Smith v. Huntsville Times Co., Inc.
Decision Date | 12 March 2004 |
Citation | 888 So.2d 492 |
Parties | Edward W. SMITH v. The HUNTSVILLE TIMES COMPANY, INC., and David Person. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Sharon A. Johnston, Huntsville, for appellant.
E. Cutter Hughes and Kimberly Bessiere Martin of Bradley Arant Rose & White, LLP, Huntsville, for appellees.
Edward W. Smith appeals from a summary judgment in favor of The Huntsville Times Company, Inc. ("the Times"), and David Person, an editorial writer for the Times, in Smith's defamation action against them. We affirm.
On October 27, 2000, the Times published on its editorial page the following "Commentary" written by Person:
(Emphasis added.) In October 2000, Smith owned and leased a number of "residential duplex buildings" in Glen Park.
On July 27, 2001, Smith filed a three-count complaint against the Times and Person. The counts alleged (1) "defamation/libel," (2) "false light invasion of privacy," and (3) "defamation involving profession." The Times and Person moved for a summary judgment on the ground that Smith is a "public official," and, therefore, that the defendants are entitled to the constitutional protection recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). In its judgment granting the motion, the trial court stated, in part:
The principal issues Smith raises on appeal are whether the actual-malice standard applies to his claims, and, if so, whether the evidence he produced in opposition to the summary-judgment motion provided sufficient evidence of actual malice.
The threshold question whether the actual-malice standard applies in a defamation action involves a two-pronged inquiry — whether the defendant is a public official and, if so, whether the allegedly defamatory comments related to his conduct as a public official.1 This is so, because "the Constitution protects statements made about public officials when those statements concern `anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office ....'" Soke v. Plain Dealer, 69 Ohio St.3d 395, 397, 632 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (1994) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964)) (emphasis added); see Roberts v. Dover, 525 F.Supp. 987, 989 (M.D.Tenn.1981). This formulation includes "personal attributes," regardless of whether they "may also [reflect] the official's private character." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77, 85 S.Ct. 209. This is so, because "[f]ew personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation." Id. Thus, the first prong concerns the defamation plaintiff's status, while the second prong concerns the "nexus between that position and the conduct that is the subject of the defamation." Note, The Status/Conduct Continuum: Injecting Rhyme and Reason into Contemporary Public Official Defamation Doctrine, 84 Va. L.Rev. 871, 874 (1998) (emphasis added). Such threshold determinations are questions of law for the court. See Ex parte Rudder, 507 So.2d 411, 416 (Ala.1987); Fulton v. Advertiser Co., 388 So.2d 533, 536 (Ala.1980).
Smith does not contend that the first prong of the public-official analysis is not satisfied. He does not argue, in other words, that a police officer is not a public official for defamation purposes. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968) ( ); Hailey v. KTBS, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex.Ct.App.1996) ( ). He states, however, that he was "not on duty" at the time the incident in the Commentary is alleged to have occurred, and, therefore, that "Person's article defamed [him] in his private business." Smith's brief, at 28-29. "The alleged actions... which were the subject of Person's article were," he insists, "all actions connected to his private business as a landowner and landlord in the Glen Park area of Huntsville." Smith's brief, at 29. Thus, Smith contends, the allegedly defamatory statements were "not related to his `official conduct,'" for the purposes of the second prong of the public-official analysis. Smith's brief, at 28 (Smith's emphasis). We disagree.
The Commentary never mentions Smith's status as a property owner or as a landlord. It does, however, make frequent references to Smith's status as a police officer. Indeed, the Commentary is titled: "Can Glen Park residents believe in the badge ?" (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the Commentary apprises the reader that Smith owns property in the neighborhood or suggests that Griffin's allegations relate in any manner to real estate. Indeed, the Commentary suggests no reason for Smith's presence in Glen Park, other than as a police officer.
The fallacy of Smith's argument is further reflected by the procedural history underlying the dispute. A few days after the alleged incident, Griffin and her brother, Lavender, visited the Huntsville Police Department ("the Department") and filed a complaint against Smith. Her complaint alleged, among other things, that on the evening of October 5, 2000, Smith yelled derogatory accusations at her, accusing her of prostitution and disparaging her ethnicity. Smith did this, Griffin alleged, "...
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