Smith v. Anderson

• Citation: 67 Cal.2d 635,63 Cal.Rptr. 391,433 P.2d 183
• Decision Date: 09 November 1967
• Docket Number: S.F. 22541
• Parties: , 433 P.2d 183 Arthur L. SMITH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Jimmie ANDERSON, as Tax Collector, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)

Page 391

63 Cal.Rptr. 391

67 Cal.2d 635, 433 P.2d 183

Arthur L. SMITH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Jimmie ANDERSON, as Tax Collector, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

S.F. 22541.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Nov. 9, 1967.

Franklin A. Dill, San Francisco, and William B. Boone, Santa Rosa, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Richard M. Ramsey, County Counsel, and John C. Gaffney, Asst. County Counsel, for defendants and respondents.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Ernest P. Goodman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. Hollingshead, Deputy Atty. Gen., Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Los Angeles, A. R. Early, Asst. County Counsel, Robert M. Wash, County Counsel, Fresno, and Herbert L. Ashby, County Counsel, Ventura, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and respondents.

BURKE, Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered upon the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend to their petition for mandate. Defendant Anderson is the Tax Collector-Redemption Officer and defendant McMullen is the Assessor of Sonoma County. A hearing was granted by this court, after decision by the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, for the purpose of giving further study to the problems presented. After such study we have concluded that the opinion of the Court of Appeal, prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice Molinari and concurred in by Justices Sims and Elkington, correctly treats and disposes of the issues involved, and it is therefore adopted as and for the opinion of this court, with certain further comments of our own pertinent to contentions urged. Such opinion (with appropriate ( ) The question presented on appeal is whether upon the request of an owner of an undivided interest in real property, which property has been sold and deeded to the state for delinquent taxes, the county redemption officer and assessor are required under Revenue and Taxation Code sections 4153 and 4154 to separately value the owner's undivided interest in the property in order that he might separately redeem his interest. We have determined that this question must be answered in the affirmative and, accordingly, that the judgment must be reversed.

[433 P.2d 185] deletions and additions as indicated) is as follows: ¹

By their petition for writ of mandate appellants Smith and Tallarico alleged that by deed recorded on November 23, 1965, they each became the owners in joint tenancy of an undivided 190/720th interest in certain real property in Sonoma County, which property is described on the county assessment roll as 'Parcel No. 77--17--1'; that this entire parcel had been sold to the State of California for delinquent taxes in 1952 and deeded to the state in 1957; that neither the Smiths' nor the Tallaricos' interest in this parcel of property has a separate voluation for any year; that appellants have presented their deeds to respondent Anderson, requesting him to obtain a separate valuation for appellants' respective undivided interests in the subject property so that appellants may redeem these interests, and to furnish appellants with the separate estimates necessary to redeem their undivided interests in the subject property; that respondent Anderson has refused and still refuses to make such request to respondent McMullen and to furnish appellants with such estimates; and that respondent McMullen has informed appellants that he will not agree to a separate valuation of their respective undivided interests.

Based upon these allegations appellants prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandate compelling respondent Anderson to request of respondent McMullen separate valuations for appellants' respective undivided interests in the subject property; further compelling respondent McMullen to furnish such separate valuations so that appellants may redeem their respective undivided interests in the subject property; further compelling respondent Anderson to accept the amounts so computed as being the correct amounts necessary to redeem appellants' respective interests; and finally compelling respondent McMullen to separately assess appellants' respective interests in the subject property for both current and future taxes.

In support of their contention that the petition states a case in mandate, appellants assert that based upon the allegation that they requested a valuation pursuant to section 4151 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, ² a duty devolved upon respondents by virtue of sections 4153 and 4154, ³ to On its face, section 4151, which speaks in terms of separate valuation of a 'parcel' of tax-sold and tax-deeded property, appears to sanction separate valuation for the purpose of redemption of only a geographically-delineated portion of tax-sold or tax-deeded property. (See Peterson v. Johnson, supra.) While this is the construction of section 4151 which respondents claim to be the proper one, appellants urge that section 4151 also authorizes a separate valuation of an undivided interest in tax-sold or tax-deeded property. In so urging, appellants rely heavily upon section 4146, which provides in pertinent part that the term 'parcel,' as used in the chapter entitled 'Redemption of Part of Assessment,' which chapter includes section 4151, 'includes an undivided interest in real property.' We think that appellants' contention is sound. Not only does the wording of section 4151, when read in conjunction with the definition of the term 'parcel' contained in section 4146, support appellants' position, but, in addition, the legislative history of sections 4146 and 4151 indicates that separate valuation and partial redemption of an undivided interest in tax-sold or tax-deeded property was intended by these sections.

[433 P.2d 186] make separate valuations of appellants' interests in the subject property. Respondents, on the other hand, take the position that appellants do not fall within the class of persons who are entitled to apply for separate valuation under section 4151 and that therefore sections 4153 and 4154 impose no duty upon respondents to make such separate valuations. From the respective positions of appellants and respondents it becomes apparent that we are called upon on this appeal to interpret section 4151 and particularly to determine whether this section entitles the owner of an undivided interest in tax-sold and tax-deeded property to request a separate valuation of his undivided interest in that property in order to redeem such interest. We should point out here that since the right of redemption comes entirely from statute and is subject to all limitations and conditions therein imposed (Peterson v. Johnson, 39 Cal.2d 745, 748, 249 P.2d 17; Sutter-Yuba Invest. Co. v. Waste, 21 Cal.2d 781, 785, 136 P.2d 11; Quinn v. Kenney, 47 Cal. 147, 150), if respondents are to be held duty-bound to respond to appellants' requests for separate valuation of their undivided interests, the source of this duty must be found in sections 4151, 4153 and 4154.

The predecessor statute to sections 4146 and 4151, which were enacted in 1939, was Political Code section 3818. ⁴ As we read In support of their position respondents rely, in good part, upon an opinion of the Attorney General of this state. (37 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 223.) We have concluded, however, that the reasons advanced by the Attorney General which are supportive of respondents' position on the issue in question are not persuasive. ⁵ (For a criticism of the Attorney General's opinion see 50 Cal.L.Rev. 325--326.) In concluding that a joint tenant or tenant in common cannot obtain a separate valuation of his interest in tax-sold or tax-deeded property for the purpose of redeeming his interest, the Attorney General relies on the similarity of section 4151 to section 2803, which authorizes separate valuation for the purpose of paying current taxes. ⁶ Specifically the Attorney General concludes that since section 2803 does not ( ) (require) separate valuation of an undivided interest for the purpose of paying current taxes and since the language of section 4151 is similar to that of section 2803, such separate valuation is not ( ) (required) by section 4151 for the purposes of redeeming tax-sold or tax-deeded property.

[433 P.2d 187] the pertinent language of this section it appears to have authorized separate valuation and partial redemption not only of lots, pieces or parcels of land, that is, geographically-delineated portions, but also of undivided interests in separately-assessed parcels of land. Moreover, while section 4151 is worded in language similar to the first of the paragraphs of former Political Code section 3818 quoted in footnote 4, which paragraph dealt with separate valuation and partial redemption of a lot, piece, or parcel of land which did not have a separate valuation on the assessment roll, we are of the opinion that section 4151 was intended to be a recodification[67 Cal.2d 641] not only of that portion of Political Code section 3818 but also of that portion of said statute dealing with the separate valuation and partial redemption of an undivided interest in a separately-assessed parcel contained in the second paragraph of Political Code section 3818 which is set out in said footnote. This intention on the part of the Legislature was, we believe, manifested by the enactment of section 4146, which provides that the term 'parcel' as used in section 4151 'includes an undivided interest in real property.'

( ) (Even if it be conceded, without deciding, that the Attorney General is correct in concluding that section 2803 does not require separate valuation of an undivided interest for the purpose of paying Further, we believe that the Attorney General's analysis of the legislative history of section 4151 is incorrect. This analysis is found in a letter written by the Attorney General as an amplification of his opinion concerning separate valuation and redemption of undivided interests. In this letter the Attorney...