He was holding onto the railing with both hands. As he paused for an instant on this step, he was facing inwards, as one witness says, --towards the center of the car. In this position he left the train. After so leaving, he hung on to the railing with his left hand, and was dragged a short distance. One of the witnesses, a brakeman, says, "He seemed to me like a man who was going to step down on another step,--as if he thought there was another step there." While the question in response to which this statement was made was objected to by defendant, it was general in character, calling upon the witness to say whether Smith appeared to jump or fall from the train. No motion was made to strike the answer, and no assignment of error presents the question of the propriety of the court's action in receiving this testimony. Further, this witness stated that, in his opinion, Smith fell from the train. The record on this matter is the same as we have set out with relation to the last question and answer spoken of, except that there was a motion to strike out the answer. No assignment of error is predicated upon these rulings of the court. Under well established rules, this evidence stands for our consideration. Taking the case thus made, and the jury were authorized in finding that Smith did not intend to alight until the train stopped at the crossing, and inadvertently did so, by attempting to descend to another step, which he supposed was below the one upon which he was standing. If this was the case, his injury was accidental, within the definition of that term as heretofore given by this court, for it was the result of an event which took place without his foresight or expectation. It was an undesigned and unexpected happening. Feder v. Association, 107 Iowa 538, 78 N.W. 252.

II. The policy in suit did not cover accident or death resulting in whole or in part from voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger, and it is claimed on the part of appellant that Smith's death was so caused. The burden of proof was upon the defendant to establish the breach of this clause of the contract. Follis v. Association, 94 Iowa 435, 62 N.W. 807; Jones v. Same, 92 Iowa 652; Sutherland v. Insurance Co., 87 Iowa 505, 54 N.W. 453. "Voluntary exposure to danger" means something more than negligence contributing to the injury. "The policy was, no doubt, intended to cover accidents, although the assured may have been guilty of negligence which approximately contributed to his injury." Follis v. Association, supra. The act which causes the exposure may be voluntary, yet the exposure may be involuntary. Jones v. Association, supra; Burkhard v. Insurance Co., 102 Pa. 262 (48 Am. Rep. 205); Equitable Acc. Ins. Co. v. Osborn, 90 Ala. 201 (9 So. 869, 13 L. R. A. 267). The test seems to be, did the assured appreciate that by doing the act he was putting life or limb at hazard? Matthes v. Association, 110 Iowa 222, 81 N.W. 484. The evidence discloses that Smith was accustomed to traveling on railroad trains; that he had ridden on this train before. We cannot say, as matter of law, that his standing upon the car steps, holding to the rail with both hands, was a "voluntary...