Smith v. Califano

• Decision Date: 09 March 1979
• Docket Number: No. 77-1296,77-1296
• Citation: 597 F.2d 152
• Parties: Jeanine R. SMITH, Successor Party in Interest, Rosette V. Guidet, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary of H. E. W., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 152

597 F.2d 152

Jeanine R. SMITH, Successor Party in Interest, Rosette V Guidet, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary of H. E. W., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 77-1296.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

March 9, 1979.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1979.

Thomas E. Hookano (argued), Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

Dwayne Keyes, U. S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., William Kanter, Atty. of Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Leonard Schaitman, Atty. (argued), Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

Before MERRILL and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and MURRAY, ^* District Judge.

CHOY, Circuit Judge:

Jeanine R. Smith, as successor in interest to Rosette V. Guidet, appeals from the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (the Secretary). We affirm.

I. Statement of the Case

The parties are agreed on the essential facts. Ms. Smith's grandmother, Rosette V. Guidet, was born in 1895. She was widowed and suffering from a sight limitation and amputated leg. On January 1, 1974, Mrs. Guidet was placed in a board and care facility by Smith's husband with the assistance of the Sacramento County Welfare Department. Though it was understood that the costs of care would be paid by public assistance programs, ¹ Mr. Smith signed the admissions agreement, providing for payment of $250 a month in advance.

In late January and early February, Mrs. Guidet completed the necessary applications for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1381. Mrs. Guidet died on March 6, 1974, before the Social Security Administration (SSA) completed its processing of her application. Without completing an eligibility determination, ² the SSA denied payment to Mrs. Smith or her successors because:

Section 1631(b) of the Social Security Act provides that money due a supplemental security income recipient who dies may be paid only to the deceased individual's surviving husband or wife who was also a supplemental security income recipient in the month the deceased individual died. If there is no such surviving husband or wife, the payments due the deceased recipient cannot be made to anyone.

Upon appeal, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Mrs. Guidet's benefits for January and February should be paid either to the health facility or "to another appropriate representative payee." The ALJ wrote:

(I)f a person entitled to supplemental security income payments dies before receiving them, . . . payment, wholly or in part, may be made to a representative payee, to be used solely to reimburse . . . for necessaries furnished to the deceased applicant during the period for which the benefits are due, if such necessaries were provided in reasonable reliance on the needy applicant's future payment for such necessaries out of supplemental security income payments not yet received but to which entitlement existed for the period of furnishing such necessaries.

The Appeals Council of HEW on its own motion reviewed the ALJ's decision. Rejecting the ALJ's conclusion, the Appeals Council wrote:

Where an individual has died, there can be no payment to her even through a representative payee. Similarly, the applicant's attorney argues in his excellent brief that under Section 416.601(b) of the Regulations, payment to a representative payee constitutes payment to an eligible individual. The Appeals Council does not disagree with this contention; however, it is evident from Section 416.601(a) that payment through a representative payee is contemplated only where the eligible individual is living.

Ms. Smith then sought review of the Appeals Council's decision in the district court. ³ Noting that the health facility had not yet received payment, Ms. Smith asked that the district court reverse the Appeals Council's decision as legally erroneous, invalidate those regulations that she asserted were inconsistent with a proper reading of the Act, direct the Secretary to pay Mrs. Guidet's benefits "to an appropriate representative payee," and award costs and attorneys' fees. On cross motions for summary judgment the district court granted the Secretary's motion and denied Ms. Smith's motion. ⁴

II. Interpretation of § 1631

The parties agree that the payment involved in the present dispute constitutes an underpayment under the Act. Section 1631(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b), provides in part:

Whenever the Secretary finds that more or less than the correct amount of benefits has been paid with respect to any individual, proper adjustment or recovery shall . . . be made by appropriate adjustments in future payments to such individual or by recovery from or Payment to such individual or his eligible spouse (or by recovery from the estate of either). . . .

(Emphasis added). The Secretary argues that this provision and the regulations adopted thereunder ⁵ prevent his making posthumous underpayments to anyone except an eligible spouse. See 40 Fed.Reg. 47762 (1975; 39 Fed.Reg. 2012 (1974). Ms. Smith counters that subsection (b) does not proscribe payment to appropriate "representative payees." We believe that the Secretary's interpretation is correct.

First, the language of § 1631(b) is clear on its face. It specifically limits the Secretary to giving underpayments only to "such individual or his eligible spouse." By contrast, where Congress intended to allow payments to other individuals, it specified such allowance, as in subsection (a)(2) of § 1631. ⁶ As we wrote in another context, "(t)he language of a statute is the best and most reliable index of its meaning, and where the language is clear and unequivocal it is determinative of its construction." Monte Vista Lodge v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 384 F.2d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1967), Cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950, 88 S.Ct. 1041, 19 L.Ed.2d 1142 (1968).

Second, the legislative history indicates that Congress intended that subsection (b) be interpreted in the Secretary's manner. The House Report said of the provision which became § 1631(b):

Overpayments and underpayments. . . . (I)f less than the correct amount of benefits had been paid, the Secretary would pay the balance due to the underpaid individual. If the individual dies before the amount due has been paid to him, or before he negotiates the check representing the correct payment, the amount due would be paid to his eligible spouse, if there is one, and the payment would not be taken into account in determining the spouse's need under this program. Underpayments, however, would not be paid to the estate of a deceased individual since that would not further the objective of meeting the current needs of individuals. Overpayments, on the other hand, could be recovered from the estate of a deceased individual.

H.Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Reprinted in (1972) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4989, 5141. Later the House Report reiterated that subsection (b)

provides that when more or less than the correct amount of benefits has been paid to an individual, the Secretary will make proper adjustments in future payments or by recovery from or payment to such individual or his eligible spouse, or by recovering from the estate of either . . . .

Id. at 5326. These comments demonstrate that Congress intended subsection (b) to operate as the Secretary here contends.

Third, though the courts remain the final interpreters of an act of Congress, See FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46, 93 S.Ct. 1773, 36 L.Ed.2d 620 (1973); Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1976), the courts have also repeatedly recognized that an administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute which it administers is deserving of considerable respect. See New York Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 37 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); White v. United States Civil Service Commission, 468 F.2d 1357, 1358 (9th Cir. 1972). ⁷ In the instant case the Secretary's reasonable reading of the Act is consistent with both the language of the statute and congressional pronouncements. We are thus most reluctant to disregard the Secretary's interpretation.

We conclude, as did the Appeals Council, that subsection (b) does not authorize the disbursement of Mrs. Guidet's aid to a "representative payee."

Though apparently acknowledging that on its face subsection (b) does not authorize such payment, Ms. Smith argues that when that subsection is read in conjunction with other parts of the Social Security Act a statutory basis for such payment emerges. First, she notes that the ALJ found that because Title II of the Social Security Act provides for making underpayments to individuals other than the eligible person's surviving spouse, "(t)he parts of the statute must be read reasonably together to accomplish their purpose. The authorization in the one subsection (of Title II) is meant to be understood in all the other sections (of the Act, including Title XVI)."

Section 204(a)(2) and (d) of Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 404(a)(2) & (d), includes very detailed provision for making underpayments to persons other than a deceased individual's spouse, including to "the legal representative of the estate of the deceased." § 204(d)(7). But when Congress wished to incorporate parts of Title II into the newer Title XVI, it did so explicitly. For example, subsection (d)(1) of § 1631, the very section with which we are concerned, selectively incorporates into Title XVI procedures specified in parts of Title II. Moreover, we cannot infer such incorporation here because the Title II provision for paying "the legal representative of the estate" conflicts directly with the language of § 1631(b) and the House Report's statement that "(...