Smith v. City of Gainesville
| Decision Date | 23 January 1957 |
| Citation | 93 So.2d 105 |
| Parties | Dewey Colson SMITH, Petitioner, v. CITY OF GAINESVILLE, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
J. C. Adkins, Jr., Gainesville, for petitioner.
Lazonby, Dell, Graham & Mills, Gainesville, for respondent.
By petition for certiorari, petitioner Smith seeks review of an order of the Circuit Court affirming an order of the Municipal Court of Gainesville revoking his driver's license.
The point for our determination is the constitutionality of Section 322.25(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which authorizes municipal courts to revoke automobile drivers' licenses under certain circumstances.
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
Smith was convicted in the Gainesville Municipal Court of violating an ordinance of that city which makes it unlawful for any person to drive an automobile in an intoxicated condition. By the judgment of conviction, the municipal judge revoked petitioner's driver's license for one year. An appeal to the Circuit Court of Alachua County followed. The judgment of conviction and revocation of the driver's license was affirmed by the Circuit Judge. Review of this order of affirmance is now sought.
Petitioner contends that Section 322.25(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., violates Article V, Section 34 of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. He further contends that the assaulted statute is a bill of attainder; that it imposes a double punishment for a single offense, and that it constitutes an improper delegation of authority contrary to the organic laws of the State.
Respondent contends that the statute is not violative of the Constitution, and, on the contrary, that it imposes upon the municipal judge a purely ministerial administrative responsibility.
There can be no doubt that in the regulation of the use of automobiles on the public highways the State has ample power to require motor vehicle operators to obtain drivers' licenses. It likewise has the correlative power to impose reasonable restrictions on the use and enjoyment of the license. This, in turn, involves the power to make proper provision for the suspension or revocation of a driver's license under appropriate conditions and upon the occurrence of stipulated situations. 5 Am.Jur. Automobiles. Sections 151-157; Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Chap, 12. We, ourselves, have fully recognized this authority. Thornhill v. Kirkman, Fla.1953, 62 So.2d 740. In the case last cited, we aligned ourselves with those authorities which hold that a driver's license is a privilege, subject to proper regulations. It does not endow the holder thereof with an absolute property right in the use of the public highway. While in Carnegie v. Department of Public Safety, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 728, we held that a driver's license cannot be revoked arbitrarily or capriciously, we have nonetheless consistently followed the rule, which appears to be unanimous throughout the country, to the effect that upon a proper showing in accord with the prevailing statutes a motor vehicle operator's license may be revoked. This certainly is as it should be. It would appear to us to be utterly absured to hold that a man should be allowed to fill his automobile tank with gasoline and his personal tank with alcohol and weave his merry way over the public highways without fear of retribution should disaster ensue, as it so often does. The millinos who lawfully use the highways are entitled to protection against the potential tragedy ever lurking, inherent in this type of law breaking. It is this aspect of protecting the public, rather than as punishment for the offender, that courts have unanimously recognized as justification for revoking drivers' licenses upon conviction of certain offenses. True the recalcitrant law violator might feel the pain of the loss of a valuable privilege. However, the...
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