Appeal
from common pleas circuit court of Charleston county
Buchanan, Judge.
POPE
J.
When
this action came on for trial before his honor Judge Buchanan
and a jury, upon reading the complaint the defendant
interposed a demurrer in writing on the ground that such
complaint fails to "state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action, in that the words set out in the
complaint, and alleged to have been uttered by the defendant
are not actionable nor libelous per se, nor such
as, without more, necessarily imply damage to the plaintiff
that it is therefore necessary for the plaintiff not only to
prove, but also in his complaint to specifically allege, the
special damage which he claims to have suffered, and this he
has failed to do." After argument the court said
"I do not think the complaint sets out enough here. I do
not think it sets out special damages at all. I do not think
it is fairly inferable from the complaint that the plaintiff
has any cause of action at all. I therefore grant the
motion." Then a formal order was made, sustaining the
demurrer and dismissing the complaint, with costs. The
plaintiff gave notice of appeal therefrom. It thus becomes
necessary to set forth the complaint and the grounds of
appeal. Omitting the caption, the complaint is as follows:
"The plaintiff above named, complaining of the defendant
above named, alleges:
(1) That at the times hereinafter stated the defendant, the
Bradstreet Company, was, and still is, a body corporate, duly
chartered under the laws of the state of Connecticut, having
its principal place of business in the city of New York, in
the state of New York.
(2) That the said defendant, the Bradstreet Company, at the
times hereinafter mentioned conducted, and still conducts, a
mercantile agency in the city of New York, and throughout the
United States and Canada; also having offices in the city of
Charleston, in said state of South Carolina; and their
business then consisted, and still consists, in collecting
information as to the credits and financial standing of
dealers throughout the country. That the defendant four times
a year then published, and still publishes, a book of
ratings, called 'Bradstreet's Commercial
Reports,' and once in each week a notification sheet,
called 'Sheet of Changes and Corrections,' which said
weekly notification sheet was at the times hereinafter
mentioned distributed, and is still distributed, broadcast
throughout the country, partly by mail and partly delivered
by messenger; and this plaintiff alleges that it was then,
and still is, distributed generally among all subscribers to the defendant's publication, irrespective of
their interest in the plaintiff's credit and
standing, and that such weekly publication was so generally
distributed on the date hereinafter set forth.
(3) That on the 9th day of February, 1898, said defendant,
the Bradstreet Company, maliciously composed and published
concerning the plaintiff, who was then, and had long
previously thereto been, a reputable merchant in good
standing and credit in the city of Charleston, state
aforesaid, carrying on successfully the business of a
pharmacist and druggist in the city of Charleston, state
aforesaid, the following false and defamatory matter, under
the head of 'Record Items,' in said publication of
February 9, 1898, known as the 'Sheet of Changes and
Corrections': 'South Carolina, Charleston. Smith,
Frank--Druggist. Chattel mortgage, $1,900.'
(4) That said publication was false, and that by reason
thereof this plaintiff's business was injured, and this
plaintiff was injured in his business reputation, and in his
good name and credit as a merchant, to his damage $1,995.
Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant for
the sum of $1,995."
The
grounds of appeal were as follows: "First. Because his
honor erred in holding 'that the demurrer be sustained
and the complaint be dismissed, with costs.' Second.
Because his honor erred in holding 'that it was necessary
to set out in the complaint special damages.' Third.
Because his honor erred in holding that 'it was not
fairly inferable from the complaint that the plaintiff has
any cause of action whatever.' Fourth. Because his honor
erred in holding 'that the words set out in the
complaint, and alleged to have been uttered by the defendant,
are not actionable nor libelous per se, nor as such, without
more, necessarily imply damage to the plaintiff.' Fifth.
Because his honor should have held that, inasmuch as the complaint alleged that the defendant maliciously
composed and published the false and defamatory matter, it
was not necessary to allege special damage. Sixth. Because
his honor erred in holding that it was necessary for the
plaintiff not only to prove, but also in his complaint to
specifically allege, the special damage which he claims to
have suffered, and ...
