Smith v. General Scanning, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-1917,88-1917
• Citation: 876 F.2d 1315
• Parties: 50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 58, 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,107, 58 USLW 2043 James F. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL SCANNING, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1315

876 F.2d 1315

50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 58, 50 Empl. Prac.

Dec. P 39,107,

58 USLW 2043

James F. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL SCANNING, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 88-1917.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 6, 1989.

Decided June 8, 1989.

John A. St. Peter, and Edgarton, Ondrasek, St. Peter, Petak & Massey, Fon du Lac, Kathryn M. Bullon-Stommel, Fon du Lac, Wis., for plaintiff-appellant.

Lawrence T. Lynch, Robert K. Drummond, Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wis., John F. Adkins, and Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Mass., for defendant-appellee.

Before WOOD, Jr., POSNER and MANION, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

This is the second time we consider this case. James Smith sued his employer, General Scanning, Inc. ("GSI"), alleging that he had been discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-634. The district court granted GSI's motion for summary judgment. Smith appealed, and we vacated the district court's judgment and dismissed the action for Smith's failure to satisfy the state filing requirement contained in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 633(b). Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 832 F.2d 96 (1987) (Smith I). However, we invited Smith to refile his charge with the EEOC and the appropriate state agency, and, after 60 days, to commence a new action in federal district court. We also instructed Smith to plead and prove the existence of equitable grounds for tolling the filing requirement. Smith refiled with both agencies and brought suit in the district court. The district court again did not resolve the equitable tolling issue, opting instead to adopt its earlier decision on the merits in favor of GSI. Although we are troubled by the district court's failure to expressly rule on the equitable tolling issue, we nevertheless affirm its decision on the merits.

I.

We set forth the facts of this case in our prior decision. Because they are also relevant here, we repeat them:

On October 3, 1980, GSI hired appellant Smith, then 57 years old, to be an Applications Engineer/Sales Person in its Eastern Region motor division office in Boston. A year later the company transferred him to the Central Region [also known as the Midwest region] office in Chicago, as a Sales Engineer, to promote GSI's two basic products, Electro-Optical (laser) Scanners and Electro-Mechanical (strip chart) Recorders. However, Smith was notified by letter dated December 9, 1983, that GSI was closing its Central Region sales office, and that Smith's duties would terminate on December 31, 1983. The reason given for the termination was that GSI was forced to reduce its sales staff 'because of a second year of flat sales and reduced profits.' Smith was then 60 years old.

Smith filed a charge of age discrimination with the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations on June 26, 1984. That agency returned the charge to him for lack of jurisdiction over an employer located in Massachusetts. Thereafter, on September 5 of that year, he submitted the charge to the Boston office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; the EEOC replied that it would not proceed further with its processing of Smith's charge. Smith's third filing was this action, brought in federal district court in Wisconsin on December 6, 1985.

The district court, without addressing the administrative filing requirements of the ADEA, granted GSI's motion for summary judgment on two grounds. It first found that the plaintiff failed to prove an essential element of the prima facie case of age discrimination, qualification for the position. [The sales engineer job description requires that an applicant have a Bachelor of Science degree. Smith admitted in his deposition that he had falsified his resume which stated that he had not only a bachelor's degree but a master's degree as well. The district court found that because Smith did not have the required college degree, he could not show he was qualified to be a sales engineer with GSI.] It further found that, even had Smith established a prima facie case, GSI's reasons for its employment decisions were legitimate and nondiscriminatory. Because Smith was unable to show that his employer's reasons were pretextual, he failed in his final burden. Thus, the court granted GSI summary judgment as a matter of law.

Smith I, 832 F.2d at 97 (footnote omitted). After the case was dismissed, Smith refiled with the EEOC, filed a charge for the first time with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (the proper state agency), and then filed suit in federal district court. The district court then adopted its earlier decision granting summary judgment for GSI.

II.

A. Equitable Tolling

Smith's post-dismissal filings were untimely. But despite the district court's "duty ... to consider whether an 'equitable exception justifies ignoring [the ADEA's administrative filing procedures],' " id. at 100 (quoting Settino v. City of Chicago, 642 F.Supp. 755, 759 (N.D.Ill.1986)), it glossed over the tolling issue and instead focused on the merits of this dispute. In the court's order the district judge stated, "[a]lthough I'm not certain that the plaintiff has adequately pled grounds for the tolling of the statute of limitations, I will resolve this case on the merits." It then adopted its earlier decision granting GSI summary judgment.

It is well-settled that the ADEA's administrative filing requirements are not jurisdictional; rather, they are only preconditions to filing suit. See, e.g., Overgard v. Cambridge Book Co., 858 F.2d 371, 374 (7th Cir.1988). Therefore, they are subject to equitable modification. Stearns v. Consolidated Management, Inc., 747 F.2d 1105, 1111 (7th Cir.1984). See also Husch v. Szabo Food Service Co., 851 F.2d 999, 1003 n. 7 (7th Cir.1988). The district court should have discussed whether Smith's belated filings were sufficient under equitable tolling principles. It did not, apparently believing that this was pointless in light of its earlier determination against Smith on the merits. The only way the second decision would have differed from the first, would have been if no grounds for equitable tolling existed. In that event, the case would have been dismissed without even reaching the merits. In either situation, though, the end result is the same: the case is dismissed. Thus, on the unique facts presented here, the district court believed there was no reason to discuss the tolling issue. Because we agree with the district court's determination on the merits, there is no need to remand for a second time on the tolling question, as that would additionally burden the court's calendar and needlessly increase legal fees. However, we stress that administrative filing requirements under the ADEA, though only preconditions to filing suit, are meant to be more than a hollow gesture. We thus continue to expect litigants (they did so here) and district courts alike to adequately address these issues. Enough has been said on the tolling issue; we now address the merits of Smith's case.

B. ADEA Claim

With respect to a district court's grant of summary judgment, we recently stated:

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must view the record and all inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Citations omitted.) However, when confronted with a motion for summary judgment, a party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial. (Citations omitted.) The party must do more than simply 'show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.' (Citations omitted.) 'Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party there is no "genuine" issue for trial.' (Citations omitted.) 'The court should neither "look the other way" to ignore genuine issues of material fact, nor "strain to find" material fact issues where there are none....' (Citation omitted.)

Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1363-64 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Beard v. Whitley County, REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 409-10 (7th Cir.1988)) (emphasis in original).

To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, " 'we must consider both the substantive law of employment discrimination and the burdens of proof applicable under this law.' " Mechnig, 864 F.2d at 1364 (quoting Williams v. Williams Electronics, 856 F.2d 920, 922 (7th Cir.1988)). "[A] terminated plaintiff's ultimate burden in an age discrimination case is to prove that he was discharged because of his age." Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1988).

A plaintiff alleging age discrimination may satisfy his burden in one of two ways. First, he can present direct or circumstantial evidence that age was the determining factor in his discharge. Id. By far, however, the more common method is to employ the burden-shifting analysis developed for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). With slight modification, this framework has been adapted to age discrimination cases under the ADEA. Oxman, 846 F.2d at 452.

In a reduction in force case ("RIF"), as here, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) that he was within the protected age group; (2) that he was performing according to his employer's legitimate expectations; ¹ (3) that he was terminated; and (4) that others not in the protected class were treated more favorably. Id. at 455 (overruling Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir.1985)). If a plaintiff makes this showing, a...