Smith v. Calvary Christian Church

• Decision Date: 04 December 1998
• Docket Number: Docket No. 204661
• Citation: 592 N.W.2d 713,233 Mich.App. 96
• Parties: David Orion SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALVARY CHRISTIAN CHURCH, and Pastor Mark Byers, jointly and severally, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 713

592 N.W.2d 713

233 Mich.App. 96

David Orion SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALVARY CHRISTIAN CHURCH, and Pastor Mark Byers, jointly and severally, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 204661.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 9, 1998, at Lansing.

Decided Dec. 4, 1998, at 9:20 a.m.

Released for Publication March 12, 1999.

William S. Stern, P.C. (by William S. Stern ), Southfield, for the plaintiff.

Bigler, Berry, Johnston, Sztykiel & Hunt, P.C. (by Witold Sztykiel ), Troy, for the defendants.

Before JANSEN, P.J., and MARKEY and O'CONNELL, JJ.

MARKEY, J.

Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court's summary disposition order entered pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), (8), and (10) in favor of defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This case involves plaintiff's confessions in the mid-1980s to defendant Mark Byers, pastor of defendant Calvary Christian Church, ¹ that he had previously engaged in marital infidelity with prostitutes and defendant the pastor's decision, in late 1996, to convey this information to the entire congregation, including plaintiff's wife, family, and friends. Apparently, despite plaintiff's belief that his confession to defendant pastor was confidential, defendant Byers stated that he did not believe in confidential communications and that church doctrine required exposing plaintiff's sins to the congregation. Plaintiff claims that defendant Byers was not motivated by religious doctrine but by ill will and the intent to humiliate plaintiff and to create dissension within his family.

Plaintiff filed his complaint against defendants alleging that they breached their explicit and implicit duty of confidentiality to him by disclosing personal, sensitive information to the church congregation. Plaintiff also alleged that M.C.L. § 600.2156; MSA 27A.2156 created a cause of action against defendant Byers based on this disclosure. Moreover, plaintiff complained that this intentional breach of confidentiality caused him to suffer extreme psychological distress requiring treatment, as well as physical and mental pain. On appeal, plaintiff appears to challenge the trial court's grant of summary disposition only in regard to his allegations of intentional torts.

The trial court issued a written opinion granting defendants' motions for summary disposition, determining that M.C.L. § 600.2156; MSA 27A.2156 was a rule of evidence that did not create a cause of action for disclosure of private or privileged communications. Thus, plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. MCR 2.116(C)(8). The court also agreed that plaintiff and defendants did not enter into an express agreement regarding the confidentiality of the confessions plaintiff made to defendant Pastor Byers. Thus, plaintiff could not prove the necessary elements of a breach of contract action. Therefore summary disposition was granted to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Moreover, the court also concluded that whether the church required that the clergy keep confidential a member's personal disclosures was a matter of religious doctrine that the court could not determine according to civil law principles; consequently, even if properly pleaded, plaintiff could not and had not set forth prima facie causes of action for any form of intentional tort either.

I

Plaintiff asks this Court to determine whether the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution's First Amendment prevents him from asserting a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy where defendant Byers disclosed to the congregation personal information about plaintiff that plaintiff confidentially revealed to defendant Byers. Assuming that plaintiff is a member of defendant church, and because this question requires judicial review and interpretation of defendant church's doctrine, we answer in the affirmative.

Our review of constitutional issues and motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) is de novo. See Wilkins v. Gagliardi, 219 Mich.App. 260, 266, 556 N.W.2d 171 (1996); Pinckney Community Schools v. Continental Casualty Co., 213 Mich.App. 521, 525, 540 N.W.2d 748 (1995). Under both MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (10), summary disposition is properly granted where the court determines that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or the pleadings, affidavits, or other proofs do not establish a genuine issue of material fact. Skinner v. Square D Co., 445 Mich. 153, 161, 516 N.W.2d 475 (1994); Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Products Inc., 217 Mich.App. 705, 708, 552 N.W.2d 679 (1996). Under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we look to the pleadings alone, accept as true all factual allegations and reasonable inferences in support of the claim, and determine whether the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648, 654, 532 N.W.2d 842 (1995).

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in part, that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. US Const, Am I. This prohibition applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const, Am XIV. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government regulation of religious beliefs. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-220, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Government regulation may, however, lawfully impose an incidental burden on otherwise protected conduct where necessary to protect important societal interests, i.e., where a state interest of significant magnitude exists to override the interest allegedly protected under the Free Exercise Clause. Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 173 Mich.App. 752, 759-760, 434 N.W.2d 233 (1988); McLeod v. Providence Christian School, 160 Mich.App. 333, 343, 408 N.W.2d 146 (1987).

It is well established that only conduct posing a substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order may be subject to governmental regulation, even if that conduct is prompted by religious beliefs or principles. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). Conduct prompted by religious beliefs or principles is not, therefore, absolutely immunized from government intervention because actions taken for a presumably religious purpose can nonetheless negatively affect the public interest in peace, safety, and order. Id. "Thus, individuals have a qualified privilege to engage in conduct for religious purposes." Korean Presbyterian Church of Seattle Normalization Committee v. Lee, 75 Wash.App. 833, 839, 880 P.2d 565 (1994).

Absent conduct that negatively affects the public interest in peace, safety, and order, both federal and state courts are severely restricted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and art 1, § 4 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, in resolving disputes between a church and its members. Maciejewski v. Breitenbeck, 162 Mich.App. 410, 413-414, 413 N.W.2d 65 (1987). Indeed, jurisdiction over these matters is limited to determining property rights that can be resolved by the application of civil law. Id. at 414, 413 N.W.2d 65; see also Davis v. Scher, 356 Mich. 291, 297, 97 N.W.2d 137 (1959). When the court faces issues requiring the application of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity, ² the court ceases to have jurisdiction. Davis, supra; Berry v. Bruce, 317 Mich. 490, 500-501, 27 N.W.2d 67 (1947). The United States Supreme Court has defined religious doctrine as ritual, liturgy of worship, and tenets of faith. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979); see also Bennison v. Sharp, 121 Mich.App. 705, 713, 329 N.W.2d 466 (1982).

In Maciejewski, supra at 414, 413 N.W.2d 65, this Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of the defendants regarding the plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on alleged misconduct by church leaders. We found that

[i]t is beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts to determine rights to communion, qualification of members and privileges of membership which are necessary to decide the issues in this case. The trial court is not equipped or empowered to make such inquiries and was obliged therefore to grant summary disposition. [Id. at 416, 413 N.W.2d 65.]

Here, the manner in which defendant church and defendant Byers decide to discipline the church's members and the religious doctrine that underlies the discipline are matters of ecclesiastical polity. In his affidavit, defendant Byers stated that plaintiff's discipline was consistent with article III, § 3 of defendant church's bylaws, entitled "Discipline," which states that members wilfully absent from services for an extended period or who are "under charges" are temporarily suspended from active voting membership pending investigation of the case. The section also states that "[u]nscriptural conduct or doctrinal departure from the tenets of faith held by this assembly shall be considered sufficient grounds upon which any person may be disqualified as a member," citing several biblical passages underlying these bylaws, including Matthew 18:15-18; this biblical passage specifically states that the congregation should be told of the member's sins if the sinner refuses to repent.

Despite the civil tort language that plaintiff applies to defendants' actions, we cannot say that the facts in this case either permit or require judicial intervention into defendants' decision to discipline the church's members because this exercise will necessarily involve interpreting religious doctrine. Accord Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-710, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). Even the cases from foreign jurisdictions that plaintiff cites do not consistently mandate judicial...