Smith v. Hickenbottom
| Decision Date | 24 March 1882 |
| Citation | 11 N.W. 664,57 Iowa 733 |
| Parties | SMITH v. HICKENBOTTOM |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court.
THIS is a proceeding under section 2272 of the Code, for the appointment of a guardian of the property of the defendant Joseph Hickenbottom. The plaintiff is a son-in-law of the defendant. He bases his application upon the ground that the defendant is of unsound mind. The defendant for answer denies that he is of unsound mind.
There was a trial to a jury, which found that the defendant was of unsound mind, and the court appointed a guardian accordingly. The defendant appeals.
AFFIRMED.
McCoid & West, for appellant.
Slagle & McCrackin and D. P. Stubbs, for appellee.
The defendant, at the time of the trial, was seventy-eight years of age. It appears that until he was past seventy years of age, he was by no means deficient in business capacity, and succeeded in accumulating considerable property. It does not, indeed, appear, that at the time of the trial, he had wasted his property to any considerable extent. But he had become, bodily, very infirm and his mind, without any question, had shared somewhat in his physical disability. He seems himself at times to have been conscious of it, and expressed a wish that someone would take charge of his property and relieve him from all care in respect to it. Some arrangement could doubtless have been effected, whereby his property and himself could have been properly cared for without the appointment of a guardian, and especially without litigation, if there had been harmony among his children. But one of the painful facts, which appears from the record, is the want of such harmony. The testimony is very voluminous, as usually happens in a closely contested case of such a character. The witnesses differ considerably, but, on the whole, we may say, that it appears to us, that the evidence sustains the verdict. We have all arrived at this conclusion, upon a separate reading, and it is unnecessary to set out and discuss the evidence in detail. It is claimed, however, that the court erred in the admission and exclusion of evidence and in giving instructions.
I. One Elizabeth Smith, a daughter of the defendant, was introduced as a witness, who testified in these words: The defendant moved to exclude this evidence, but the court overruled the motion and he excepted.
We think that the evidence was not inadmissible. It tended, we think, in some slight degree, to show the defendant's mental condition. If he was laboring under a delusion in respect to his sons taking his property away from him, his statement tended to show that he was subject to delusion; and in any event, it showed that he felt unable to cope with his sons.
Some other objections are urged by the defendant's counsel, which we are not sure we fully comprehend. The evidence is said to be hearsay and very prejudicial. If the fact in question was as to whether the boys, so called, were taking the property, then evidence of anyone's statement that they were, would be hearsay, and not without prejudice to them. It is possible, indeed, that the boys, and not the defendant, are in reality making the defense in this case, but we are not allowed to make such assumption and be guided by it in the application of the law.
II. The same witness testified in these words: "He said, while we were there, that the boys had not treated him right; said he had money and did not know what went with it; he would like to get some person to come and take care of his property, and then he turned in and talked like a child." The defendant objected to the last clause because it contained the expression of an opinion. The court overruled the objection and the defendant excepted.
In our opinion the evidence was not subject to the objection It was not to be expected that the witness could repeat the defendant's words with entire accuracy, and if she could have done so, it might not have given an accurate idea of the defendant's state of mind. We can conceive that there was some what in his manner and general appearance which impressed the witness, and which she intended to describe, when she said he talked like a child. It is not easy to describe the imbecility of old age. The witness used an illustration. Descriptions are often given in this way. They may be indefinite and inadequate, but they are not usually regarded as expressions of opinion.
III. Non experts were allowed, against the objection of the defendant, to give their opinion that he was of unsound mind.
In this we think that there was no error. They were allowed to do so only after stating the facts upon which their opinion was based. We see no reason why the same rule should not apply as in cases of insanity; and that non-experts may give an opinion in such cases upon the facts stated by them is well settled in this State, whatever may be the rule elsewhere. Butler v. St. Louis Life Insurance Co., 45 Iowa 93. The departure from the ordinary rule, which excludes opinions by non-experts, is deemed justifiable upon the ground that the facts testified to in respect to insanity, must often, in the nature of the case, convey to the jury a very inadequate idea of the ultimate fact to be found by them, and upon the further ground that the insanity of a person can often be detected by a non-expert, who is familiar with the person, almost as readily as by an expert.
Mental weakness or imbecility, amounting to unsoundness, cannot always, and perhaps cannot usually, where it is not of a marked character, be adequately shown to a jury by a mere statement of facts. The difficulty, we think, is not less than in cases of insanity, which are not of a marked character. So, again, the value of technical knowledge in detecting imbecility, amounting to unsoundness, it seems to us, is not greater, and perhaps is less, than in detecting insanity.
IV. A physician was examined as an expert, and to him a hypothetical question was propounded. Certain facts and circumstances were supposed, and the witness was then...
To continue reading
Request your trial