Smith v. Hendrix, 20103
| Decision Date | 21 October 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 20103,20103 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Joseph SMITH, Appellant, v. Samuel HENDRIX, Chairman of the Lexington County Registration and ElectionsCommission and Curtis Shealy, Respondents. |
Henry H. Taylor, Dent, Kirkland, Taylor & Wilson, West Columbia, for appellant.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Donald V. Myers, Columbia, and James E. Barfield, Long, Barfield, Bouknight, Nicholson & Davis, Lexington, for respondents.
Petitioner-appellant, Joseph Smith, seeks a recount of the votes cast in an election in which he was a candidate contending that all votes should have been invalidated in instances where the voter had voted both a straight party ticket and for a specific individual candidate of the opposite party on the same ballot. This practice is referred to as 'crossover voting', and it is undisputed that these votes were counted in the election.
The Circuit Court held that petitioner was precluded from asserting the present action because he failed to pursue the statutory remedy for protesting the result of an election contained in §§ 23--453 and 23--453.2 of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina (1974 Cum.Supp.). This Court is convinced that such decision is correct, and that petitioner's failure to so proceed is fatal to the present action. 1
Petitioner was a candidate for the District 2 seat on the Lexington County Council in the general election of November 5, 1974. His opponent was the respondent, Curtis Shealy. Shealy received a majority of the votes cast in the election but because the margin was less than one (1%) percent a mandatory recount was conducted under § 23--476.3 of the 1962 Code. On November 9, 1974, the Lexington County Board of Canvassers declared Shealy the winner by a margin of 16 votes. All voting in Lexington County was conducted with vote recorders and tabulated by a computer which was programed to count crossover votes. 2
After petitioner became aware of a successful challenge before the State Board of Canvassers of the counting of crossover votes by a candidate for another office in Lexington County, he filed a protest with the Lexington County Board of Canvassers on December 4, 1974, requesting a recount of the votes in his race using a modified computer program which would not credit either candidate with a vote whenever a crossover vote was encountered. His request was denied 3 and on December 10, 1974, he instituted this action in the Common Pleas Court for an order requiring the respondent, Samuel Hendrix, (Chairman of the County Board of Canvassers) to conduct a recount in which crossover votes would not be counted for either candidate.
It is clear from the foregoing recital of facts that the essence of petitioner's action is the contest of an election. The South Carolina Constitution specifically mandates that the General Assembly shall 'establish procedures for contested elections, and enact other provisions necessary to the fulfillment and integrity of the election process.' Art. 2, § 10. Pursuant to such constitutional mandate, the General Assembly has enacted Title 23 of the 1962 Code. This title provides, inter alia, a comprehensive procedure by which elections are to be contested. A candidate seeking to contest a county election shall: (1) file a protest in writing with the County Board of Canvassers by noon Monday following the day of the declaration by the Board of the result of the election ( § 23--453); (2) if aggrieved by the decision of the County Board of Canvassers, he may then file an appeal with the State Board of Canvassers not later than noon Monday next following such decision ( § 23--453.2); (3) from the decision of the State Board of Canvassers, he may appeal directly to the Supreme Court on petition for a writ of certiorari and shall be granted first priority of consideration by the Court ( § 23--476).
The above-stated statutory provisions are simple, unambiguous, and expeditious. The manifest intent of the General Assembly is that election contests be disposed of with the maximum dispatch consistent with due process of law. It is self-evident that protracted election disputes produce an instability in government inimical to the public welfare.
Under the applicable statute, petitioner was required to file his protest with the County Board of Canvassers not later than noon November 11, 1974. No protest having been filed, the declaration of the result by such Board was final.
Petitioner seeks to avoid the application of the protest statutes by characterizing this action as a Mandamus proceeding. This argument is aborted as its inception by the settled law that where...
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Tyson, In Interest of
...342, 237 S.E.2d 384 (1977). Where another adequate remedy exists, a writ of mandamus cannot rightfully be issued. Smith v. Hendrix, 265 S.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 312 (1975). The Board had several other remedies available to it besides mandamus if it had determined that termination of parental ri......
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Taylor v. Roche, 20788
...must be made to the Board of Canvassers within the statutorily required time, or the suit will be barred. E. g. Smith v. Hendrix, 265 S.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 312 (1975). The State Board of Canvassers meets within 10 days after any "general election" for the purpose of "canvassing the vote for ......
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Jones v. S.C. Republican Party, Appellate Case No. 2017-002583
...different from cases in which we held county election boards have exclusive jurisdiction over election protests. In Smith v. Hendrix , 265 S.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 312 (1975), for example, we held "petitioner was precluded from asserting the present action because he failed to pursue the statut......
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Sims v. Ham, 21313
...from asserting her claim. Generally, a protest must be lodged within the statutory time period or it is barred. Smith v. Hendrix, 265 S.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 312 (1975). We hold that the protest procedure of Code § 7-17-30 applies to county school board elections ; however, this procedure was ......