Smith v. Hermsen
Decision Date | 10 September 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 19815,19815 |
Citation | 572 N.W.2d 835,1997 SD 138 |
Parties | Harold E. SMITH and Dolores A. Smith, Jointly and Severally, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Albert HERMSEN and Joyce Hermsen, Jointly and Severally, Defendants and Appellants. . Considered on Briefs |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
J.M. Grossenburg, Winner, for plaintiffs and appellees.
Stanley E. Whiting, Winner, for defendants and appellants.
¶1 Harold and Dolores Smith (Smiths) sued Albert and Joyce Hermsen (Hermsens) for rescission of a land sale after it was discovered that a mortgage was attached to the property. After Hermsens failed to file a timely answer, Smiths were granted a default judgment. The trial court denied Hermsens' motion to set aside default and request for leave to file answer. Hermsens appeal and we reverse and remand.
¶2 Hermsens owned approximately thirty-five acres of real estate near Winner, South Dakota. After initial refusals, Hermsens agreed to sell to Smiths a six-acre parcel upon which Smiths planned to build a house. The purchase price of $32,000 was paid and the deed was later filed on February 5, 1996. Neither Smiths nor Hermsens retained legal counsel for representation in this transaction.
¶3 After the sale, title insurance was purchased by Smiths. Upon issuance of the commitment for title insurance, it was noted that a mortgage existed on the six acres that were sold to Smiths. Smiths did not ask Hermsens to satisfy the mortgage, but proceeded to serve a summons and complaint upon Hermsens for rescission of the contract on March 12, 1996. The complaint alleged Hermsens were guilty of fraud and demanded the sale be rescinded, along with interest, costs, attorney fees, and punitive damages. 1
¶4 The mortgage was recorded in September, 1991, when Hermsens established a line of credit with First Union Home Equity Corporation involving a home equity loan. Hermsens were under the impression that this mortgage was going to attach only to their home and the surrounding couple of acres, not to the entire thirty-five acres.
¶5 When Hermsens received the complaint, they went to Smiths' lawyer's office to discuss this action. Thereafter, Hermsens contacted an attorney so that a partial satisfaction of mortgage could be prepared to release this mortgage on the six acres sold to Smiths. Hermsens did not advise their attorney that they had been served with a summons and complaint. The partial mortgage satisfaction was returned from First Union and filed on April 24, 1996.
¶6 Also on April 24, 1996, Smiths filed a motion for default judgment. Hermsens received notice of the motion and immediately sought assistance from their attorney. Hermsens' motion to set aside default and request for leave to file an answer was filed on April 29, 1996.
¶7 The trial court granted default judgment to Smiths and denied Hermsens' motion to set aside the default. The trial court found there was no showing of excusable neglect present that would justify setting aside the default. The order for default judgment required Hermsens to pay Smiths the contract price, plus accrued interest, and Smiths were to reconvey the real estate to Hermsens. Hermsens appeal, raising the following issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Hermsens permission to file an answer after the default?
¶8 SDCL 15-6-60(b) provides that upon a showing of "good cause," a judgment by default may be set aside by a court. "The decision to grant or deny relief from a default judgment rests with the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not disturb the trial court's decision absent an abuse of that discretion." First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Strub, 427 N.W.2d 836, 838 (S.D.1988) (citation omitted). "The trial court's discretion is to be exercised liberally in accord with legal and equitable principles in order to promote the ends of justice." In re Estate of Nelson, 1996 SD 27, p 15, 544 N.W.2d 882, 886 (citing City of Lemmon v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 N.W.2d 433, 437 (S.D.1980); Kuehn v. First Nat'l Bank in Sioux Falls, 90 S.D. 96, 103, 238 N.W.2d 490, 494 (1976)). "Ultimately, 'any doubt should be resolved in favor of an application to set aside a judgment in order that the case may be tried upon the merits.' " Roso v. Henning, 1997 SD 82, p 5, 566 N.W.2d 136, 139 (citing National Sur. Corp. v. Shoemaker, 86 S.D. 302, 309, 195 N.W.2d 134, 138 (1972)) (alteration omitted).
¶9 At the outset, we note that "default judgment is an extreme remedy and should only be granted when 'the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.' " Roso, 1997 SD 82 at p 8, 566 N.W.2d at 140 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, Hermsens failed to file a responsive pleading following the service of the summons and complaint and thus are left seeking relief under SDCL 15-6-60(b)(1).
¶10 Relief may be granted to Hermsens from the default judgment if the court finds they both (1) acted with excusable neglect and (2) had a meritorious defense. Hrachovec v. Kaarup, 516 N.W.2d 309, 311 (S.D.1994); Clarke v. Clarke, 423 N.W.2d 818, 820-21 (S.D.1988). "Excusable neglect must be neglect of a nature that would cause a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances to act similarly." Peterson v. La Croix, 420 N.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1988). " Clarke, 423 N.W.2d at 821 ( ). "The term excusable neglect has no fixed meaning and is to be interpreted liberally to insure that cases are heard and tried on the merits." Eby v. Misar, 345 N.W.2d 381, 383 (S.D.1984) (citation omitted).
¶11 A close examination of the facts before us reveals that Hermsens should have advised their lawyer that they had been sued when they sought help in obtaining the release of the mortgage. However, the issue remains, was this excusable? We conclude it was. Hermsens, after contacting Smiths' attorney, proceeded on the belief that the whole point of the lawsuit was based on the existence of the mortgage. It was their understanding that, if the mortgage was released, the lawsuit would be resolved. On the same day they received the summons and complaint, Hermsens sought out their attorney and began the process of securing the release. Further, Hermsens sought relief from the default within twenty days of the date their answer was due, and within five days after they received notice of the motion for default judgment. Also, the partial satisfaction of the mortgage covering Smiths' property was filed April 24, 1996--the same day the motion for default judgment was filed. "This was no dilatory behavior" that was likely to prejudice Smiths. See Roso, 1997 SD 82 at p 11, 566 N.W.2d at 141 ( ).
¶12 "The purpose of Rule 60(b) is 'to preserve the delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments and the incessant command of a court's conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.' " Hrachovec, 516 N.W.2d at 311 (citations omitted). That balance will not be disturbed if Hermsens are allowed to contest the issue of fraud lodged in the complaint against them. "As cases should ordinarily be decided on their merits, elementary fairness demands of courts a tolerant exercise of discretion in evaluating excusable neglect." Roso, 1997 SD 82 at p 12, 566 N.W.2d at 141 (citing City of Lemmon, 293 N.W.2d at 437). We conclude the circuit court failed to exercise the liberal discretion demanded to promote justice in this case. See Estate of Nelson, 1996 SD 27 at p 15, 544 N.W.2d at 886; Phipps v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 438 N.W.2d 814, 819 (S.D.1989) ( ); Midcontinent Broad. Co. v. Ava Corp., 329 N.W.2d 378, 380 (S.D.1983) ( ).
¶13 The second requirement for relief from the default is the existence of a meritorious defense. See Peterson, 420 N.W.2d at 19. This requirement rests on the following standards:
The party seeking relief must present facts either by answer or affidavit from which it could be inferred that upon a trial he would be entitled to a judgment more favorable to himself than the judgment from which he is seeking relief. An applicant for relief from a judgment satisfies the meritorious defense requirement, however, if he makes only a prima facie showing. The rule does not intend that there should be two trials on the merits.
Frieberg v. Frieberg, 509 N.W.2d 415, 419 (S.D.1993) (citations omitted).
¶14 Smiths have alleged that Hermsens committed fraud and deceit. "Fraud has been defined as 'a representation ... made as a statement of fact, which was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it, or else recklessly made; [and] made with intent to deceive and for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it.' " Klinker v. Beach, 1996 SD 56, p 13, 547 N.W.2d 572, 576 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). See also SDCL 53-4-5. Smiths may also rely on South Dakota statutes defining deceit, in part, as either: "(1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; [or] (2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which...
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