Smith v. Food Concepts, Inc.

Decision Date07 October 1988
Docket NumberNo. 87-CA-1909-S,87-CA-1909-S
Citation758 S.W.2d 437
PartiesDaniel M. SMITH and Patricia A. Smith, Appellants, v. FOOD CONCEPTS, INC., Appellee.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

William I. Markwell, Jr., Henderson, for appellants.

Thomas A. Carroll, Owensboro, for appellee.

Before CLAYTON, DYCHE and HAYES, JJ.

DYCHE, Judge.

Daniel M. and Patricia A. Smith, appellants herein, purchased a business from Food Concepts, Inc. (appellee), paying part of the purchase price in cash, and executing a promissory note for the balance. Appellee brought this action to enforce payment of the note, alleging default by the Smiths; in their answer appellants admitted the execution and terms of the note, as well as non-payment of four installments thereunder. In addition appellants raised fraud and misrepresentation by appellee as a defense to the note obligation and as a counterclaim.

Daniel M. Smith was deposed by counsel for Food Concepts, Inc., as part of the pre-trial discovery. CR 30.01. He refused to answer specific questions concerning the alleged fraud and misrepresentations, and offered no testimony concerning specific false and misleading statements made by appellee's principals, officers or agents.

Food Concepts then sought an order from the trial court compelling the answer to those questions and the production of documents referred to as false and misleading by Smith in his deposition. CR 37.01. The trial court entered an order for Smith to comply with the discovery requests of appellee within fifteen days. Appellants did not provide the answers to the questions or the documents; based on the admissions in appellant's answer to the complaint and the failure to produce any evidence of fraud or misrepresentation whatsoever, appellee sought, and was granted, a summary judgment for the sum certain claimed under the note. CR 56.

The Smiths now appeal, alleging the existence of a genuine issue of material fact (misrepresentation) and criticizing the form of the judgment itself. We will deal with these issues in reverse order.

Appellants claim that the summary judgment herein "fails to make necessary findings that there is no genuine issue as to material fact nor does it state that appellee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

We find no such requirement of rote recitation of those two magic phrases. In setting out those terms, CR 56.03 merely gives the courts some guidance in ruling on these motions. Further, CR 52.01 reads, in part, "[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56...."

As far as appellee's entitlement to a summary judgment, we feel that the analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (which corresponds to our CR 56.03) by the Supreme Court of the United States in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) is helpful.

Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since...

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6 cases
  • Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 25 Mayo 1990
    ...56.03, Comment 11 (1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 Supp.). The analysis was endorsed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Smith v. Food Concepts, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 437 (Ky.App.1988). See also Bertelsman, Views from the Federal Bench, "Significant Developments in the Law of Summary Judgments," Kentu......
  • Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 11 Abril 1991
    ...v. Southern Ry. Co., Ky.App., 752 S.W.2d 791 (1988).3 See, Gill v. Warren, Ky.App., 751 S.W.2d 33 (1988).4 See, Smith v. Food Concepts, Inc., Ky.App., 758 S.W.2d 437 (1988).5 See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kentucky v. Baxter, Ky.App., 713 S.W.2d 478 (1986).6 See, Childress, A New Era for......
  • Estep v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 11 Diciembre 1992
    ...concur. 1 Saul's citation to Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and Smith v. Food Concepts, Inc., Ky.App., 758 S.W.2d 437 (1988), is therefore, clearly inappropriate.2 The Esteps have cited us to five such cases, which are as follows: Woods v. Pri......
  • Allen v. Stallings, No. 2008-CA-000889-MR (Ky. App. 5/29/2009)
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 29 Mayo 2009
    ...previously specified he had the obligation to present affirmative evidence and not rest on his "mere allegations." Smith v. Food Concepts, Inc., Ky.App., 758 S.W.2d 437 (1988) (noting that a party resisting summary judgment must "put up or shut up"). See also Steelvest v. Scansteel Service ......
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