Smith v. ConAgra, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 May 1997
• Citation: 694 So.2d 32
• Parties: Shirley SMITH v. ConAGRA, INC. 2951317.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 32

694 So.2d 32

Shirley SMITH v. ConAGRA, INC.

2951317.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 9, 1997.

Robert W. Lee, Jr., and Ashley P. Norton of Robert W. Lee & Assocs., P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.

Roy W. Scholl III and Anthony G. George of Roy W. Scholl III, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.

L. CHARLES WRIGHT, Retired Appellate Judge.

On September 23, 1994, Shirley Smith filed a complaint against her employer, ConAgra, Inc., seeking workers' compensation benefits. Smith alleged that she had developed carpal tunnel syndrome arising out of and in the course of her employment. ConAgra answered, asserting that Smith's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. Thereafter, ConAgra filed a motion for a summary judgment, along with supporting documents. Smith filed a response to the motion, along with supporting documents.

On July 8, 1996, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of ConAgra, stating, in pertinent part "[ConAgra] alleges that [Smith's] claim is barred by [the] statute of limitations. The Court agrees with [ConAgra's] contention that carpal tunnel syndrome is an 'injury' as specifically set out in Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-1(9), amended in 1992.

"The Court also is of the opinion that the injury suffered by [Smith] is of a latent-injury type. The issue then becomes when did [Smith's] injury mature. The Court is of the opinion that as stated in American Cyanamid v. Shepherd, (Ala.Civ.App.1995):

" 'We hold that a latent-injury case like this one calls for the application of a rule like the following one advocated by Professor Larson: "The time period [of the statute of limitations] does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable person, should recognize the nature, seriousness, and compensable character of his injury or disease." ' "

"The Court therefore agrees with [ConAgra's] contention that the claim matured on October 15, 1990, when [Smith] reported her pain to her supervisor. The Court finds that [Smith] should have recognized the nature, seriousness, and compensable character of her injury on October 15, 1990. The Court further finds that [Smith] filed this petition on September 23, 1994. Therefore, the Court finds that [Smith's] claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations...."

Smith appeals, contending that when the statute of limitations for carpal tunnel syndrome begins to run is controlled by this court's holding in Dun & Bradstreet Corp. v. Jones, 678 So.2d 181 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).

A motion for a summary judgment may be granted when no genuine issue of a material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Hand v. Greensprings Storage, 678 So.2d 1187 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). If the moving party makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of a material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact. Id.

In Dun & Bradstreet Corp. v. Jones, 678 So.2d 181, 184-85 (Ala.Civ.App.1996), this court addressed the issue of when the statute of limitations for carpal tunnel syndrome begins to run by stating as follows:

"This court must determine what serves as the date of the injury for cumulative trauma disorders, such as carpal tunnel syndrome, for purposes of determining the date from which the statutory limitations period would begin to run on the employee's claim for workers' compensation.

"Dun & Bradstreet argues that American Cyanamid v. Shepherd, 668 So.2d 26 (Ala.Civ.App.1995), is controlling, and that the limitations period for Jones's claim began to run when Jones, as a reasonable person, should have recognized the nature, seriousness, and compensable nature of her injuries. Dun & Bradstreet argues that, at the latest, Jones should have recognized the nature, seriousness, and compensable nature of her injuries by March or May 1992, when she took off work because of her injuries.

"Jones argues that Gattis v. NTN-Bower Corp., 627 So.2d 437 (Ala.Civ.App.1993), is controlling, and that the limitations period for her claim began to run at the date of her last exposure to the hazard that caused her injury, which was in August 1993...