Smith v. Beck, No. COA08-403 (N.C. App. 3/17/2009)
| Decision Date | 17 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. COA08-403.,COA08-403. |
| Parties | LARRY EUGENE SMITH, Petitioner, v. THEODIS BECK, in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, Respondent. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Petitioner Larry Eugene Smith, Jr. appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Smith contended in his complaint that the State had failed to provide him with meaningful access to the courts as required by Article I, Sections 18, 19, and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. Because, however, Smith did not allege in his complaint that any inadequacies in the State's system for providing access caused him actual injury, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of his claims.
Prior to 1989, the State, through the Department of Correction ("DOC"), provided its prison inmates with access to the courts through the use of law libraries. In 1989, the State created North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services ("NCPLS"), an entity that now provides the sole source of legal services to North Carolina prisoners, and stopped providing law libraries. On 29 June 2005, Smith, a state inmate serving a 39-year sentence, brought this action in Scotland County Superior Court, challenging the sufficiency of NCPLS as a means of providing meaningful access and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the state and federal constitutions.
In his complaint, Smith alleged that NCPLS was "an inadequate substitute for law library, typewriter and photocopier access as NCPLS does not provide necessary support services such as legal research, typing, photocopying, or advice to inmates who are forced to represent themselves because NCPLS has refused to represent them in various non-frivolous legal matters." He further alleged that his "requests for legal assistance from NCPLS [were] routinely denied as NCPLS generally only accepts for representation lawsuits that have class action impact or where a large damage award is likely or when ordered to by a judge."
Smith alleged that he had been forced "to proceed pro se without access to the necessary legal research, typing and photocopying services [he] needed to adequately prosecute [his legal claims] within the courts . . . ." He claimed, therefore, that the State had violated "his right to be afforded adequate, effective and meaningful court access" under the United States Constitution as guaranteed in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977), and by Article I, Sections 18, 19, and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. Smith requested that the trial court issue an injunction ordering the State to adequately fund NCPLS so that NCPLS could begin to meet the legal needs of Smith and the tens of thousands of other inmates; provide Smith with legal research access when proceeding pro se either through law library access, on-line legal research access such as Westlaw or LexisNexis, or through NCPLS; provide Smith with access to a photocopier; and provide Smith with access to a typewriter either at DOC or his own expense.
On 18 July 2005, Smith filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On 8 August 2005, the State filed a notice of removal to the United Stated District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. In an order dated 25 September 2007, United States District Judge N. Carlton Tilley, Jr. noted that Smith had made a motion for voluntary dismissal of his federal claims; he treated that motion as a motion to amend the complaint by dismissing the federal claims; and he allowed that motion, dismissing the federal claims with prejudice. Judge Tilley then declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction over Smith's remaining state law claims and remanded the case to Scotland County Superior Court.
On 5 October 2007, the State filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Smithfiled a notice of hearing dated 8 October 2007, requesting that his motion for preliminary injunction be heard on 26 November 2007. Smith also filed a written response to the State's motion to dismiss on 31 October 2007. In a letter filed 8 November 2007, the State requested that the trial court decide the motion to dismiss "without an in-person hearing" since the motion raised only a question of law and "[a]n in-person hearing would add absolutely nothing to the briefs and would waste a considerable amount of court time, state employee work time, travel time, and gasoline."
Judge Richard T. Brown sent a letter to the parties on 16 November 2007, advising them that he would consider the State's motion "based on written briefs or memorandums." Judge Brown stated further that the parties could have additional time "to prepare and submit the proper paperwork for consideration" if the request was made prior to 26 November 2007.
On 2 January 2008, after considering the file and the written arguments of the parties, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court concluded:
(1) that the North Carolina Constitution does not provide a right of access to the courts greater than that provided by the United States Constitution; (2) that meaningful access to the courts is provided under the current arrangement where, in lieu of law libraries, DOC contracts with North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services to provide legal assistance to inmates (see Wrenn v. Freeman, 894 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.C. 1995)); (3) that meaningful access to the courts does not necessarily include a right to photocopies of legal documents (see Wanniger v. Davenport, 697 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1983)); and (4) that meaningful access to the courts does not include the right to use a typewriter (seeStubblefield v. Henderson, 475 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1973)).
The trial court, therefore, dismissed Smith's claims with prejudice. Smith timely appealed to this Court.
As an initial matter, we must address two procedural arguments made by Smith. First, Smith contends that due process required the trial court to hear oral argument before ruling on the State's motion to dismiss. "Due process, of course, requires adequate notice and opportunity to be heard." Forman & Zuckerman, P.A. v. Schupak, 38 N.C. App. 17, 19, 247 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1978). We believe Smith was given both notice and an opportunity to be heard on the State's motion. He submitted written arguments to the trial court and was also given the chance to submit any additional materials that he wished the trial court to consider. Smith does not persuasively explain in what way the trial court's ruling would have been different if he had been permitted to present his legal arguments regarding the sufficiency of his complaint orally rather than in writing.
In In re Estate of Pope, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 666 S.E.2d 140, 149 (2008), disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2009 N.C. LEXIS 69, 2009 WL 422194 (Feb. 5, 2009), this Court recently rejected a plaintiff's claim that she was deprived of her right to due process because the trial court did not hear oral argument before issuing its ruling. In Pope, we stressed that the plaintiff was given "ample opportunity to be heard" through the trial court's acceptance of written materials. Id. We think the same is true here. Because Smith had an opportunity to be heard through his eight-page response to the motion to dismiss and any additional materials he wished to submit, the trial court did not err in failing to hold oral argument before ruling on the State's motion. See also Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004) (); Dayco Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 1975) (); Spark v. Catholic Univ., 510 F.2d 1277, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ().
Smith next contends that the trial court was required to rule on his pending motion for a preliminary injunction prior to ruling on the State's motion to dismiss. We believe, however, that the trial court could have reasonably determined that deciding the motion to dismiss first would be a more efficient manner of proceeding. If the trial court determined that the motion to dismiss should be allowed, then the action would be dismissed, and the motion for a preliminary injunction would be moot. See State v. Fayetteville St. Christian Sch., 299 N.C. 351, 357-58, 261 S.E.2d 908, 913 (), aff'd per curiam on reh'g, 299 N.C. 731, 265 S.E.2d 387, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807, 66 L. Ed. 2d 11, 101 S. Ct. 55 (1980); United Leasing Corp. v.Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 408, 263 S.E.2d 313, 318 (), disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980). On the other hand, if the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, it could still address the motion for a preliminary injunction.
We now turn to the merits of Smith's appeal. This Court reviews a trial court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo. Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of Am., Inc., 184 N.C. App. 455, 459, 646 S.E.2d 418, 422 (20...
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