Smith v. Hruby-Mills

• Citation: 380 P.3d 349,2016 UT App 159
• Decision Date: 29 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20150198–CA,20150198–CA
• Parties: Michael Smith, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Elizabeth Hruby–Mills and Salt Lake City, Respondents.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Utah

380 P.3d 349

2016 UT App 159

Michael Smith, Petitioner,

v.The Honorable Elizabeth Hruby–Mills and Salt Lake City, Respondents.

No. 20150198–CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed July 29, 2016

Jason Schatz, Attorney for Petitioner.

Brent M. Johnson and Nancy J. Sylvester, Attorneys for Respondent the Honorable Elizabeth Hruby–Mills.

Padma Veeru–Collings and Brandon E. Simmons, Attorneys for Respondent Salt Lake City.

Judge Stephen L. Roth authored this Opinion, in which Judge J. Frederic Voros Jr. and Justice John A. Pearce concurred.¹

Opinion

ROTH

, Judge:

¶1 Pursuant to rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

, Michael Smith petitions this court for extraordinary relief following a ruling against him by the Honorable Elizabeth Hruby–Mills on a motion to suppress evidence. Smith filed the motion during the course of an appeal to the district court from a misdemeanor criminal conviction in the Salt Lake City Justice Court. Although we conclude that he is eligible for relief, we deny Smith's petition because he has failed to persuade us that the district court abused its discretion.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Smith was arrested for driving under the influence, see Utah Code Ann. § 41–6a–502 (LexisNexis 2014)

, and failure to stay in one lane, see id. § 41–6a–710(1). Salt Lake City (the City) subsequently filed corresponding charges against Smith in the justice court.

¶3 Before trial, Smith successfully moved the justice court to suppress all evidence obtained following the initial traffic stop on the basis that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The City “exercise[d] its right to appeal [the justice court's] pre-trial order suppressing evidence” by filing a notice of appeal seeking a hearing de novo in the district court. See id. § 78A–7–118(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015).² The City's appeal was assigned to Third District Court Judge Hruby–Mills.³ After the de novo hearing, which included briefing, presentation of evidence, and argument, the district court judge denied Smith's motion to suppress and remanded the case to the justice court for further proceedings. Smith then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and was sentenced.⁴ The day after sentencing, Smith appealed his conviction to the district court under section 78A–7–118(1) of the Utah Code

and rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provide for a trial de novo in the district court on appeal from a judgment of the justice court.

¶4 Coincidently, Smith's appeal was again assigned to Judge Hruby–Mills.⁵ On appeal, Smith refiled the same motion to suppress evidence that the justice court had granted and the district court had denied on hearing de novo. In opposing the motion, the City argued that the matter had already been subject to a hearing de novo and that consideration of the motion to suppress a second time in Smith's trial de novo “would violate the doctrine of res judicata.” The district court acknowledged that Smith was “entitled to a trial de novo ... pursuant to Utah Code 78A–7–118(1)

” and that he was “entitled to have the District Court hear ‘any pretrial evidentiary matters the court deems necessary,’ pursuant to rule 38(e)(2) [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure],” but ultimately the court concluded that “in this case” it was “not ... necessary” to hear Smith's motion to suppress because “the same [motion] ... ha[d] previously been argued before and decided” by the court. Smith now files this petition for extraordinary relief seeking an order directing the district court to consider his motion to suppress in the context of a trial de novo and to assign the case to a judge other than Judge Hruby–Mills. Both the City and Judge Hruby–Mills (collectively, Respondents) oppose Smith's petition, arguing that either res judicata or the law of the case doctrine—or both—bar Smith from relitigating the motion to suppress as part of his trial de novo in the district court.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 Smith petitions this court for extraordinary relief under rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

. In his petition, Smith challenges the district court's decision not to hear his motion to suppress on the ground that the court misinterpreted the applicable statute and prior case law. Under rule 65B, Smith's petition may succeed only if “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available,” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), and upon showing, among other things, that the district court “abused its discretion,” id. R. 65B(d)(2).

¶6 The first portion of that standard is established. Because there is no right of appeal from a district court's de novo review of a justice court decision, Smith has no other “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” from the district court's decision in these circumstances, and can therefore seek extraordinary relief by petition.⁶ Id. R. 65B(a)

. Our decision to grant relief, however, depends on a number of factors including:

the egregiousness of the alleged error, the significance of the legal issue ..., the severity of the consequences occasioned by the alleged error, and additional factors. The scope of review is limited to determining whether the respondent [in this case, the district court judge] has regularly pursued its authority.

Salt Lake City v. McCleve , 2008 UT 41, ¶ 5, 190 P.3d 1240

(alteration and omission in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶7 We first discuss section 78A–7–118 of the Utah Code

, which provides the processes for both a hearing de novo and trial de novo of an appeal from a decision made in the justice court. Next, we consider the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and how they may apply in the context of a trial de novo. We conclude that although law of the case is applicable to an appeal from justice court, res judicata is not. We then turn to Smith's request for extraordinary relief and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion and we therefore deny Smith the relief he requests.

I. Appeal from a Justice Court Ruling¶8 Section 78A–7–118 of the Utah Code

establishes two types of appeal from justice court: a trial de novo and a hearing de novo. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A–7–118 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015).

¶9 A defendant has a right to a trial de novo in the district court on appeal from a justice court conviction. Subsections (1) through (3) govern a defendant's right to appeal a conviction and describe the process a defendant must take to obtain a “trial de novo in the district court.” Id. § 78A–7–118(1)

-(3). Subsection (1) states that “a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court [after] ... (a) sentencing ... or (b) a plea of guilty or no contest in the justice court that is held in abeyance,” while subsections (2) and (3) address particular circumstances related to the process that are not at issue here. Id. § 78A–7–118(1)(a)-(b)

; see also

id. § 78A–7–118(2) -(3). Smith has appealed his conviction after his justice court sentencing.

¶10 A defendant in some circumstances and the prosecution in other circumstances also have a right to a hearing de novo in the district court after an adverse ruling, generally where important rights are involved that cannot be remedied by the defendant through a trial de novo or would not be remedied at all by the prosecution. Id. § 78A–7–118(4)

-(6). For example, under subsection (4) a defendant “is entitled to a hearing de novo in the district court” from a justice court's decision to revoke probation, to enter “a judgment of guilt” for violation of the terms of a plea in abeyance and any sentence entered after the entry of such a judgment, or to deny “a motion to withdraw a plea.” Id. § 78A–7–118(4)(a)-(d). Under subsection (5), the prosecution “is entitled to a hearing de novo” from a justice court decision that would halt or seriously impede the prosecution of the case, such as an order “holding invalid any part of a statute or ordinance,” an order allowing the defendant to “withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest,” and certain orders that essentially end the prosecution as a matter of law, including a “final judgment of dismissal,” “an order arresting judgment,” and “an order terminating the prosecution” on the basis of “double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial.” Id. § 78A–7–118(5)(a)-(d), (g). As relevant to the circumstances here, the prosecution may appeal “a pretrial order excluding evidence.” Id. § 78A–7–118(5)(e). Subsection (5) states that “[t]he prosecutor is entitled to a hearing de novo in the district court on ... a pretrial order excluding evidence, when the prosecutor certifies that exclusion of that evidence impairs continued prosecution of a class B misdemeanor,” such as the class B misdemeanor DUI charged in this case. Id. § 78A–7–118(5)(f).⁷

¶11 The question here is whether under this statutory scheme Smith is entitled to relitigate, as part of his district court trial de novo, the motion to suppress evidence that the district court resolved against him in a hearing de novo originated by the City in the course of the justice court process. The concept of the trial de novo as “a complete retrial upon new evidence,” Pledger v. Cox , 626 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1981)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), where the defendant has “a new opportunity to have a trier of fact review the case unfettered by prior factual findings,” Taylorsville City v. Adkins , 2006 UT App 374, ¶ 6, 145 P.3d 1161, arguably is broad enough on its face to encompass the sort of “fresh start” that Smith argues ought to include a rehearing on his motion to suppress evidence, free from the burden of the district court's prior decision on the hearing de novo, see, e.g. , Bernat v. Allphin , 2005 UT 1, ¶ 31, 106 P.3d 707 (“The outcome of the prior justice court proceeding plays no part in the trial de novo....”); Pledger , 626 P.2d at 416 (“The words ‘de novo,’ mean[ ] literally ‘anew, afresh, a second time.’ ” (citation omitted)); State v. Hinson , 966 P.2d...