Smith v. Czescel
Decision Date | 23 December 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 5397,5397 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Leonard SMITH et al. v. John CZESCEL |
Arthur M. Field, Fairfield, for appellants (plaintiffs).
William F. Gallagher, New Haven, with whom, on brief, was Gwen B. Weltman, Bethany, for appellee (defendant).
Before BORDEN, DALY and O'CONNELL, JJ.
The principal issue of this appeal is whether the trial court committed plain error in its charge to the jury regarding falling asleep while operating a motor vehicle. We conclude that the charge as given does fall within the plain error doctrine.
The named plaintiff, Leonard Smith, and his minor daughter, Kristen Smith (the plaintiff), appeal from the judgment rendered upon a verdict for the defendant, who was the owner and operator of a motor vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. The plaintiffs' principal claims of error concern the court's instructions to the jury arising out of evidence that the defendant momentarily fell asleep while driving his vehicle.
The plaintiffs' evidence was, in part, as follows: On December 31, 1981, at approximately 7:30 p.m., the plaintiff went to a New Year's Eve party in Naugatuck with the defendant, who was her boyfriend. Some time after midnight, they left to go home in the defendant's Chevrolet Blazer. The plaintiff climbed into the back of the vehicle and fell asleep. The defendant had nearly reached his home when he remembered that the plaintiff was asleep in the back of his vehicle. He then drove toward the plaintiff's home. After driving for a total of about forty minutes, they were traveling southbound on Coram Road, in Shelton, approximately one mile from the plaintiff's house. At 3 a.m., while traveling approximately thirty-five miles per hour, the vehicle left the road, and struck a mailbox and a telephone pole. The plaintiff incurred serious and undisputed injuries.
The plaintiff recalled only climbing into the back of the vehicle, falling asleep, and waking up in the hospital emergency room. She testified that, while the defendant was visiting her in the hospital three days after the accident, the defendant told her that he "started to doze off," that he felt the vehicle go off the road, and that he attempted to steer it back onto the road before hitting the pole. The defendant testified that "[f]rom the time I was headed southbound on Coram Road, almost at the scene of the accident, I have a blank spot from there and the next thing I knew, I was headed off the road." He stated in his motor vehicle accident report, introduced into evidence, that he He also testified that this written account was true "[t]o the best of my knowledge, I cannot--the dozed off part is the only thing--I got that black spot, that blank," that he "must have dozed off for a second," and "I got that blank spot, that's all I can really say." It is clear, therefore, that the court was required to charge the jury on the rules of law applicable to a situation in which the operator of a motor vehicle falls asleep.
The court charged in this respect as follows: 1 Thereafter, during its deliberations, the jury requested the court to repeat its charge "about negligence and blacking out by the defendant." The court repeated for the jury its original charge on falling asleep or losing consciousness. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict, and rendered judgment for the defendant. This appeal followed.
The plaintiffs raise a constellation of claims of error regarding the court's instructions. The defendant correctly argues, however, that the plaintiffs failed to preserve properly their claims for appellate review because they neither filed a request to charge regarding sleep, nor took exceptions which were distinct enough to alert the court to their claims of error. 2 Indeed, the plaintiffs took no exception at all to the court's repetition, after the jury's request, of its original instruction. Such procedural failures ordinarily preclude appellate review. Practice Book § 315. 3 Despite these gross procedural inadequacies, however, we conclude that the plaintiffs' claims qualify for review under the plain error doctrine. This court "may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court." Practice Book § 4185. "Such review is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings." State v. Hinckley, 198 Conn. 77, 87-88, 502 A.2d 388 (1985); Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 607, 609, 436 A.2d 1259, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956, 101 S.Ct. 363, 66 L.Ed.2d 221 (1980). An important factor in determining whether to invoke the plain error doctrine is whether the claimed error "result[ed] in an unreliable verdict or a miscarriage of justice." State v. Hinckley, supra, 198 Conn. at 88, 502 A.2d 388. This is such a case.
Our Supreme Court first considered the issue of the relationship between sleep and negligence in operating a motor vehicle in Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 588-92, 131 A. 432 (1925). In that case, the plaintiff passenger sued the defendant driver who had momentarily fallen asleep, causing the car to leave the road and hit a tree. The trial court "submitted to the jury the question [of] whether, in view of the circumstances preceding and surrounding the accident, the fact that the defendant momentarily fell asleep constituted negligence on his part." Id. at 588, 131 A. 432. The defendant argued that, as a matter of law, he could not be negligent "because no man can tell when sleep will fall upon him." Id. at 590, 131 A. 432.
The court, in rejecting the defendant's argument, pointed out that, although one cannot precisely fix the moment when he falls asleep, "it is not true that ordinarily sleep comes unheralded." Id. at 590-91, 131 A. 432. The court then reviewed "the chief phenomena of ordinary, healthy sleep"; id. at 591, 131 A. 432; namely, diminishing consciousness of ordinary stimuli, either external or internal to the sleeper; a sense of well-being; relaxation of the muscles and limbs; drooping eyelids; contracted pupils; slow and deeper breathing; slower pulse; general lowering of body temperature; and slowing of metabolic processes. Id. This is particularly true where sleep comes to one in a situation such as driving a car, where there is "prolonged action" of the motion of the car, little voluntary movement, and muscular relaxation, "acting upon one who has become more or less fatigued and is sitting down in a warm atmosphere." Id.
The court then stated: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kilburn v. Bush
...fell asleep at the wheel and has not justified or explained his conduct should more closely comport with the charge in Smith v. Czescel, 12 Conn.App. 558, 533 A.2d 223, certification denied 206 Conn. 803, 535 A.2d 1316 [following Bushnell ]. There, the court charged that "sleep does not ord......
-
State v. Falcon
...review is limited to instances involving confidence in the fairness and integrity of the adjudicative process; Smith v. Czercel, 12 Conn.App. 558, 563, 533 A.2d 223 (1987); the doctrine essentially invokes the discretion of the court. Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., [202 Conn. 190, 196......
-
State v. Rogers
...review is limited to instances involving confidence in the fairness and integrity of the adjudicative process; Smith v. Czescel, 12 Conn.App. 558, 563, 533 A.2d 223 (1987); the doctrine essentially invokes the discretion of the court. Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., [202 Conn. 190,] 19......
-
Town of Beacon Falls v. Posick
...v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 607, 609, 436 A.2d 1259 (1980); Daley v. Gaitor, 16 Conn.App. 379, 383, 547 A.2d 1375 (1988); Smith v. Czescel, 12 Conn.App. 558, 563, 533 A.2d 223 (1987). We consider the fact that, although it ruled otherwise, the trial court actually had no subject matter jurisdictio......