Smith v. Executive Custom Homes Inc

• Decision Date: 10 May 2010
• Citation: 230 P.3d 1186
• Docket Number: 09SC223
• Parties: Judith A. SMITH and James R. Smith, Petitioners/Cross-Respondentsv.EXECUTIVE CUSTOM HOMES, INC., Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

230 P.3d 1186

Judith A. SMITH and James R. Smith, Petitioners/Cross-Respondentsv.EXECUTIVE CUSTOM HOMES, INC., Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

No. 09SC223.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

May 10, 2010.

Hanes & Schutz, LLC, Timothy J. Schutz, Richard W. Hanes, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioners/Cross-Respondents.

Vaughan & DeMuro, Gordon L. Vaughan, Jessica Kyle Muzzio, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

Justice MARTINEZdelivered the Opinion of the Court.

I.Introduction

Judith A. Smith and her husband James R. Smith, plaintiff-appellants below, petitioned for review of the court of appeals' judgment in Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc.,209 P.3d 1175(Colo.App.2009).The Smiths sought review of the court of appeals' holding that their claims for personal injuries under the Construction Defect Action Reform Act (“CDARA”) began to accrue, for purposes of the CDARA's two-year statute of limitations, on the date the Smiths discovered the construction defect that later allegedly caused Judith Smith's injury.Executive Custom Homes, Inc.(“ECH”), defendant-appellee below, also petitioned for review of the court of appeals' holding in Smith.ECH approves of the court's first holding regarding accrual of the Smiths' personal injury claims; however, ECH seeks review of the court of appeals' additional holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the equitable “repair doctrine” tolled the statute of limitations, which resulted in reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in ECH's favor.

We agree with the court of appeals that under section 13-80-104, C.R.S. (2009)(“section 104”), a claim for personal injury arises not at the time of injury, but “at the time the claimant ... discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the physical manifestations of a defect in the improvement which ultimately causes the injury.”Id.§ 104(b)(I).However, we disagree with the court of appeals' holding that the equitable repair doctrine may have tolled the statute of limitations on the Smiths' claims.Because we conclude that equitable tolling under the repair doctrine is inconsistent with the CDARA, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court with directions to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

II.Facts and Procedural History

The Smiths live in a newly-constructed “patio home” built by ECH, which is located in a retirement community managed by a homeowners association.The homeowners association employs a professional property management company, Z & R Property Management (“Z & R”), to maintain the community properties.The property manager furnished by Z & R apparently serves as a liaison between homeowners and ECH to handle complaints related to the construction of the residences.

On February 6, 2004, James Smith sent an e-mail to the property manager stating that he had noticed a sheet of ice accumulating on his sidewalk near the entrance to his home, which he felt was the result of a construction defect.The property manager then forwarded the e-mail to ECH asking ECH to look into the problem.ECH later responded by e-mail to the property manager that it had inspected the Smiths' home and agreed that some repairs to the gutters were needed; however, ECH indicated that repairs could not be completed until the snow melted.ECH then arranged for the contractors who originally installed the gutters to make the necessary repairs, which took place between February and June of 2004.Neither the property manager nor ECH ever contacted the Smiths regarding the repairs, and the Smiths had no personal knowledge that the repairs took place.

On February 2, 2005, Judith Smith sustained injuries after she slipped on ice that accumulated on the front walkway of the Smiths' home.The Smiths then contacted ECH directly by letter to notify it of the accident.In response, ECH informed the Smiths of the repairs to the gutters and denied liability for Judith Smith's injuries.On January 17, 2007, nearly two years after the accident, the Smiths filed a complaint against ECH alleging damages for personal injuries caused by a construction defect.¹ECH responded by filing a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the undisputed facts established that the Smiths' claims, which were filed almost three years after the Smiths first noticed the ice accumulation, were time-barred by the CDARA's two-year statute of limitations located in section 104.The trial court agreed, granted ECH's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case.

The Smiths appealed to the court of appeals, which held that, although it agreed with the trial court that the Smiths' claims for personal injury began to accrue on the date James Smith notified the property manager of the ice accumulation, genuine disputes as to material facts existed regarding whether the statute of limitations was equitably tolled by operation of the “repair doctrine” while ECH performed its repairs.SeeSmith,209 P.3d at 1181.As a result, the court of appeals reversed the trial court order granting ECH's motion for summary judgment.The Smiths and ECH both petitioned for certiorari.²

III.Analysis

A.Accrual of Personal Injury Claims Under the CDARA

The Smiths acknowledge that their personal injury claims, which allegedly resulted from the defective construction of their home, are governed by the applicable statute of limitations set forth in section 104.Section 104 states that actions under the CDARA shall be brought within two years after the claim for relief arises.See§ 13-80-104(1)(a)(cross referencing § 13-80-102, C.R.S.(2009)).The question we must answer is whether such a “claim for relief arises” when the injury occurs, as the Smiths contend, or at the time the homeowner first observes the defect that allegedly causes the injury, as ECH argues and as the trial court and court of appeals concluded.

Statutory interpretation involves only questions of law, which we review de novo.Spahmer v. Gullette,113 P.3d 158, 162(Colo.2005).When interpreting a statute, we strive to give effect to the legislative purposes by adopting an interpretation that best effectuates those purposes.Id.In order to ascertain the legislative intent, we look first to the plain language of the statuteid., giving the language its commonly accepted and understood meaning Prop.Tax Adm'r v. Prod. Geophysical Servs., Inc., 860 P.2d 514, 517(Colo.1993).Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we do not resort to legislative history or further rules of statutory construction.SeeSpahmer,113 P.3d at 162;Prop. Tax Adm'r,860 P.2d at 517.

We agree with the trial court and court of appeals that the plain meaning of section 104 is clear.The statute contains both a list of specific claims to which the statute applies and the corresponding accrual standard for such claims.The list of claims explicitly includes “actions for the recovery of damages for ... injury to or wrongful death of a person caused by any such deficiency.”§ 13-80-104(c)(I)-(III).Regarding the accrual of such claims, the statute clearly states that “a claim for relief arises under this section at the time the claimant or the claimant's predecessor in interest discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the physical manifestations of a defect in the improvement which ultimately causes the injury.”§ 13-80-104(b)(I).Thus, it is plain from the language of the statute that claims under the CDARA, personal injury claims included, begin to accrue when the homeowner first discovers or should have discovered the defect.³

The Smiths dispute this plain meaning interpretation by arguing that the statute's lengthy legislative history renders the statutory language ambiguous.⁴According to the Smiths, such ambiguity must be resolved by interpreting the statute so that the special statutory accrual standard in section 104 applies to all claims under the CDARA except claims for personal injury.In place of section 104, the Smiths argue that personal injury claims should be governed by the general claim accrual standard in section 13-80-108, C.R.S. (2009), which provides that claims for personal injury, among others, begin to accrue when both the injury and its cause are known.The legislative history, however, cannot render the plain and unambiguous language of section 104 ambiguous.When the meaning of a statute is clear based on a plain reading of the language, we do not consult legislative history.SeeScoggins v. Unigard Ins. Co.,869 P.2d 202, 205(Colo.1994)(“Even if the intent of the General Assembly can be disputed, if the plain language of the statute is clear, it is controlling.”);Hyland Hills Park & Recreation Dist. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.,864 P.2d 569, 574(Colo.1993)(“[D]espite the ambiguous statements that comprise most of the legislative history, the plain meaning of the statute is dispositive.”).Thus, even though we may not agree with the propriety or wisdom of a policy that limits claims for personal injuries in the manner set out in section 104, we must refrain from going beyond the plain meaning of the statute to “accomplish something the plain language does not suggest.”Scoggins,869 P.2d at 205.⁵

The Smiths also argue that such a literal interpretation produces an absurd and unfair result by encouraging homeowners to file unripe lawsuits because they will be forced to file suit before the injury happens or before the extent of the injury is known, a result that directly conflicts with the CDARA's purpose of streamlining construction litigation.SeeCLPF-Parkridge One, L.P. v. Harwell Invs., Inc.,105 P.3d 658, 664(Colo.2005)(discussing the purpose of the CDARA).We agree with the Smiths that this court should avoid an interpretation that produces an illogical or absurd result.Seeid. at 661....