Smith v. Chamberlain

• Decision Date: 29 March 1893
• Parties: SMITH et al. v. CHAMBERLAIN.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

17 S.E. 371

38 S.C. 529

SMITH et al. v. CHAMBERLAIN.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 29, 1893

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Aiken county; J. F. Izlar Judge.

Action by Rebecca Smith and Seymour E. Smith against D. H Chamberlain, receiver of the South Carolina Railway Company. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

The charge of the court below was as follows:

"Gentlemen of the jury: This case has consumed considerable time, but no more time, however, than its importance demands; and it becomes your duty, and mine, now to perform our respective parts in this trial. It is my duty to give you the law of this case, as I understand it; and it is your duty to find the facts of this case under the testimony, as you have heard it, and apply the facts to the law as I have given it to you, and then find your verdict. In the consideration of this case, gentlemen, you will eliminate from your minds altogether that one party to this transaction was white or black, except so far as it becomes necessary to consider it in connection with certain portions of the testimony; and you will at the same time, gentlemen, in making up your verdict in this case, not find a verdict against the corporation because it is a corporation, or against Daniel H. Chamberlain because he happened to be the defendant in this case. The real defendant in this action is the South Carolina Railway Company. So, gentlemen, in considering this matter, you will consider it just as you would any other case which is brought before you. Give full weight to the testimony, give full heed to the law, as the court shall give it to you, and then find your verdict.

"Now Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, this action is brought by Rebecca Smith, plaintiff, against Daniel H. Chamberlain, as receiver of the South Carolina Railway Company, to recover damages for being, as she alleges, forcibly and unlawfully ejected from the ladies' room of the station house at Graniteville on the line of said railway, by the agent of said company, where she had gone to purchase a ticket for the purpose of becoming a passenger on the trains run by said company. The gist of her action is shown in the fifth paragraph of the complaint, which I will read to you 'That, while the plaintiff Rebecca Smith was in the passenger room of said depot, she applied to one Fishburne, agent of said defendant, to purchase a ticket from Graniteville to Aiken, but that he refused to sell her a ticket, and ordered the plaintiff to go into the room allotted to male passengers, and upon plaintiff's refusal to do so the said agent came into said room, and approached the plaintiff, and unlawfully, in a rude and violent manner, ordered the plaintiff Rebecca Smith to get out of said room, and, upon her refusal to leave, caught hold of her, and entered into a tussle with said plaintiff, and finally, in a rough, unlawful, and violent manner, pulled and forced the said plaintiff to leave said room, and at the same time inflicting bruises and injuries upon this plaintiff which caused her pain and suffering.' Now, the gist of her action is contained in that allegation of plaintiff's complaint. The defendant denies all the material allegations of the complaint respecting the forcible and unlawful ejectment of the plaintiff. Thus, Mr. Foreman, the main issues of the case are clearly presented; and I hold that under a general denial, where the plaintiff alleges that she was unlawfully ejected, the defendant may give in evidence any testimony tending to show that such ejectment was not unlawful,--even a known rule of regulation,--not as a justification of the act, but as responsive to the issue, and in rebuttal of the allegation of unlawful ejectment. It is true that some testimony has been brought out in the hearing tending to show a discrimination against the plaintiff on account of color, she being a colored woman. This testimony was admitted without objection, but I do not think it was responsive to any allegation in the complaint, or any issue raised by the pleadings. The plaintiff, in her complaint, does not complain that she was discriminated against on account of color. Her cause of action, as set forth in her complaint, grows out of the alleged fact that she was forcibly and unlawfully ejected from the ladies' waiting room, where she had gone to purchase a ticket for the purpose of becoming a passenger on the railway of said company. Now, when a railroad company holds itself out to the traveling public as a carrier of passengers, persons desiring to travel on the line of such railway have a right to enter the ticket office provided by such company for the purpose of procuring tickets, and to occupy the waiting rooms provided, until the arrival of the trains. But, while they have this right, they must, while there, conduct themselves with decency and propriety. They cannot, because of the right accorded them by law, use the privilege so as to abuse it. They cannot take advantage of the privilege to disturb and annoy others who go there with like purposes, and under like privileges. If, while there, one should become boisterous, abusive, or indulge in profanity or open obscenity, or other disreputable conduct, to the annoyance and discomfort of others, it would not only be right and proper for the agent to eject such person, but it would be his duty to do so; and in doing so he would be justifiable, under the law, provided he did not use more force than was necessary for the purpose. Every railroad agent in this state is, within certain limits, a conservator of the peace, and is clothed with authority to arrest all disturbers and breakers of the peace, and those who are there violating the reasonable rules and regulations established for protection, convenience, and safety of the traveling public, and those interfering with the business of the agent.

"It may become necessary, in view of the testimony introduced in this case, that I should say something in regard to discrimination on account of color. Among the citizens of South Carolina, we have two distinct races. Before the law, they are equal. The colored race, in our courts of justice, stand on the same plane as the white race. Our laws bear equally upon all, without regard to race, color, or previous condition. Our social conditions, however, are very different. Friends, companions, and neighbors must be of our own choice. These relations and associations the law does not undertake to make or regulate for us. If we do not wish to associate with one class of society, there is no law that I know of which compels us to do so. Under the law, however, there can be no discrimination. There cannot be one law for the white man, and another for the black man. All laws must be made so as to bear equally, and to protect and punish alike all citizens of a common state or common community. But, while this is so, we have the question presented, is it discriminating against the colored race to provide a waiting room at a railway station for the whites, and another for the blacks, and to require each to purchase their tickets at a place provided for that purpose, if both rooms are of equal comfort, and equal accommodations are provided? My view of the law is that this would not be an act of discrimination. Both races would, under these circumstances, be treated exactly alike, though it might be in different rooms. The same regulations or rules would bear equally upon both. The same comforts would be enjoyed by both, and the same accommodations would be extended to both. While I give you this as the law, yet it is for you to say, from the evidence in the case, whether or not the accommodations provided by the South Carolina Railway Company at the Graniteville station, for the whites and blacks, on the occasion when the plaintiff claims to have been forcibly and unlawfully ejected from the waiting room, were substantially equal. If the preponderance of the evidence satisfies you that the accommodations provided were not substantially equal, then I charge you that a refusal to sell the plaintiff a ticket in that room by the agent, on account of her color alone, would be an act of discrimination, but, if otherwise, it would not be. I submit this question of fact to you. You must solve it by the preponderance of the evidence. I can do no more than give you the law as I understand it. I do not think, gentlemen, that in making provision at the railroad depot for the accommodation of the traveling public, where two rooms are provided,--one for the colored and one for the whites, (I am not speaking of this case now, but generally, and I say that where the accommodations are substantially equal, and require persons of these different classes to go into these respective rooms to purchase their tickets,) it would be an act of discrimination, but I do not think that exact equality, in every respect, would be required, but only a substantial equality in this accommodation. Now, one room might have upon it a knob lock and the other a padlock; and to come down to exact equality, I don't think it would be reasonable, and the law don't intend it. The accommodations, however, must be substantially equal. And I further charge you, gentlemen, that a regulation of that kind, in case you should come, in this case, to the conclusion that there was such a regulation existing at that place,--I don't think that a regulation of that kind would be unreasonable. I can see very good reasons why it would be otherwise .

"The next question to which I would call your attention is as to the authority of the agent to make reasonable regulation, in case you come to the conclusion, from the evidence, that such regulation was made and enforced by him. The agent of a railway

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