Smith v. Comair, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-2451,96-2451
• Citation: 134 F.3d 254
• Parties: James W. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMAIR, INCORPORATED; Delta Airlines, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 254

134 F.3d 254

James W. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMAIR, INCORPORATED; Delta Airlines, Incorporated Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-2451.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 5, 1997.

Decided Jan. 15, 1998.

ARGUED: Randy Virlin Cargill, Magee, Foster, Goldstein & Sayers, Roanoke, VA, For Appellant. Robert Stewart Ballou, Johnson, Ayers & Matthews, Roanoke, VA, for Appellees.

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, ELLIS, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation, and MERHIGE, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge ELLIS and Senior Judge MERHIGE joined.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Chief Judge:

James Smith sued Comair, Inc. and Delta Airlines, Inc. for breach of contract, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Comair on the grounds that Smith's claims are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978(ADA) and, alternatively, that his intentional tort claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Smith appeals. We agree that Smith's contract and tort claims are preempted to the extent they complain of Comair's boarding procedures. Furthermore, to the extent Smith's tort claims rest on allegations distinct from Comair's refusal to allow him to board, we agree that they should be dismissed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Because the instant case comes to us at the summary judgment stage, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to Smith, the nonmoving party. Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 768 (4th Cir.1997). On the morning of October 5, 1995, Smith boarded a 6:40 a.m. Comair flight in Roanoke, Virginia to travel to Minneapolis, Minnesota, with a layover in the Cincinnati airport. Comair representatives did not ask Smith for proof of identification when he boarded the flight in Roanoke. In Cincinnati, Smith met some business associates and together they attempted to board the 9:00 a.m. connecting flight to Minneapolis. When Smith began to board, however, the Comair representative asked him "to step aside." After complying with this request and watching the rest of the flight's passengers board, Smith asked why he was not permitted to board. A Comair representative told Smith that a supervisor would be called. The supervisor, Mr. Price, arrived approximately thirty minutes after the Minneapolis flight's departure. According to Smith, Price would not explain why Smith could not fly out of the Cincinnati airport. Meanwhile, Smith also noticed for the first time two security guards standing approximately fifty and seventy feet away observing him. Smith testified that these officers watched him throughout the rest of his stay in the Cincinnati airport.

Three hours later, Price finally told Smith he was denied permission to board the Minneapolis flight because he did not match the physical description contained in his Delta frequent-flyer account. Smith, however, called his company's travel agent and learned that Delta did not maintain a record of physical descriptions in connection with frequent-flyer accounts. Smith, therefore, located Price and confronted him with this information. Price continued to insist that the dissimilar physical description was the reason Smith was not permitted to board.

At approximately 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., Price returned to Smith and told him the real reason he was refused permission to board was that the Roanoke Comair representatives had failed to ask for photo identification, as shown by the absence of pink highlighting on his boarding pass. At some point, Price explained that the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") required photo identification pursuant to security regulations. Smith replied that he could not produce his driver's license because he had left it in the glove compartment of his car, which was parked at the Roanoke airport. Price then asked Smith instead for his birth certificate and social security card, neither of which Smith had at the time. Smith offered to have his physical description faxed by the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") or to pay Comair's expenses if they would enter his car, retrieve his driver's license, and fly it to Cincinnati on the next available flight. Price refused both options, as DMV could not fax a photo and entering Smith's car might expose Comair to liability.

Finally, sometime after 3:00 p.m., Price gave Smith a ticket to Roanoke and told him Comair would return him there. While waiting to board the flight, Smith spoke to Price again and stated that he was so angry he "would like to punch [Price] in the mouth." In response, Price motioned for the two security guards Smith previously had observed, one of whom was a Cincinnati police officer. When the two approached and restrained Smith, Price asked them to remove Smith from the terminal. After Smith explained his situation to the guard and police officer, the officer intervened on Smith's behalf and convinced Price to permit Smith to fly to Roanoke. Smith then returned to Roanoke.

Smith filed a motion for judgment in the Circuit Court for the City of Roanoke, alleging breach of contract, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Comair. The court found that Smith's claims were preempted by the ADA and that his tort causes of action failed to state a claim. Smith now appeals.

II.

The scope of federal preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act has not been considered in this circuit, so it is appropriate first to review the statute's preemption provision, the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting that provision, and federal law concerning the boarding practices of airlines. The Act provides:

[A] State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 states may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). The Supreme Court first considered the scope of preemption under the ADA in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). It noted that section 41713(b)(1) was enacted "[t]o ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own." Id. at 378, 112 S.Ct. at 2033. Focusing on the statutory phrase "relating to" the Court held that "the words thus express a broad pre-emptive purpose." Id. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. ^* Claims that have "a connection with, or reference to" an airline's prices, routes, or services are therefore preempted under the statute. Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. Specifically, the Court stated that even general statutes, when particularly applied to the airline industry, are preempted. Id. at 386, 112 S.Ct. at 2038. However, state actions that would affect airline prices, routes, or services " 'in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner' " would not be preempted. Id. at 390, 112 S.Ct. at 2040 (citation omitted). Applying these principles, the Court held that the ADA preempted the specific application of general state consumer protection statutes to airline fare advertising.

The Court next considered the ADA's preemption clause in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995). In accord with Morales, the Court held plaintiffs' claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act were preempted, because such actions served "to guide and police the marketing practices of the airlines." Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228, 115 S.Ct. at 823. However, the Court carved out an exception to ADA preemption for contract claims against airlines such as those involving frequent-flyer programs, even when related to prices, routes, or services. The Court reasoned that such contract actions merely seek to enforce the parties' "own, self-imposed undertakings." Id. The Court, however, limited its breach-of-contract exception to actions confined to the terms of the parties' bargain, "with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement." Id. at 233, 115 S.Ct. at 826. Thus, when a contract claim cannot be adjudicated without resort to outside sources of law, the claim is still preempted by the ADA.

Significantly, when Congress deregulated the airline industry in 1978 by passing the ADA, it retained statutory provisions granting broad discretion to airlines in making safety-related boarding decisions. See Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-366, § 204, 88 Stat. 409, 418. The current version of that statute provides, in part: "Permissive refusal.--Subject to regulations of the Administrator, an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier may refuse to transport a passenger or property the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to safety." 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b). Air travel in modern society presents formidable safety and security concerns and often passengers with criminal intentions are the source of that threat. Federal law--in conjunction with its broad preemption of state-law claims related to airlines' services--appropriately grants airlines latitude in making decisions necessary to safeguard passengers from potential security threats. Section 44902(b) recognizes airlines' boarding practices as a specific area of federal concern.

III.

A.

Smith first contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Wolens saves his breach-of-contract claim from preemption by the ADA. He argues that by refusing him permission to board his flight, Comair...