Smith v. Davidson
| Decision Date | 22 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 11-00498 LEK-RLP |
| Parties | RUSTIN I. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. BLAKE DAVIDSON, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Before the Court is Defendant Louis M. Kealoha's ("Kealoha") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, filed December 8, 2011. Plaintiff Rustin I. Smith ("Plaintiff") filed his memorandum in opposition on February 23, 2012, and Kealoha filed his reply on February 20, 2012. On March 15, 2010, Defendant State of Hawaii ("the State") filed a Statement of No Position with respect to the Motion. This matter came on for hearing on March 19, 2012. Appearing on behalf of Kealoha was Curtis Sherwood, Esq., appearing on behalf of the State was Richard Stacey, Esq., and appearing on behalf of Plaintiff were Ronald Kim, Esq., and Eric Seitz, Esq. After careful consideration of the Motion, supporting and opposing memoranda, and the arguments of counsel, Kealoha's Motion is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the reasons set forth below.
Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint For Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Complaint") on August 17, 2011 against Defendants Blake Davidson ("Davidson"), William Lu ("Lu"), the City and County of Honolulu ("the City"), the State, and Kealoha (collectively "Defendants"), alleging violations of his federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state-law claims.1
Plaintiff is the President of Hard Knocks, Inc. ("Hard Knocks"), which owns and operates two stores on Oahu. [Complaint at ¶¶ 4, 11.] He alleges that, on April 12, 2011, the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division, filed an Anticipatory Search Warrant based on an affidavit made by Lu, which authorized law enforcement officials to search Plaintiff's residence for bath salts containing methylenedioxypyrovalerone ("MDPV").2 That same day, approximately fifty law enforcement officers searched Plaintiff's residence and arrested him, seizing cash and a vehicle from the residence. Plaintiff was questionedby Honolulu Police Department ("HPD") detectives, and detained overnight without formal charges or the opportunity to appear in court or post bail. [Id. at ¶¶ 18-24.]
Circuit, Honolulu Division, filed a Search Warrant based on an affidavit made by Davidson, which authorized law enforcement officiants to search Hard Knocks' stores for bath salts containing MDPV and related paraphernalia and documentation. During the raids conducted pursuant to the Search Warrant, HPD arrested two Hard Knocks employees and seized cash from the stores. [Id. at ¶¶ 26-28.]
Plaintiff alleges that HPD continued to hold him overnight on April 13, 2011 without formal charges or the opportunity to appear in court or post bail. On April 14, 2011, HPD read Plaintiff his rights, and released him later that afternoon. Plaintiff has not been charged with any offense. [Id. at ¶¶ 29-31.]
Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on unreasonable searches and seizures, cruel and unusual punishment, and the denial of due process; (2) denial of due process based on the vagueness of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1242; (3) a challenge to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 329-11(e) based on the Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act; (4) "Alternative to Count I - Negligent Training/Supervision," anegligent training, supervision, and/or discipline claim against Kealoha and the City; (5) a negligence claim against Kealoha and the City; (6) a negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") claim against Kealoha and the City; (7) an intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claim against Kealoha and the City; (8) a conversion claim against Kealoha; and (9) a false imprisonment claim against Kealoha. Kealoha, the Chief of HPD, is sued in his official and individual capacities. [Id. at ¶ 7.]
Kealoha moves to dismiss the Complaint against him because (1) Plaintiff's claims against him in his official capacity are redundant; and (2) various causes of action fail to state a claim under the pleading standards established in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). [Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 2.]
Kealoha argues that the claims made against him in his official capacity are duplicative of the claims against the City. That is, a suit against a governmental officer in his official capacity is the same as a suit against the entity of which the officer is an agent; here, HPD and the City. [Id. at 13-14.]
Kealoha also argues that the majority of the claimsagainst him do not involve matters that he personally participated in, and that the allegations are conclusory and fail to state a claim. Of the nine causes of action, all but the second and third name Kealoha. [Id. at 2.]
Kealoha argues that Plaintiff's first cause of action is insufficient because it fails to allege any personal participation by Kealoha. He notes that there are no factual allegations that he directed the search and seizure of Plaintiff and his property, violated the knock and announce rule, prolonged Plaintiff's detention, or otherwise participated in the conduct giving rise to the alleged violations. To the extent Plaintiff alleges a purported policy and/or practice, Kealoha argues that the allegations are vague and conclusory. [Id. at 4-5.]
Kealoha also asserts that Plaintiff relies on inapplicable constitutional violations to support his § 1983 claim. To the extent Plaintiff alleges deprivations of state law rights, Kealoha notes that those claims are not actionable under § 1983. [Id.]
Plaintiff's second cause of action takes issue with the placement of MDPV onto Schedule 1 and the law enabling the Department of Public Safety to do so. Kealoha argues that Plaintiff's second cause of action does not purport to state aclaim against him, despite Plaintiff's use of the plural term "Defendants." Kealoha maintains that this claim was not meant to apply to him. [Id. at 7.]
Kealoha next argues that Plaintiff's fourth cause of action is entirely conclusory and that he cannot be liable as an individual supervisor under a respondeat superior theory of liability. He argues that, in order to maintain a state law claim for negligent supervision and training, Plaintiff must establish that the employer knew or should have known of the necessity and opportunity for exercising a greater degree of control or supervision over a particular employee. Nor does Plaintiff allege any factual details regarding how the HPD officers' behavior was related to Kealoha's failure to train in the instant matter. Specifically, he argues that Plaintiff fails to identify how Kealoha failed to train the officers involved, how he was negligent in supervising in the officers involved, or describe how he failed to discipline them with regard to the incident at issue. Last, Kealoha argues that Plaintiff fails to plead nonconclusory facts to "plausibly" support the theory that the subordinate officers were acting outside the scope of their employment. [Id. at 8-9.]
Kealoha argues that Plaintiff's fourth, fifth, andsixth causes of action fail to allege malice, which is required to maintain negligence claims against government officials. [Id. at 11-12 ().]
With respect to causes of action five, six, seven, eight, and nine, Kealoha states that he is simply lumped in with other Defendants, and is made the subject of conclusory allegations in which he played no direct role. There are no allegations that he personally participated in this particular operation, therefore, the allegations in these claims make no sense when applied to him. [Id. at 12-13.]
Plaintiff argues that Kealoha was personally involved in and committed wrongful conduct that caused the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights due to: (1) implementing, maintaining, and allowing the use and continuance of the unconstitutional "48-hour rule"; and (2) failing to sufficiently train and/or supervise HPD members who violated the knock-and-announce rule when they knocked down the door toPlaintiff's residence. He also argues that the allegations plausibly support the reasonable inference that Kealoha acted with malice and that he is liable under causes of action five, six, seven, eight, and nine. [Mem. in Opp. at 2.]
Plaintiff argues that allegations detailing how Kealoha implemented the 48-hour policy and proving its illegality are unnecessary to state a plausible claim against him. He asserts that a supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Plaintiff states that supervisors may be liable for: "'(1) their own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of subordinates; (2) their acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation of which a complaint is made; or (3) for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.'" [Id. at 3 (quoting Castro v. Melchor, 760 F. Supp. 2d 970, 993 (D. Haw. 2010)).] Further, personal participation is not essential if the supervisor causes a deprivation of rights by "'setting in motion a series of acts by...
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