Smith v. Coutant

• Decision Date: 24 November 1942
• Docket Number: 46115.
• Parties: SMITH v. COUTANT et ux.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

6 N.W.2d 421

232 Iowa 887

SMITH v. COUTANT et ux.

No. 46115.

Supreme Court of Iowa

November 24, 1942

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

John R. Cronin, of Nashua, for appellants.

Geiser & Donohue, of New Hampton, for appellee.

BLISS Justice.

Defendants occupied the farm under a written lease for one year commencing on March 1, 1941. They notified the plaintiff that they were entitled to occupy the farm for another year commencing on March 1, 1942, because the plaintiff had failed to give written notice to them, on or before the first day of the preceding November, of the termination of the lease, as provided in section 10161, Code, 1939. This defense was alleged in the answer to plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff, in her reply, admitted the execution by the parties of the one-year lease, which by its terms ended on February 28, 1942. She admitted the occupancy of the defendants thereunder, and that no notice of termination under section 10161 had been given. As an affirmative defense, plaintiff alleged that: Prior to September 3, 1941. Mrs. Coutant asked the plaintiff to extend the lease for another year, at which time she told said defendant that she intended to sell the farm and that it would not be for rent; at this time she offered to sell the farm to the defendants; on September 3, 1941, plaintiff sold the farm, and a few days later notified Mrs. Coutant of that fact, and that the purchaser would desire possession on March 1, 1942; in this conversation, plaintiff asked said defendant if it would be necessary to serve a notice to vacate and defendant said it would not be necessary; about the last of September, 1941 defendants called upon plaintiff and stated that there was certain property on the place which belonged to them and which they desired to remove on March 1, 1942; it was agreed by the parties that the property specified could be taken from the premises; before the first of November, 1941, defendants informed plaintiff that they had leased a farm near Williamstown for the coming year and were going to move on to it on March 1, 1942; defendants have such a lease; shortly after the sale of the premises, the purchaser informed the defendants that he had bought the farm and intended to move onto it on March 1, 1942, and asked permission to enter at once and do the fall ploughing, which he did with the consent of defendants; after November 1, 1941, defendant informed plaintiff that he had rented another farm but would not surrender the plaintiff's farm, but would sublet it, unless plaintiff would pay him $75. Because of the matters just stated, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had waived the serving of any written notice as provided in said section 10161 and were estopped to assert any rights under said section.

Defendants moved to strike from the reply all allegations and references to estoppel, or to an oral agreement, for the reason that they were not in issue since the essential elements of estoppel had not been pleaded, and there were no allegations in the reply allowing evidence in support of an oral agreement.

By agreement of the parties, the motion was to be ruled on after trial on the issues, and in the submission of the cause. Trial was had upon evidence received in support of the issues as alleged, and the court, after hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, found "that the allegations of the plaintiff's petition are true and that the facts set forth in plaintiff's reply to defendants' answer are sustained," and decreed the plaintiff entitled to all of the relief prayed for. The court made no reference to the defendants' motion to strike, but the decree, in itself, was an overruling of the motion. There was no merit in the motion as the defenses in the reply were sufficiently alleged. No other question of law was raised by the pleadings, or in the trial court.

I. In this court, the appellants, in support of their contention that the defenses in the reply were not sufficiently pleaded, call attention to our decisions that estoppels are not favored in law. There is language in our own cases, and in decisions of other courts, to that effect. Baldwin v. Lowe, 22 Iowa 367, 371; Cheshire v. McCoy & Henry, 205 Iowa 474, 481, 218 N.W. 329; City Bank of Mitchellville v. Alcorn, 188 Iowa 592, 594, 176 N.W. 628; McIntosh v. McIntosh, 211 Iowa 750, 757, 234 N.W. 234; Stookesberry v. Burgher, 220 Iowa 916, 922, 262 N.W. 820. This is stating it rather too broadly, and ought not be taken too literally. The statement has usually been given in connection with the further statement that every element of estoppel should be proven clearly, convincingly and satisfactorily, and it was the latter thought that was relevant to the decisions, and uppermost in the court's mind. In Anfenson v. Banks, 180 Iowa 1066, 1091, 163 N.W. 608, 616, L.R.A.1918D, 482, this court, speaking through Justice Weaver, after stating that it is a common expression that "estoppels are odious", and that we have held that estoppel is not favored in law, and must be clearly proved, also said: "* * * the rule is one capable of wholesome application when kept within its proper function for the prevention of fraud, actual or constructive. * * * The courts do not hesitate, however, to uphold a claim of estoppel wherever it is essential to prevent fraud." See also McIntosh v. McIntosh, supra, 211 Iowa 750, 757, 234 N.W. 234. The authorities quite uniformly, and with sound basis, support these holdings of this court, last referred to. In 19 Am.Jur., section 4, page 602, the author states: "It is a common expression that estoppels are odious and not favored in law. * * * Now estoppels, especially those known as 'equitable' or 'in pais,' are not deemed odious, but are said to be conductive to honesty and fair dealing and promotive of justice and to stand on the broad grounds of public policy and good faith. * * * It is also recognized, however, as a doctrine of wholesome application; that when properly applied and kept within its proper function, it is founded upon reason and justice and is a principle of good morals as well as of law; * * * and that it often enables right and justice to triumph where nothing else known to jurisprudence can do so."

To the same effect, the author in 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 3, page 193, states: "It is commonly stated in many decisions that estoppels are odious and are not favored in law because they exclude the truth. Nevertheless, the wisdom and justice of the principle of estoppel, especially estoppel in pais, see infra § 63, are generally recognized, the view being founded on principles of equity, morality, and justice, and in accord with good conscience, honesty, and reason; and, as such, the doctrine subserves its true purpose as a plain, practical, fair, and necessary rule of law."

We reannounce our approval of these principles. In general, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments, to the injury of one to whom they were directed, and who reasonably relied thereon. Such a doctrine is neither odious, nor in disfavor, in either law or equity.

In further support of their position that estoppel was not pleaded in appellee's reply, the appellants quote from Stookesberry v. Burgher, supra, 220 Iowa 916, 921, 262 N.W. 820, 823, as follows: "In order to constitute equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, false representation or concealment of material facts must exist; the party to whom it was made must have been without knowledge of the real facts; that representations or concealment must have been made with the intention that it should be acted upon; and the party to whom it was made must have relied thereon to his prejudice and injury. There can be no estoppel in any event, if any of these elements are lacking."

In McIntosh v. McIntosh, supra, 211 Iowa 750, 757, 234 N.W. 234, 238, we amplified the element of intent. We there said: "* * * the representation or statement, * * * must have been willfully intended to lead the party setting up the estoppel to act upon the same, or there must have been reasonable grounds to anticipate that he would change his position or in some way act on the faith of the conduct or representations to his detriment." See also 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 69.

It is our judgment that the allegations are broad enough to permit proof of all of the elements commonly held essential to the establishment of an equitable estoppel. The intention, of course, is a matter of inference, to be drawn from the facts and circumstances relied upon to constitute the same. Under the record presented to us, we must presume that the evidence sustained the allegations.

Appellants also insist that the allegations do not constitute an estoppel because it has to do with a future contingency since the statements or conduct relied upon were all prior to the first day of November, the date fixed by the statute as the last day for giving the written notice terminating the...