Smith v. City of Atlanta
| Decision Date | 27 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:11-CV-765-TWT |
| Parties | TONY SMITH, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
This is a civil rights action. It is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 4] and the Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Defendants' motions.
The Plaintiff, Tony Smith, was a student at Grady High School in Atlanta, Georgia, on October 6, 2009. That morning Smith was near the school bus when money was stolen from a student's wallet. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Smith claims that he did not commit the theft but was merely a witness. (Id.) The Defendants claim that a witness identified Smith and another student as the perpetrators of the theft. (Defs.' Mot. toDismiss, at 2.) On the morning of October 7, 2009, Smith claims that he was handcuffed and forcibly removed from class by Atlanta Police Officers Larry Bennett and Charles Brown, Grady Assistant Principal Roosevelt Foreman, and other school administrators. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Smith claims that the officers placed him in a small room (Compl. ¶ 12) and handcuffed him to a file cabinet and chair for approximately seven hours. (Compl. ¶ 20.)
The Atlanta Citizens Review Board investigated the incident in response to Smith's request. The Board found that Defendants Brown and Bennett violated Atlanta Police Department Standard Operating Procedures by detaining Smith for an unreasonable amount of time, not transporting him themselves to the juvenile detention facility, and handcuffing Smith to a filing cabinet. (Compl., Ex. 3.) Defendant Turner, the head of the City of Atlanta Police Department, responded to the Board's letter by acknowledging violations due to holding Smith at the school for an unreasonable amount of time and handcuffing Smith to a filing cabinet. (Compl., Ex. 4.)
Smith filed the Complaint in this Court on March 11, 2001, against the City of Atlanta, the Atlanta Police Department, Police Chief George Turner (individually and in his official capacity), Officer Charles Brown (individually and in his official capacity), Officer Larry Bennett (individually and in his official capacity), AtlantaIndependent School System Superintendent Beverly Hall (officially), individual members of the City of Atlanta Board of Education (officially), and Roosevelt Foreman (individually and in his official capacity). Smith alleges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also alleges various violations of state law. On June 29, 2011, all the Defendants except Officer Bennett filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10], and on September 6, 2011, Officer Bennett moved to adopt the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 17]. Officer Bennett's motion is hereby granted and he is now a party to the Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10].
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that the facts alleged fail to state a "plausible" claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, even if it is "improbable" that a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the possibility of recovery is extremely "remote and unlikely." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dev.Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (). Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid complaint. See Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964).
The Plaintiff alleges violations of both his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. To the extent that the Plaintiff is attempting to state a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment based on these facts, the due process clause does not provide a remedy for the Plaintiff. The Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to expanding the concept of substantive due process. The Court limits the concept traditionally to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause does not provide relief when another constitutional provision provides an explicit textual source for protection ofa substantive right. Id. at 273-74; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). For instance, unlawful search and seizure claims fall squarely within the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Albright, 510 U.S. at 274; see also Dorsey v. Wallace, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Sims v. Glover, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1287-88 (M.D. Ala. 1999). The facts alleged in support of the Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims are simply reiterations of those asserted in support of the Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claims. The Plaintiff has not indicated how his due process rights are different from his Fourth Amendment rights in this context. Because the Fourth Amendment addresses the rights of individuals to be free from unlawful seizures, there is no basis for invoking the more generalized notion of due process. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The Fourteenth Amendment claims are dismissed.
Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for persons whose rights under the federal Constitution have been violated under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute confers no substantive rights itself. Instead, it provides "a method of vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To establish a Section 1983 violation, plaintiffs must show (1) conduct committed by a person acting under color of state law (2) that deprived them of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the UnitedStates. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 1996). Municipalities and other bodies of local government are "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
The Plaintiff seeks to hold the City of Atlanta and the Atlanta Police Department liable for the alleged constitutional violations committed by Officer Brown and Officer Bennett. A plaintiff suing a local governmental entity under Section 1983 bears an additional burden to the normal Section 1983 requirements. Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987). To establish the liability of a city or county, the plaintiff must also show that the constitutional deprivation resulted from a custom, policy or practice of the municipality. Id. (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Proof of a single isolated incident of unconstitutional activity generally is insufficient to impose municipal liability under Monell. Id.; see also Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 685 (11th Cir. 1985).
The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have strictly limited municipal and county liability under Section 1983. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1998). A municipality or county is not liable through respondeat superior for thewrongful acts of its employees. Id. at 1350 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Thus, plaintiffs asserting municipal or county liability under Section 1983 must show that the government's "official policy" caused the unconstitutional actions of its employee. Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350. To do this, plaintiffs must "identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused [their] injury." Id. (citing Bryan County Com'rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)). "It is only when the 'execution of the government's policy or custom...inflicts the injury' that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983." Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).
It is implausible that Atlanta Police Department policy sanctioned the seven hour detention, failure to transport the Plaintiff to the juvenile detention facility, or the handcuffing of the Plaintiff to a filing cabinet. In fact, exhibits to the Plaintiff's own Complaint clearly state that these actions violated Atlanta Police Department policy. (Compl., Exs. 3-4.) The City of Atlanta and Atlanta Police Department are thus dismissed as Defendants in this case.
The Court notes that the Plaintiff asserts his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and his state law claims against Turner, Brown, Bennett, and Foreman in both their official and individual capacities. However, a claim against a public official in his official capacity is considered a claim against the governmental entity that the officialrepresents. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Vineyard v. County of Murray, Ga., 990 F.2d 1207, 1210 n.3 (11th Cir. 1993). Thus, the claims against the City of Atlanta and the official capacity claims against Turner,...
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