Smith v. Carrasco
Decision Date | 03 September 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 3:04-CV-0010 AS.,3:04-CV-0010 AS. |
Citation | 334 F.Supp.2d 1094 |
Parties | Eric D. SMITH, Aka Eric Danchi, Plaintiff, v. CARRASCO, D. Miller, and Edward L. Cohn, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Eric D. Smith, Michigan City, IN, pro se.
Eric Smith, a prisoner confined at the Maximum Control Facility, submitted a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC") officials violated his federally protected rights while he was confined at the Indiana State Prison ("ISP"). The defendants are former IDOC Commissioner Ed Cohn and ISP officials D. Miller and Sergeant Carrasco. Mr. Smith alleges that on August 1, 2003, D. Miller took anarchist pamphlets from him and that on August 4, 2003, he received a confiscation notice from Sgt. Carrasco, formally advising him that these materials had been confiscated. Mr. Smith also asks the court to take supplementary jurisdiction over claims that the defendants violated provisions of the Indiana Constitution. This case is now before the court on Mr. Smith's amended complaint, filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(A).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint seeking redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. § 1915(b). Courts apply the same standard under § 1915A as when addressing a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint. Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir.2000).
A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Accordingly, pro se complaints are liberally construed.
In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court requires only two elements: First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of the right acted under color of state law. These elements may be put forth in a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In reviewing the complaint on a motion to dismiss, no more is required from plaintiff's allegations of intent than what would satisfy Rule 8's notice pleading minimum and Rule 9(b)'s requirement that motive and intent be pleaded generally.
Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir.2001) ( ).
The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that prisoners must utilize any available prison grievance procedure before they may file a § 1983 claim regarding conditions of confinement. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); Perez v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir.1999). A prisoner who does not take a timely administrative appeal of a grievance denial has not exhausted his administrative remedies for purposes of § 1997e(a). Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.2002). "§ 1997e applies to `all inmate suits, whether they involve general conditions or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.'" Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir.2002), quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). "Defendants may waive or forfeit reliance on § 1997e(a), just as they may waive or forfeit the benefit of a statute of limitations." Perez v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir.1999).
Mr. Smith initiated grievances concerning the confiscation of his anarchist materials, but it is not clear from the amended complaint whether he completed all steps of the IDOC grievance program. For the purpose of this memorandum, the court will presume that Mr. Smith has exhausted his administrative remedies. If the defendants wish to pursue failure to exhaust an available administrative remedy as an affirmative defense, they may file a dispositive motion addressing that claim.
Mr. Smith brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action to redress the violation of federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state law. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.1984). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that a person acting under color of state law committed the alleged deprivation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). The first inquiry in every § 1983 case is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979).
This court may not entertain Mr. Smith's request for injunctive and declaratory relief on his state law claims. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). To require Indiana officials to conform their conduct to Indiana law, Mr. Smith must look to his state court remedies.
Mr. Smith seeks injunctive and declaratory relief on his federal constitutional claims. But he has been transferred from the Indiana State Prison, where the incidents he complains of occurred, to the Maximum Control Facility. If a prisoner is transferred to another prison, "his request for injunctive relief against officials of the first prison is moot unless `he can demonstrate that he is likely to be retransferred.'" Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir.1996), quoting Moore v. Thieret, 862 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir.1988). Mr. Smith's transfer from the Indiana State Prison to the Maximum Control Facility renders any claims for injunctive relief moot. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 339 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied 501 U.S. 1208, 111 S.Ct. 2805, 115 L.Ed.2d 978 (1991); Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir.1996). A prisoner's transfer from one institution to another also renders his claims for declaratory relief moot. Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d at 811, citing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) ( ).
Mr. Smith alleges that the defendants' actions violated rights protected by Article I §§ 9 and 11 of Indiana's Constitution, and asks the court to assume supplemental jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367, which codified the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, provides that federal courts, unless otherwise provided by statute, "have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action ... that they form part of the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court may, however, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if "the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1).
Under the federal system, federal courts do not interpret state constitutions, though they may apply settled interpretations of a state constitution established by state courts. Mr. Smith is asserting state constitutional claims as they apply to convicted prisoners, on which there is apparently no state created precedent. Linnemeier v. Indiana University — Purdue University Fort Wayne, 155 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1056 (N.D.Ind.2001). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), this court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Smith's Indiana constitutional claims, and will dismiss those claims without prejudice to his right to bring them in state court.
Mr. Smith alleges that defendants Carrasco and Miller made decisions that violated his federally protected rights, acting under IDOC Rule B-246. He alleges that former IDOC Commissioner Ed Cohn violated his Constitutional rights "by creating a rule that was vague without caring if such vague rule would be abused by prison officials and others that would result in the violation of plaintiff's rights." (Amended complaint at p. 11).
Section 1983 creates a cause of action for damages based on personal liability. A person cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the person was personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing. A plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant's participation or direct responsibility for the conditions of which he complains, Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 879 (7th Cir.1996), by demonstrating a causal link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's...
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