Smith v. Idaho State University Federal Credit Union

• Decision Date: 08 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 13810,13810
• Citation: 103 Idaho 245,646 P.2d 1016
• Parties: L. Jean SMITH, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1016

646 P.2d 1016

103 Idaho 245

L. Jean SMITH, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13810.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 8, 1982.

John K. Looze of Dial, Looze & May, Pocatello, for defendant-appellant.

Gus Carr Anderson, Pocatello, for plaintiff-respondent.

SWANSTROM, Judge.

Idaho State University Federal Credit Union appeals from summary judgment in favor of L. Jean Smith. The issues on this appeal center around the court's finding that certain deposits with the Credit Union were Jean's separate property and were not subject to a security interest claimed by the Credit Union for loans made to Jean's husband, Alfred. We hold that the court erred in awarding summary judgment to Jean. We reverse and remand.

Alfred and Jean were husband and wife from 1971 to November 1, 1978, when they were divorced. During this marriage monies were deposited with the Credit Union and now comprise the following three items claimed by both parties: one Credit Union certificate of deposit issued in 1977 for $3,210, another issued in 1978 for $6,350.97-both in the names "L. Jean Smith or Alfred E. Smith,"-and a savings account which was opened in 1971 and which contained approximately $8,439 when this suit was brought. It is disputed whether the savings account stands in Jean's name only or whether Alfred is also named as an owner.

Shortly after her divorce from Alfred, Jean brought this suit to compel the Credit Union to pay over the above funds to her. She alleged that all monies on deposit were her separate property. The Credit Union defended, alleging it had made a series of loans to Alfred that were community obligations on which Alfred had defaulted. It alleged Alfred had pledged all deposits held by the Credit Union as security for the unpaid loans. Alfred, once a defendant in this suit, was dismissed after he was adjudicated a bankrupt.

Affidavits, depositions, and answers to interrogatories were filed with the district court. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The court found that (1) the savings account and certificates of deposit were Jean's separate property, and (2) no joint tenancy in the accounts had been created because Alfred's name was added to the accounts only for convenience and without intent to grant him any property interest. Based on these findings, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Jean, and denied the Credit Union's motion for summary judgment.

The Credit Union contends that the trial court erred in granting Jean summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute. It argues that summary judgment is not available where the moving party's credibility is placed in issue by inconsistences among her affidavits, deposition, and answers to interrogatories.

The trial court's determination, that the savings account and certificates of deposit were Jean's separate property, must have been based on Jean's assertion that the money came from the proceeds of a settlement agreement she and a former husband had made, and from an award she had received in settlement of a workmen's compensation claim. Jean, however, was unable to recall the amount of her marriage settlement or which account was obtained with the workmen's compensation award. In addition, she gave differing statements of a number of other facts, including the date of her marriage to Alfred and the date of her injury on the job, and what property she claimed to be her separate property.

Difficulties in remembering relevant facts, and the giving of contradictory testimony are factors to be considered in determining a witness' credibility. E.g., State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904, 911, 478 P.2d 284, 291 (1970); cf. Smith v. Howard, 76 Idaho 235, 240, 280 P.2d 1060, 1063 (1955). Summary judgment is not proper when the relevant pleadings, depositions, and affidavits raise any question of the credibility of witnesses. Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 918, 500 P.2d 218, 219 (1972); Merrill v. Duffy Reed Construction Co., 82 Idaho 410, 414, 353 P.2d 657, 659 (1960).

The credibility issue is material here because it is presumed that property acquired after marriage is community property. Estate of Freeburn v. Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 848, 555 P.2d 385, 388 (1976). It appears that a determination in favor of Jean would require that issues of tracing and commingling be resolved in her favor based upon her testimony. In summary judgment proceedings the facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which might be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 300, 612 P.2d 142, 143 (1980). Applying this rule to a case where, as here, an issue has been raised concerning the credibility of a key witness, we hold that summary judgment is inappropriate. We conclude that summary judgment in Jean's favor should be reversed, and the cause remanded.

On remand, it appears that the district court may be required to determine whether the workmen's compensation proceeds are community or separate property. During the pendency of this appeal our Supreme Court decided Cook v. Cook, 102 Idaho 651, 637 P.2d 799, (1981). In Cook the court held that to the extent workmen's compensation payments are made to compensate a spouse for loss of earning capacity during marriage, the payments are community property. On remand, the district court is instructed to consider possible applicability of Cook to the facts of this case.

For further guidance to the trial court, we will discuss the Credit Union's contention that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the applicable law of joint accounts. The court, in its decision granting summary judgment, relied upon Chase v. Reid, 82 Idaho 1, 348 P.2d 473 (1960), for the rule that a joint tenancy is not created where an account was made joint purely for convenience and without intent to create any property interest. This is good law, Greene v. Cooke, 96 Idaho 48, 55, 524 P.2d 176,...