Smith v. Hawkins
| Decision Date | 23 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 1998-28171,NO. 01-09-00060-CV,01-09-00060-CV,1998-28171 |
| Parties | RODNEY SMITH, Appellant v. JILL NANETTE HAWKINS, Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
On Appeal from the 310th District Court Harris County, Texas
This is an appeal from a final order arising from a suit to modify an order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship ("SAPCR"). In two issues, appellant, Father, challenges the provisions in the order requiring him to (1) pay childsupport in the amount of $1,200.00 per month to appellee, Mother, and (2) pay appellee, Aunt, $72,433.07 in attorney's fees. In a third issue, Father challenges Aunt's standing to intervene in the SAPCR. We affirm.
M.H. was born in 1996 to Father and Mother and was 12 years old at the time of trial. M.H.'s grandmother ("Grandmother") had cared for M.H. since M.H. was two years old. M.H.'s Aunt maintained a household with Grandmother.
Grandmother was named managing conservator of M.H. in 1998. Father and Mother were named possessory conservators. In 2001, Grandmother filed a suit to modify the underlying SAPCR, and the trial court rendered an order again naming Grandmother managing conservator of the child and Father and Mother possessory conservators.
In 2007, Father sought to modify the 2001 court order providing for conservatorship of, and child support, for M.H. Grandmother filed an answer and counter-petition to modify, seeking an increase in child support and attorney's fees. Grandmother also requested that Father pay for M.H.'s health insurance. Aunt intervened, seeking to be named a joint managing conservator with Grandmother, and requested attorney's fees. On the issues of managing and possessory conservatorship and visitation, the parties entered into a mediatedsettlement agreement, the terms of which were incorporated into the subsequent modification order. On the issue of conservatorship, Father and Mother were again appointed possessory conservators of M.H., while Grandmother and Aunt were appointed joint managing conservators of M.H.
On the issues of child support and attorney's fees, t he parties proceeded to a bench trial. Father testified that he was employed as a contractor and that his monthly net income was $2,633.00. He also testified that he had received a personal injury settlement for injuries sustained in a pipeline explosion, totaling approximately $900,000. Father stated that he had used the settlement proceeds to purchase a home for himself and his parents, an automobile, and a boat. He also stated that he had used the funds to establish a college fund for M.H. in the amount of $20,700.00 and to pay back child support in an amount of $26,000.00.
The trial court ordered Father to pay to appellees monthly child support in the amount of $1,200.00, to pay Mother's attorney's fees in the amount of $7,000, and to pay Aunt's attorney's fees in the amount of $72,433.07. The trial court also entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Father filed a motion to modify the trial court's order and a motion for new trial on November 19, 2008. Father also filed a motion to dismiss Aunt's intervention. The trial court denied both of Father's motions on January 13, 2009.
We first address Father's contention that Aunt lacked standing to intervene into the suit affecting the parent-child relationship.
A party seeking conservatorship of a child must have standing to seek such relief. In re SSJ-J, 153 S.W.3d 132, 134 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.). "Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction." Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Because "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case," a party's lack of standing deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction and renders subsequent trial court action void. Id.; In re Smith, 260 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding).
When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis. Smith, 260 S.W.3d at 572. In the context of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, standing is governed by the Texas Family Code, and "[t]he party seeking relief must allege and establishstanding within the parameters of the language used in the statute." In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). When standing has been sufficiently alleged in the pleadings and the jurisdictional challenge attacks the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court considers the evidence submitted by the parties to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). The burden of proof on the issue of standing is on the party asserting standing. In re Pringle, 862 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, no writ). In a family law case, when the petitioner is statutorily required to establish sta nding with "satisfactory proof," the evidentiary standard is a preponderance of the evidence. In re A.M.S., 277 S.W.3d 92, 96 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.); Von Behren v. Von Behren, 800 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied). The petitioner must show the facts establishing standing existed at the time suit was filed in the trial court. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001); In re Vogel, 261 S.W.3d 917, 921 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding). If the petitioner fails to meet his burden, the trial court must dismiss the suit. In re M.T.C., 299 S.W.3d 474, 479-480 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.).
A party's standing to seek relief is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004); In re Vogel, 261 S.W.3d at 920-21. When standing is challenged, the court of appeals in its de novo review must take as true all evidence favorable to the challenged party and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the challenged party's favor. In re M.J.G., 248 S.W.3d 753, 758 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
Standing to file a petition seeking conservatorship of a child is governed by sections 102.003 and 102.004 of the Texas Family Code. Section 156.002(b) provides that a person who has standing to sue under Chapter 102 of the Family Code may file a suit for modification in the court that has continuing jurisdiction. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Section 102.003 provides that "a person, other than a foster parent, who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition" may file an original suit at any time. Id. § 102.003(a)(9) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
The purpose of section 102.003 is to provide standing for those who have developed and maintained a relationship with a child over time. In re Y.B., 300 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied); T.W.E. v. K.M.E., 828 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, no writ) (examining former Family Code section 11.03(a)(8)). Six months is, in the judgment of the Legislature, the minimum time needed to develop a significant relationship for purposes of standing to seek custody. In re Garcia, 944 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, no writ.); T.W.E, 828 S.W.2d at 808. The requirement that the six months' possession be within 90 days of filing suit prevents persons who do not have a recent or current relationship with the child from disrupting the child's life with stale claims. Garcia, 944 S.W.2d at 727; T.W.E., 828 S.W.2d at 808.
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as they pertain to the issue of Aunt's standing read as follows:
J.H. is a person, other than the foster parent, who has had actual care, control,...
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